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THE CASE FOR CYBER COERCION 
TARA A. KEMMER 
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Major Professor: Thomas Berger, Professor of International Relations 
ABSTRACT 
Are cyber capabilities a useful method for coercive diplomacy? If so, what 
conditions favor successful cyber coercion to produce a desired victim response? This 
research explores how cyber coercion can be used as a tool of statecraft to change an 
adversary’s behavior and examines two cases over three temporal values. Examining the 
two cases of North Korea versus Sony and Russia versus Estonia illustrates practical 
lessons about the constraints and abilities of the employment of cyber coercion as well as 
how victim responses operate on a spectrum and can change over time.   
 In examining George’s seven factors that favor coercive diplomacy and applying 
them to these cases, this research reveals four additional factors that ought to be included 
when addressing the dynamics that contribute to a victim changing their behavior in 
response to cyber coercion. The difference between a low-level attack (e.g. web 
defacement) compared with a high-level attack (e.g. paralyzing backbone servers) 
communicates two vastly different levels of threat to a victim and incurs extremely 
different costs for the victim. These technical aspects of cyber statecraft and their 
ramifications for cyber coercion are not covered by George’s earlier works on coercive 
diplomacy, as few people in the 1990s were even considering cyber as a threat landscape.  
 
v 
This research does not provide one generalizable theory of how to conduct cyber 
coercion; rather, it provides a Utilitarian theory that identifies additional factors that favor 
cyber coercion and contributes to a conditional generalization. Further, it introduces the 
idea of examining this change in behavior over time to properly assess the impact of 
cyber coercion on the totality of the victim’s behavior. Extending the time intervals 
reveals additional critical data necessary to fully analyze the nature of a cyber coercion 
dyad. Finally, it provides a hybrid method to attain attribution by fusing social science 
methodology with cybersecurity techniques. Together, this data and method serve to 
correct the conventional wisdom on two influential cases; this research traces the process 
that proves why a correction for each case is warranted; and, it shows how the choices an 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
"With cyberweapons, a war theoretically could be waged without casualties or political 
risk, so their attractiveness is great -- maybe so irresistible that nations are tempted to 
use them before such aggression is justified."1 
 
“In comparison to the nuclear revolution in military affairs, strategic studies of the cyber 
domain are chronologically equivalent to 1960 but conceptually more equivalent to 1950. 
Analysts are still not clear about the lessons of offense, defense, deterrence, escalation, 
norms, arms control, or how they fit together into a national strategy.”2 
 
 Thucydides teaches us that the strong may dominate the weak and that power 
projection can result in victory in conflict, but that naked aggression and poor strategy 
can also backfire horribly.3 “[I]n asymmetric conflicts the strong actor should almost 
always win”4 but at times, the comparably weaker actor prevails. With the advent of 
cyberspace, and the associated vulnerabilities and audience costs it presents, weaker 
states have the ability to successfully engage in cyber coercion.5 The potential for 
 
1 Lin, Patrick, Fritz Allhoff, and Neil Rowe. "Is It Possible to Wage a Just Cyberwar?" The 
Atlantic Monthly, June 5, 2012.  Found at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/06/is-it-possible-to-wage-a-just-
cyberwar/258106  and accessed September 4, 2013. 
2 Nye Jr., Joseph. “”Nuclear Lessons for Cybersecurity?” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 
2011. p.19. 
3 Strassler, Robert B. and Richard Crawley. 1998. The Landmark Thucydides: a Comprehensive 
Guide to the Peloponnesian War. New York: Simon & Schuster. Specifically, compare the 
difference in the results for Athens versus Melos and Athens versus Sicily.  In the Siege of Melos 
the Athenian power projection and Athen’s rejection of the moral and just arguments from the 
Melians resulted in annihilation for the Melians. Conversely, the Athenian Sicilian Expedition,  
was a monumental disaster for the Athenians that resulted in lasting damage and foretold the 
eventual downfall of Athens.   
4 Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict." 
International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1. Summer 2001. p. 96 
5 Political realism contains three key elements: (1) states exist in an anarchical system; (2) all 
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leveling of the playing field in what some call a “Fifth Dimension of Warfare,”6 the cyber 
realm, changes the relationship between adversaries of unequal power. Cyber coercion 
introduces the opportunity for limited offensive cyber capabilities to be used also as a 
below-the-level-of-armed-conflict tool of statecraft in crisis and non-crisis situations. 
Cyber coercion provides another avenue for competition between adversaries, 
augmenting more traditional options like economic sanctions and other nonviolent 
activities.  Here, the stronger power does not necessarily prevail. In looking at two cases 
of state's use of cyber capabilities for coercion, one state versus state, Russia against 
Estonia, and one state versus a non-state actor, North Korea against Sony Pictures 
Entertainment, this research examines what factors contribute to a victim’s response to an 
aggressor’s use of cyberspace.  
 The conventional wisdom on the impact of cyber statecraft, also referred to as 
information and communication technologies (ICTs),7 on international relations, largely 
falls into two bipolar camps that began nearly thirty years ago: pessimists and optimists.  
The first wave pessimists believe “an electronic Pearl Harbor is waiting to happen,” as 
Winn Schwartau, a pioneering cybersecurity expert, warned in testimony before Congress 
 
states have a capacity to harm one another; and (3) states seek to increase their relative power to 
deter other states from attacking and/or to compel other states into making concessions.  This is 
why Realists expect states naturally to exercise cyber statecraft options.  
6 Remarks as delivered by Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, Air Force Chief of Staff, to the Armed 
Forces Communications-Electronics Association, Washington, April 25, 1995.  Located at: 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/5th-dimension/iw.htm  and accessed on June 1, 2018. See 
also “Cyberwar:  War in the fifth domain.” The Economist,  June 1, 2010.   
7 While the term “cyber” in the United States has a broad, encompassing definition of all actions 
in cyberspace, the United Nations and the European Union use the term information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) to refer to cyber activities. For purposes of this paper, the 
term “cyber” will be the prevailing usage, but ICT may be employed when using references and 
quotations from European and United Nations sources.   
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in 1991.8 Similarly, an early and influential study of the issue published by RAND in 
1993 proclaimed "Cyberwar Is Coming!”9  It is the central tenet of this camp that cyber 
represents a fundamental transformation in warfare. Alternatively, the second camp, the 
optimists, consists of those who believe that cyber capabilities are simply another weapon 
to be used alongside conventional military action. This second wave believes that cyber 
does not represent a watershed moment in the conduct of warfare and coalesces around 
the question, “...how authentic can a war be when things don't blow up?”10 This research 
seeks to contribute to a burgeoning third wave of literature11 by providing a Utilitarian 
theory that seeks to stake out an intermediate position, one that demonstrates utility of 
cyber statecraft while realistically providing parameters for its degrees of effectiveness as 
a tool of statecraft.  
What is coercion and how does it apply to cyber statecraft?  The figure below 
shows the components of cyber statecraft. To start with definitions, cyberspace is the 
 
8 Schwartau, Winn.  Testimony at Hearing before the Subcommittee on Technology and 
Competitiveness of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 
Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, First Session, June 27, 1991, page 2. Located at: 
https://winnschwartau.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Testimoney-1991-Computer-
security_hearing.pdf  and accessed on December 5, 2019. 
9 Cyberwar Is Coming!” John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt  RAND Corporation analysts 
10 Stein, Jeff.  "Book review: 'Cyber War' by Richard Clarke."  The Washington Post, May 23, 
2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/21/AR2010052101860.html 
11 Third wave scholars include:  Timothy J. Junio. “How Probable is Cyber War? Bringing IR 
Theory Back into the Cyber Conflict Debate.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 2013. 36:1, 125-133; 
ed. A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012. Washington DC: Cyber Conflict 
Studies Association, 2013; Smeets, Max. “The Strategic Promise of Offensive Cyber 
Operations.” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 3 (FALL 2018), pp. 90-113; and, Slayton, 
Rebecca. “What is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance?” International Security 41:3. Winter 
2016/2017. p. 72-109  
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terrain; cyber capabilities or cyberweapons are the means; cyberattacks are the method,12  
and cyber coercion-to-cyber warfare is the spectrum of activity that describes increased 
tensions occurring in cyberspace. The red box in Figure 1. below illustrates Schelling’s 
definition of coercion, which consists of two forms: active coercion which is defined as 
compellence, and passive coercion defined as deterrence.13 As he notes:  
Deterrence and compellence differ in a number of respects, most of them  
corresponding to something like the difference between statics and dynamics.  
Deterrence involves setting the stage—by announcement, by rigging the trip-wire,  
by incurring the obligation—and waiting. The overt act is up to the opponent. The  
stage-setting can often be nonintrusive, nonhostile, nonprovocative. The act that is  
intrusive, hostile, or provocative is usually the one to be deterred; the deterrent  
threat only changes the consequences if the act in question—the one to be  
deterred—is then taken. Compellence, in contrast, usually involves initiating an  
action (or an irrevocable commitment to action) that can cease, or become  
harmless, only if the opponent responds. The overt act, the first step, is up to the  
side that makes the compellent threat. To deter, one digs in, or lays a minefield,  
and waits—in the interest of inaction. To compel, one gets up enough momentum  
(figuratively, but sometimes literally) to make the other act to avoid collision.  
…Deterrence tends to be indefinite in its timing. …Compellence has to be  
definite.14 
 
For George, coercion is employing “rational persuasion and accommodation as 
well as coercive threats to encourage the adversary to either comply with the demands or 
to work out an acceptable compromise.”15  It also “needs to be distinguished from 
 
12 According to Herb Lin, et al, “cyberattack refers to actions—perhaps taken over an extended 
period of time—to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy adversary computer systems or 
networks or the information and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks.” 
Cited in William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam and Herbert S. Lin, eds., ‘Technology, Policy, Law 
and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities.’ Washington, DC: 
The National Academies Press, 2009. p. 19.  
13 Schelling, Thomas. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. p. 70-72. 
14 Schelling, Thomas. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. p. 71-72. 
15 George, Alexander L. and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. p. 7. 
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deterrence, a strategy that employs threats to dissuade an adversary from undertaking a 
damaging action not yet initiated.16  When applied to cyber statecraft, George’s definition 
artificially limits research by excluding deterrence. In a field where, less than ten years 
ago, a scholar noted that “no comparable comprehensive assessment of the impact of 
cyber warfare capabilities exists. Outside the slowly emerging policy literature there is 
limited scholarly work on the topic, leaving important theoretical questions 
unexamined,”17 Schelling’s more expansive definition including deterrence is more apt.  
Since cyber coercion can also cause secondary deterrence effects, as will be discussed 
later in this research, this research chooses to use Schelling’s broader definition, while 
relying on George for his identification of the conditions that favor coercive diplomacy.  
A visual representation of how Schelling’s definition of coercion fits into cyber 
statecraft is depicted in Figure 1. As shown, cyber statecraft touches various realms to 
include military, diplomacy, commercial industry, intelligence and law enforcement. This 
research is bounded to the military, diplomatic and commercial spaces, as shown by the 
blue lines, and does not address intelligence and law enforcement, which is cyber 
espionage and cybercrime, respectively, and is illustrated by grey lines. Within the 
bounds of this research, a state may choose to use the military or diplomatic government 
entities to conduct cyber coercion, or the state may choose/may allow a commercial or 
private industry to conduct cyber coercion (as referenced in Jason Healey’s Spectrum of 
 
16 Ibid. 
17 Liff, Adam. “Cyberwar: A New ‘Absolute Weapon’? The Proliferation of Cyberwarfare 
Capabilities and Interstate War.” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3, 401–428, June 
2012. p. 402. 
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State Responsibility).  
 





  MILITARY  DIPLOMACY  COMMERCIAL  INTELLIGENCE  LAW ENFOR 
              (cyberespionage)   (cybercrime) 
     
 
   COERCION  
   




This research will show the following: 1) that cyber coercion can have significant 
impact on a victim’s behavior, either positive or negative, when measured over time, 
more so than has been recognized in the literature thus far, and certainly of sufficient 
magnitude to warrant a serious reconsideration of the optimistic assessments of some 
analysts and scholars (i.e. the Second Wave literature). And, 2) cyber coercion is 
complicated, and while it offers some advantages for a would-be coercer, an expanded 
range of conditions must be met to favor successful coercion beyond those that must be 
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met to allow for success for more conventional forms of coercion as described by 





Research Question: Importance for Academia and Policy Makers  
 Are cyber capabilities a useful method for coercive diplomacy? Under what 
conditions can cyber coercion be employed to produce a desired victim response? Are 
there conditions that are ripe for cyber coercion as opposed to economic sanctions or 
diplomatic moral arguments and threats? Should states and non-state actors invest in 
creating cyber capabilities or do they fail to compel or deter victims? Should weak, small 
or regional powers invest in cyber capabilities, or should they put their limited resources 
toward becoming a nuclear power or increasing air or sea power? Does cyber offer a 
level of power projection that a state could not otherwise exercise? Or does the utility of 
employing cyber tactics only have a cost-benefit when it focuses on other aspects like  
cybercrime? 
 Research thus far on the coercive effectiveness of cyber exploitation in relations 
among states has been focused largely in two camps: the pessimists and the optimists. 
The pessimists, in the first wave, emphasize assessing the value of cyber in the conduct 
of war-making, viewing it as revolutionizing how states conduct warfare and claiming it 
will cause widespread destruction. The optimists, on the other hand, representing the 
second wave, claim that cyber threats are exaggerated, that cyber conflict is unlikely to 
result in lethal violence and therefore it is little more than a nuisance.18 “To constitute 
cyber warfare an action must be a potentially lethal, instrumental and political act of 
 
18 Gartzke, E. The Myth of Cyberwar. International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2, Fall 2013, p. 41–73. 
Liff, A.  "Cyberwar: A New 'Absolute Weapon'? The Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities 
and Interstate War." Journal of Strategic Studies 35(3): 401-428, 2012.  Rid, T. "Cyber War Will 
Not Take Place." Journal of Strategic Studies 35(1): 5-32, 2012.   
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force, conducted through the use of software.”19  
 Each of these cohorts, the pessimists and the optimists, provides useful 
perspectives on the strategic nature of employing cyber capabilities, but each camp is too 
extreme and fails to see the middle road where cyber capabilities can be an effective and 
efficient method of statecraft.  This dissertation raises a new set of questions and offers a 
deeper examination that provides a theoretical framework for effectively addressing the 
arguments of both the pessimists and optimists with respect to the usefulness of 
employing cyber coercion against soft, countervalue targets to gain a desired response 
from a victim as part of a state's strategy. Further, it will identify and examine what 
factors influence certain victim outcomes and how the coercive use of cyber capabilities 
can impose costs that are less than lethal but greater than mere nuisance.  
 Several actions in the cyber realm are below the level of armed conflict during 
peacetime, similar to economic sanctions, but like all aggressive actions and tools of 
coercive diplomacy, in cyber statecraft there exists the potential to increase tension and 
instigate armed conflict.20 Cyber statecraft spans the spectrum of options from peacetime 
diplomacy to tension to crisis or even to outright war-making and provides a cyber 
 
19 Rid, Thomas. “Cyberwar May Not Happen.” Located on the author’s website at:  
https://ridt.co/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Rid-KCL-comment.pdf  and accessed on June 3, 
2021.  
20 On May 5, 2019,  the Israeli Defense Forces tweeted from its official, verified account: “We 
thwarted an attempted Hamas cyber offensive against Israeli targets. Following our successful 
cyber defensive operation, we targeted a building where the Hamas cyber operatives work. 
HamasCyberHQ.exe has been removed.” This was watershed moment in the history of cyber 
aggression because it was the first time a kinetic strike was employed solely in response to a 
cyberattack in real-time against the hackers, but of course this action must be viewed within the 
larger construct of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The IDF tweet can be viewed here: 
https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1125066395010699264.   
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capability to supplement or supplant each method to solving conflict. Further, this study 
will discuss the likely implications for this use in practical policy applications. This 
interdisciplinary approach, drawing from the fields of political science and cybersecurity 
and computer operations, will improve our understanding of the coercion dynamic in the 
cyber realm and how the introduction of new technologies can be used effectively by 
states in the international system for political means.  
The Study of Cyber Coercion  
 Successful coercion is hard, but not impossible. “In any crisis, the policy maker 
must decide what combination of persuasion, coercion, and accommodation to employ 
and in what sequence.”21 George helpfully reminds us of the goal in studying coercive 
diplomacy, namely:  
“The systematic comparison we undertake is not intended to formulate a 
sweeping set of generalizations that purport to explain in a simple way why 
coercive diplomacy sometimes succeeds and at other times fails. The phenomena 
of coercive diplomacy is too complex and the conditions and variables at play too 
numerous to permit formulation of such generalizations. …This will call…for 
conditional generalizations that identify those factors and variables noted in our 
case studies that, if present, favor the success of the strategy.”22 
 
 There are ample examples in modern political literature of failed coercion using 
conventional arms threats and the reasoning for the failures ranging from misinterpreting 
 
21 George, Alexander and William E. Simons, eds. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. p. 277.  
22 George, Alexander L. and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. p. 268. 
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reputation costs to poor target choice and execution.23 In the cyber domain, with the 
added factors of secrecy and attribution complications, successful coercion can be even 
more difficult to achieve, but it is still possible.  
In cyber coercion it is imperative to understand that each cyber dyad is unique, 
that they are motivated by different factors and that these differences can be leveraged in 
the course of a coercive act. A successful strategy for cyber coercion will require an 
adversary-specific approach.  This approach includes understanding the different 
motivations and particular variables in a dyadic game to effectively use cyber as a tool to 
achieve a strategic objective.  “Coercive diplomacy is a flexible  strategy that is highly 
context-dependent;”24. as opposed to other types of coercion, cyber coercion has the 
added factor of mystery. In cyberspace, one is unable to see an aggressor’s armory to 
calculate the extent of the hurt they might endure when threatened, and one may not even 
know their networks have been breached until they are confronted with the threat. 
Coercion can occur before the use of the force, through the use of force, or via a 
combination of diplomacy and force, with scholars disagreeing among these three 
 
23 Examples are included in the following:  Sechser, Todd “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and 
Asymmetric Power, International Organization 64, no. 4, October 2010: p. 627–60; Robert Pape, 
Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Cornell University Press, 1996. George, 
Alexander.  Forceful Persuasion. Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Publisher, 
1991. p. 77; Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive 
Diplomacy, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994; and Byman, D and M Waxman. The 
Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might. UK: 
Cambridge University Press, RAND, 2002.   
24 George, Alexander.  Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. 
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991.  p. 76-81.  See also Alexander L. 
George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1994. p. 291. 
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definitions25.  For purposes of this study, we will use the broad definition that 
encompasses all three options.   
 Bratton divides coercion into four main categories, the type of threat, the role of 
force, the actors and the definition of success, in Tables 1-4 below represents these 
distinctions as well as identifies the authors in the literature who concur:26 
 
 
What types of threats are involved 
in coercion? 
Authors who concur 
Only compellent threats (i.e., coercion 
is different from deterrence) 
Alexander George, Janice Gross Stein, 
Robert Pape 
Both compellent and deterrent threats  
Thomas Schelling, Daniel Ellsberg, 
Wallace Thies, Lawrence Freedman, 
Daniel Byman, and Matthew Waxman 
Table 1. Types of Threats27 
 
 
What role does force play in 
coercion? 
Authors who concur 
Coercion before the use of force (i.e. 
coercive threats made through 
diplomacy) 
George, Gross Stein 
Coercion only through force Pape 
Coercion through diplomacy and force Schelling, Thies 





25 Bratton, P. "When is coercion successful? And why can't we agree on it?" Naval War College 
Review, 58 (3). p. 103. 
26 Ibid. p. 103. 
27 Ibid p. 100.   
28 Ibid. p. 103. 
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Who are the actors? Authors who concur 
Best thought of as identical, unitary, 
rational calculating actors 
Schelling, George, Pape, and Daniel 
Drezner 
Rational actors can be somewhat 
different (democracies vs. 
authoritarian governments) or are 
made up of a few simple parts (govt, 
military, public, etc.) 
Pape, Risa Brooks, Byman and 
Waxman 
Complex governments that both 
threaten and respond to threats 
differently29 
Thies, David Auerswald 
Table 3. Actors30 
 
How is success defined? Authors who concur 
Full compliance with coercer’s 
demands, independent of any other 
factors 
Pape 
Need to distinguish degrees of 
success. Possible to have partial 
success or secure secondary 
objectives without securing primary 
objectives 
Kimberly Elliot, Drezner, Karl Mueller, 
and Byman and Waxman 




29 Bratton uses the term “complex governments” to refer to regimes where regime composition 
and internal political struggles play a significant role and cannot be considered a “rational, 
calculating actor.”  He notes: “the coercer needs to know the ‘political realities within the target 
state’s government and to shape their policies in a way that maximizes the influence of those in 
the target state’s government whose hopes and fears are most compatible with the coercer’s 
objectives.’ In some cases there will be factions that are compatible with the coercer’s desires, in 
others not.” In Bratton, P. "When is coercion successful?  And why can't we agree on it?"  Naval 
War College Review, 58 (3). p. 111.  
30 Bratton, P. "When is coercion successful?  And why can't we agree on it?"  Naval War College 
Review, 58 (3). p. 108.  Pape sees the target as a unitary rational actor, but in Bombing to Win, he 
also notes differences in the reaction in the cases of Japan and Germany in WWII.   
31 Ibid. 111.  
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 As noted, for purposes of this study, a broad definition modeled on Schelling that 
includes both compellence and deterrence will be employed in designing the coercion 
framework. Schelling notes, "the threat that compels rather than deters often requires that 
the punishment be administered until the other acts, rather than if he acts.32 
 Beyond the definition of coercion, there is the concept of cyber coercion.  For 
purposes of this research, cyber coercion is defined as the “threat (implied or explicit) or 
limited use of [computer network operations] CNO to motivate a change in behavior by 
another actor that may involve cyber operations on their own or in conjunction with other 
coercive actions.”33  For purposes of this study, we will use the terms “computer network 
operations (CNO),” which is the modern definition, often used interchangeably with 
“cyber operations,” and refers broadly to any activity taking place via computer 
networks.34 Key questions in the application of coercive measures in the cyber realm 
include:  
1. Under what conditions does cyber coercion produce particular victim responses 
on a spectrum from total acquiescence to complete refusal, or a combination in 
between?   
 
32 Schelling, Thomas. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. 
33 Hodgson, Quentin, Logan Ma, Krystyna Marcinek and Karen Schwindt. “Fighting Shadows  in 
the Dark: Understanding and Countering Coercion in Cyberspace.” Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 
2019. Located at: 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2900/RR2961/RAND_RR2961
.pdf  
34 For a primer on computer networks, please see Kurose, J. F. and K. W. Ross. Computer 
Networking: A Top-Down Approach, 5th Edition. New York: Addison Wesley, 2010.  
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2. For successful cyber coercion, is there a difference in following our tradition to 
counterforce and discriminate in targeting to focus on military targets, or is it 
more fruitful to focus on soft, countervalue (including non-military government) 
or targets? 
3. How does cyber coercion and victim response change over time? 
 
Cyber Coercion Conventional Wisdom 
 Cyberspace actions are commonly defined as operations that disrupt, deny, 
destroy, or degrade access to some networked asset. Strategic analysis of the cyber realm 
has experienced three waves:  the alarmist/pessimist first wave, the silencing/optimist 
second wave, and now the pragmatist/utilitarian third wave.  The principal inquiry at the 
core of this research is a multi-case qualitative examination of the conditions under which 
cyberspace provides an avenue for coercive diplomacy; the purpose of this analysis is 
two-fold:  both theory-building and hypothesis testing.35   
 Is cyber coercion sufficient to yield a particular response from a victim and, if so, 
how?  The conventional wisdom largely consists of two polarized camps that each 
approach the question of cyber coercive effectiveness as a binary option, instead of 
degrees of responses, while also ignoring temporal considerations, resulting in 
insufficient theoretical explanation. This research provides a middle-of-the-road theory, 
the Utilitarian theory, as a more plausible explanation for what factors determine the 
 
35 The methodology used to support this study will be extensively covered in the Research Design 
section in Chapter two.  
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spectrum of victim responses to using cyber coercion to achieve one's political goals.  
The additional factors this research identifies are 1) financial costs for the victim, 2) 
audience costs for the victim, 3) leadership destabilization potential through targeting of 
leadership, and 4) the amount of pressure on leadership. 
 Borrowing from the economic sanctions literature, the concept of degrees of 
success, or partial success, can be applied to cyber coercion and allow greater 
illumination of the factors contributing to the outcome of these cyber coercive actions. 
Additionally, introducing a temporal scale, combined with the degrees of effectiveness, 
results in richer descriptive and theoretical explanatory power.  For this research, the 
determination of the degrees of effectiveness of cyber coercion encompasses a spectrum 
of changes in victim behavior that can translate to partial success to full success and 
partial failure to complete failure for the aggressor.  This determination is also dependent 
on behavior change over time, factors which are excluded from the two sides of 
conventional wisdom on this subject.  
The conduct of cyber coercion is not a fire-and-forget process. Cyber coercion is 
most often an iterative process; with the dynamics of an unfolding process, a state's initial 
cyber coercion strategy may adjust as hostilities continue.  Both aggressor and victim 
may learn and adapt as a cyber coercive action progresses which is why examining 
changing temporal values are necessary to include in a comprehensive theory of cyber 
coercion. As George noted, the most important factor influencing success or failure in 
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coercion is the adversary’s perception of each of these conditions.36 If an initial strategy 
does not satisfy most or all of George's seven principles favoring coercive diplomacy 
(which are the factors whose presence or absence can contribute to the success or failure 
of a coercive strategy), we would expect to see the state adjusting its cyber coercive 
approach as the situation develops.   
 When applied to the case studies, the choices the aggressors, Russia and North 
Korea, made with respect to George’s seven factors influencing successful coercive 
diplomacy are revealed, but they do not fully explain the divergent outcomes observed in 
the two dyads. Therefore, the identification of additional variables to explain the outcome 




36 George, Alexander.  Forceful Persuasion. Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace 
Publisher, 1991. p. 81. 
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First, Second and Third Wave Literature  
This research is focused on expanding the third wave scholarship, but I will begin 
by expanding on the first (cyber hysteric) and second (cyber skeptic) waves that were 
briefly described above. The two main cohorts weighing in on the value of cyber in 
international relations are diametrically opposed.  One group believes that the presence of 
cyber represents a fundamental change in the conduct of international relations and 
warfare. In response, a second wave of academics believes that cyber does not represent 
anything significant since it cannot cause tremendous physical destruction.    
 The initial decade-long reaction to the advent of the popular use of the internet in 
the 1990s, and the associated vulnerabilities it presented, was that cyber represented a sea 
change in the conduct of military affairs. Proponents pointed to the concept of the 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and argued that the cyber realm offered a strategic 
advantage since a fundamental element of the theory of RMA is the collection and 
control of information. RAND's John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt argued that 
information is the necessary component to wield power.  Particularly, “information… 
should be treated as a basic, underlying, overarching dynamic of all theory and practice 
about warfare in the information age.”37  Further, that “cyberwar may raise broad issues 
of military organization and doctrine, as well as strategy, tactics, and weapons design. It 
may be applicable in low- and high-intensity conflicts, in conventional and non-
conventional environments, and for defensive or offensive purposes.”  Lastly, they add:  
 
37 Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. “Information, power and grand strategy: in Athena’s 
camp.” In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 1997. p. 154. 
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“...we anticipate that cyberwar may be to the 21st century what blitzkrieg was to the 20th 
century. ... In a deeper sense, cyber war signifies a transformation in the nature of war.”38   
 This assessment has continued to thrive among leadership circles in different 
states. While as Secretary of Defense in 2012, Leon Panetta echoed Winn Schwartau’s 
words from 1991 and warned of a "Cyber Pearl Harbor that would cause physical 
destruction and the loss of life, an attack that would paralyze and shock the nation and 
create a profound new sense of vulnerability...  and could shut down the power grid 
across large parts of the country.”39 The White House’s International Strategy for 
Cyberspace of 2011 codified this sentiment by proclaiming: “When warranted, the United 
States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our 
country,” to include a military response.40 This policy joined the chorus of cyber 
warnings that likened the threat from cyberspace to that of conventional hostile warfare. 
This theory of the threat of cyber warfare will be known as the first wave response group.  
 The retort to the first wave assessment, known as the second wave, argued that 
since cyber warfare would not likely result in the physical deaths of the enemy or target 
country, it therefore did not represent a significant change in the conduct of warfare and 
admonished the first wave academics, policy makers, and commentators as being 
hysterical and hyperbolic.  Without a body count, this second wave assessment refuted 
 
38 Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming!” Comparative Strategy, Vol 12, No. 
2, Spring 1993, p. 27-32. 
39 Bumiller, Elizabeth and Thomas Shanker.  "Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of Cyberattack on 
U.S." The New York Times, October 11, 2012. 
40 “International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked 
World.” Washington, DC: The White House, May 2011. p. 14. 
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the claim that cyberwar was a threat equal to conventional hostilities. Rid argues that for 
a cyber war to occur, there must be lethality, and that a cyberattack has never resulted in 
death so cyber war has not occurred and will not occur in the future.41 The second wave 
contends that cyber war capabilities are akin to any other incremental military technology 
advancement and do not represent a change in the conduct of warfare. In "The Myth of 
Cyberwar," Gartzke notes:   
Cyberattacks are unlikely to prove particularly potent in grand strategic terms  
unless they can impose substantial, durable harm on an adversary. In many,  
perhaps most, circumstances, this will occur only if cyber war is accompanied by  
terrestrial military force or other actions designed to capitalize on any temporary  
incapacity achieved via the internet. 
 
 Maness and Valeriano argue that there is little evidence that cyber war is or is 
likely to become a serious threat.  They coded dyadic cyber interactions from 2001 to 
2011 and using that empirical data, concluded that cyber incidents are a “little-used tactic 
with low level intensity and few to no long-term effects.”42 Valeriano argues:  "The data 
we have presented here illustrate that cyber disputes are rare. When they do happen, the 
impact tends to be minimal. Only 20 of 126 possible ongoing rivals engage in cyber 
combat."43 However, focusing on the quantity provides a false sense of security and these 
scholars were using a dataset covering only the first decade of the 2000s. Moore's law44 
 
41 Rid, Thomas, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35/1 (Feb. 2012). 
p. 6–10. 
42 Valeriano, Brandon and Ryan Maness.  Cyber War Versus Cyber Realities. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015. p. 108 
43 Ibid. p. 108 
44 As noted earlier, Moore's law is the observation that the number of transistors in a dense 
integrated circuit doubles approximately every two years. A modern interpretation is a focus on 
the increase of cores per die instead of simply clock speed, as was the original Moore’s law. A 
core is a unit that runs in parallel with other cores; a die consists of several cores.   
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demonstrates that isolating cyber-related research to the first decade of the 2000's ignores 
5-6 cyber generations that have occurred in the interim. In addition, Valeriano and 
Maness' conclusion that cyber does not meet the threat level of a hot war does not 
preclude its ability to be used successfully in other ways, such as cyber coercion.    
 The view of the third wave sees a value in the use of the cyber realm for foreign 
policy, refuting both extremes of the first and second waves and provides several 
utilitarian options for the use of cyber, one of which is cyber coercion. This third wave 
has contributed to the literature by providing structured empirical analyses and studying 
cyber interactions that have actually occurred.45 Additionally the third wave has 
improved the dialogue by using middle-range international relations theory46 and 
presenting evidence in a policy-relevant, straightforward manner that is neither 
hyperbolic and based on what-if scenarios nor dismissive since it is unlikely to result in a 
hot war. The third wave of “middle-range theories attempt to formulate well-specified 
conditional generalizations of a more limited scope. …[This allows them] to explain 
different subclasses of a general phenomena.”47 
 Scholars following this design in examining the use of cyber for coercive 
diplomacy include Travis Sharp, Forrest Hare, Daniel Flemming, Neil Rowe and Tim 
Junio.  Sharp argues that cyber has a coercive value through cost imposition and 
leadership destabilization and uses the 2014 North Korea cyber operation against Sony 
 
45 Sharp, Travis. "Theorizing Cyber Coercion: The 2014 North Korean Operation against Sony." 
Journal of Strategic Studies, 2017. Vol 40, Num 7. p. 901  
46 George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett.  Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, MIT Press, 2005.  p. 266.  
47 Ibid.  p. 266. 
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Pictures Entertainment as a case study to prove his theory. He also spends time refuting 
the second wave theorists and advances a proxy idea to get at the issue of 
attribution/credible demand, the Known Coercer Plus Known Demand Standard, which 
has been borrowed for this research. 
 In looking at cyber coercion from the victim's side, Forrest Hare employs Buzan's 
vulnerabilities framework to explain how relative power disparities among states and 
differing levels of socio-political cohesion within a state can cause them to prioritize and 
characterize cyber threats differently. He highlights that a concern that stems from these 
different views on the significance of cyber threats creates a potential for a security 
dilemma in cyberspace.48  In a later paper, Hare advances a proposed coercion strategy 
framework, in the absence of any other working framework in the discipline for this 
issue, focusing on the deterrence aspect of coercion. He, too, spends ample time refuting 
the second wave theorists but also argues that "unequivocal attribution is not required"49 
to assess an effective deterrence strategy and provides several examples to demonstrate 
his argument.    
 Flemming and Rowe argue that cyber coercion will likely become increasingly 
prevalent in the future. Further, they argue that cyber coercion can defuse short-of-war 
conflicts and can offer net cost-benefit, saving potential financial and human costs 
 
48 Hare, Forrest. "The Cyber Threat to National Security: Why Can't We Agree?" Conference on 
Cyber Conflict Proceedings, 2010. Tallinn, CCD COE Publications.   
49 Hare, Forrest. "The Significance of Attribution to Cyberspace Coercion: A Political 
Perspective." Fourth International Conference on Cyber Conflict, 2012. Tallinn, CCD COE 
Publications.   
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associated with warfare.50 
 In challenging second wave scholars such as Rid and Liff, Junio believes that 
cyber war, defined as “a coercive act involving a network computer attack”51 is possible 
and he seeks to correct “the [second wave] narrative that cyberwar is improbable.”52 
Junio provides an overview of a structured scientific inquiry testing the effect of 
information technology (IT) on the assumptions contained in Fearon's “Rational 
Explanations for War” describing the conditions in which war should not occur. Junio 
concludes that the effect of IT on each assumption makes it either less tenable or the 
same as other kinds of warfare. In addressing the second wave, Junio offers that “if the 
perception that cyber weapons are non-lethal comes to be widely-perceived (as Rid 
would prefer), it is reasonable to conclude that the threshold for their use will be lower 
than other kinds of weapons - even if the cost of cyberattacks is greater."53  He 
demonstrates not only the destructive potential of cyber war but illustrates how cyber 
statecraft increases the potential for conflict.   
 This research contributes to the third wave in a number of ways including by 
presenting policy-relevant recommendations as well as demonstrating that the 
conventional wisdom on two widely-cited case studies should be significantly modified. 
This reversal is shown by introducing a Utilitarian approach and examining the case 
 
50 Flemming, Daniel and Neil Rowe. " Cyber Coercion: Cyber Operations Short of Cyberwar." 
This paper appeared in the proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Cyber Warfare 
and Security, Skukuza, South Africa, March 2015. 
51 Junio, Timothy. "How Probably is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back into the Cyber 
Conflict Debate." The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 36, Num 1, 2013.  p .126. 
52 Ibid. p .132. 
53 Ibid. p .130. 
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studies over a longer temporal period, thus revealing additional data points that require a 
reevaluation of the common interpretation of these cases.  Further, this research extends 
the variables that favor coercive diplomacy within cyber statecraft and shows how the 
presence or absence of these variables can result in divergent outcomes. This set of 
expanded variables include 1) financial costs for the victim, 2) audience costs for the 
victim, 3) leadership destabilization potential through targeting of leadership, and 4) the 
amount of pressure on leadership. Finally, this research fuses social science approaches to 
cyber attribution with the commercial cybersecurity industry access and techniques to 




CHAPTER 2:  CYBER COERCION 
You can engage in a shift in relative power without going to war,  
…you may look for a new scene in which to exploit capabilities in such a way that you 
might be able to achieve strategic intent. If you understand that pivot, this notion of 
campaigns with strategic intent, leveraging cyber, cyber campaigns I should say, then the 
need to engage on a continuous basis, primarily from a defensive motivation,  
and build more resiliency, …in fact requires you, given the nature of the  
technology and given the nature of the space, to be outside your network.  
 If you are defending on your network… you’re chasing.54 
 
 Are cyber capabilities useful to elicit certain responses from a victim? Applying 
George’s seven conditions that favor coercive diplomacy is a good start in examining this 
question. However, George’s approach for traditional coercive diplomacy is not sufficient 
to explain the divergent outcomes seen across cases of cyber coercion.  Instead, it is the 
interaction among George's seven conditions, along with additional independent 
variables, combined with changing temporal values that contribute to determining a 
victim’s response to cyber coercion against soft, countervalue targets. It is this extension 
of George’s original conditions that can explain why cyber coercion produces certain 
responses in some circumstances and different responses in others. Traditional studies do 
not do this – previous scholarship has been too binary and focused narrowly on 
success/failure, but also too restricted temporally. This chapter will also provide the 
applicable international relations theoretical literature to include George's theory of 
coercive diplomacy and forceful persuasion, and, offense-defense theory, as posited by 
 
54 Richard Harknett, Professor and head of the Department of Political Science, University of 
Cincinnati; presenting at the Cato Institute “Cyber Warfare, Coercion, and Restraint,” May 9, 
2019.   
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scholars Robert Jervis, George Quester and Stephen Van Evera and its application to the 
cyber realm.55  
  
 
55 Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics, 1978, vol. 30, no. 2. 
p. 167 214; Quester, George. “Offense and Defense in the International System.” In Michael 
Brown, Owen Cote Jr., Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller (eds.) Offense, Defense and War. 
Cambridge: MIT press, 2004. p. 51-68; and Van Evera, Stephen. “Offense, Defense and the 
Causes of War.” International Security, Spring 1998, Vol. 22, No. 4.  See also Glaser, Charles L. 
& Chaim Kaufmann: “What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It?”, 
International Security, Spring 1998, Vol. 22, No. 4. p. 44-82. 
27 
 
Why is Cyber Unique? 
 Cyber capabilities are distinct from conventional weaponry in nature, behavior, 
cost, and power calculation. However, early academic scholarship sought to compare a 
state’s options for using cyber capabilities with the Cold War-era nuclear proliferation 
literature and this narrative had significant stickiness for the study of strategy in 
cyberspace. Much of the 1990’s and early aughts literature finds scholars borrowing 
theories and strategies from the nuclear proliferation literature56 to apply to the cyber 
realm; “…indeed much of the lexicon of cyber strategy is drawn from the Cold War.”57 
While we can use some of these theories to explain relations among states during times of 
low-level disagreement and conflict, and apply them to cyber, we must distinguish cyber 
capabilities from other types of pressure campaigns used for coercion among states. 
Schelling's work in nuclear deterrence is often applied to the cyber realm and his seminal 
work on strategy and bargaining in the nuclear age, Arms and Influence,  provides a 
foundation that we can employ to assess to usefulness of cyber in coercive diplomacy.  
 Cyber statecraft offers a number of benefits for conflict resolution for both the 
aggressor and the victim, depending on the choices each player makes. For the victim, 
there is the range of reactions from doing nothing or ignoring the demands, to 
 
56 A number of scholars have demonstrated the progression of the study of political implications 
for cybersecurity from relying heavily on the nuclear proliferation literature in the 1990s and 
2000s to forming its own area of study in the 2010s onward. This history is captured well in: 
Jason Healey, ed. A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012. Washington DC: 
Cyber Conflict Studies Association, 2013. See also, Fred Kaplan, Dark Territory: The Secret 
History of Cyber War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2017.  
57 Lewis, James. “Toward a More Coercive Cyber Strategy.” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, March 4, 2021. p. 2. 
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acquiescing, defending, counter-attacking or some combination of these responses.  As 
one scholar noted:  
“The uncertainty of cyberspace, instead of creating spiral dynamics and security 
dilemmas, allows people the space to slow down. It creates anxiety, if you are a 
state that does not want to respond anyway, it gives you the uncertainty to be able 
to back out. Oh, I could not get attribution! Oh, I am not sure if that [the cyber 
action] is really a cyber thing? …And if your tendency is not to retaliate then 
cyberspace actually gives you the ability to not retaliate. To have this nice space 
that is created in which you can have some level of confrontation… but what we 
need to think about in our strategies is about articulating much more clearly what 
that confrontation looks like.”58 
 
 Depending on the nature of the attack, if it is one where a victim does not incur 
audience costs nor financial costs, a victim may choose to acquiesce quietly to stave off 
future embarrassment and save face. However, if the aggressor chose to publicly 
announce the cyberattack or publicly embarrass the victim, thus driving up victim 
audience costs and potentially financial costs, then a victim may choose a different 
response in order to preserve their status, protect their dignity, and/or deter other states 
and non-state actors from also attacking. 
Nature and Behavior 
 The strategy considerations for cyber statecraft should not be shoved under the 
umbrella of extended nuclear deterrence theory when looking for explanatory theories or 
designing options for statecraft. Cyber capabilities and weapons are inherently secretive 
 
58 Jacquelyn Schneider, Assistant professor in the Strategic and Operational Research 
Department, U.S. Naval War College;  presenting at the Cato Institute “Cyber Warfare, Coercion, 
and Restraint,” May 9, 2019.   
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in nature and can suffer a short shelf life.  States may not risk a cyber conflict quickly;59 
since, unlike conventional weapons, some cyber capabilities can be one-and-done options 
once the vulnerability is revealed to an adversary, or they may be reusable techniques.  
 The National Academy of Sciences noted that cyber capabilities  have three 
characteristics that differentiate them from kinetic weaponry.  Namely, cyber capabilities 
are: 
  “easy to use with high degrees of anonymity and with plausible deniability, 
 making them well suited for covert operations and for instigating conflict between 
 other parties; are more uncertain in the outcomes they produce, making it  
 difficult to estimate deliberate and collateral damage; and involve a much larger  
 range of options and possible outcomes; and, may operate on time scales ranging 
 from tenths of a second to years, and at spatial scales anywhere from  




 The cost of conducting cyber operations can be incredibly cheap or extremely 
investment-heavy, depending on the type of operation, the sophistication of the target, 
and the expected duration.  In the case of a sophisticated hard target, one does not just 
replicate more code and lob them at the adversary; “…the cost of a cyber weapon, which 
is almost entirely in R&D [research and development], cannot be amortized over as many 
 
59 Axelrod and Iliev analyze the optimal timing for the use of cyber capabilities and offer a 
mathematical model to determine the best timing to use a particular capability, especially given 
that its first use may prevent it from being used again in the future. The full citation is:  Robert 
Axelrod and Rumen Iliev. “The Timing of Cyber Conflict.” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. January 28, 2014. p. 1298-1303. 
60 Owens, William A, Kenneth W. Dam and Herbert S. Lin (eds.), “Technology, Policy, Law and 
Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities”. National Research 
Council, 2009; p. 24. 
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targets as would be the case for a kinetic weapon. This fact necessarily increases the cost-
per-target destroyed.”61  A missile can be used as a deterrent for years; conversely, cyber 
capabilities are one patch away from being rubbish.  
That being said, some cyber capabilities do not require significant research and 
development funding, some can be easily purchased or created with minimal investment, 
which is part of why they are an attractive option for small or weak states, and non-state 
actors, to exert influence or power. Writing in 2011, Joseph Nye observed: “90 percent of 
military telephone and Internet communications travel over civilian networks. Finally, 
because of the commercial predominance and low costs, the barriers to entry to cyber are 
much lower for non-state actors.”62 The barriers to entry for non-state actors may be low, 
but it also means that those capabilities are likely be used against soft targets or 
unsophisticated adversaries.   
 
Power Calculation 
 While a state may have a reputation for its offensive cyber aptitude, unlike 
conventional arms, offensive and defensive cyber capabilities are a constantly changing 
game and it is difficult to measure one's relative cyber power against an adversary, 
especially one prone to bombastic speech who may overstate their abilities. A state’s 
offensive cyber capabilities are kept secret, so when a state or non-state actor is deciding 
 
61 Lin, Herbert.  “Oft-Neglect Cost Drivers of Cyber Weapons,” Council on Foreign Relations 
Net Politics (online blog), December 14, 2016, 
http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2016/12/14/oftneglected-cost-drivers-of-cyber-weapons/.   
62 Nye Jr., Joseph. “”Nuclear Lessons for Cybersecurity?” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 
2011. p. 22. 
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whether to use their cyber capabilities offensively against an adversary for coercive 
purposes, it is tricky to calculate one’s chances for success at the outset since the 
adversary may have an extremely competent defense or may withhold its relative cyber 
power capabilities during increased tension or a cyber-based coercive conflict to preserve 
for future use. That is, “the malleability of cyberspace offers, in the words of Bruce 
Schneier, a unique ‘window of exposure’ for cyberattacks to be effective.”63 As Richard 
Harknett noted at a CATO Institute policy forum in 2019:  
You can engage in a shift in relative power without going to war, …you may look 
for a new scene in which to exploit capabilities in such a way that you might be 
able to achieve strategic intent. If you understand that pivot, this notion of 
campaigns with strategic intent, leveraging …cyber campaigns, then the need to 
engage on a continuous basis, primarily from a defensive motivation, and build 
more resiliency, …in fact requires you, given the nature of the technology and 
given the nature of the space, to be outside your network.  If you are defending on 
your network… you are chasing.64 
 
 Unlike conventional arms capabilities which can be debuted at parades as they 
roll down the promenade, counted and assessed for range and lethality by adversary 
states,65 for cyber capabilities one cannot see the capabilities consisting of ones and zeros 
 
63 Referenced in Smeets, Max. “A matter of time: On the transitory nature of cyberweapons.” 
Journal of Strategic Studies, 2018: 41:1-2, 6-32.  p. 13.  Original quote from Bruce Schneier, 
‘Crypto-Gram’, September 15, 2000. Located at: https://www.schneier.com/crypto-
gram/archives/2000/0915.html   
64 Richard Harknett, Professor and head of the Department of Political Science, University of 
Cincinnati; presenting at the Cato Institute “Cyber Warfare, Coercion, and Restraint,” May 9, 
2019.   
65 "North Korea Stages Show of Force with New Missiles During Parade," Reuters, September 9, 
2018.  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-parade/north-korea-stages-show-
of-force-with-new-missiles-during-parade-idUSKBN1FT0U8  Accessed September 20, 2019.  
Additionally, multiple defense reporters and defense researchers from RAND and elsewhere were 
live tweeting this parade, their observations about new weaponry and potential lethality 
estimations as well as observations about weaponry that is known to exist in North Korea but 
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that an adversary may harbor at any given time.  These cloaked capabilities have 
consequences for relative power calculations within the larger coercion calculus.  
 Of those who believe the cyber threat is exaggerated, the focus is myopic; 
concentrating on body counts when the discipline needs to approach this as a tool 
applicable across a spectrum of options. The "cyber threat" does not stem from the 
malicious code, but from the human intent to use it against a specific target.66 When 
talking about the employment and risk assessment of cyber, scholars and policymakers 
often speak in terms of effects, residual body counts and the extreme of possible 
destruction. We discuss the ethics of using this suite of cyber-based weapons and 
capabilities with respect to the furthest extent of damage possible: will it result in the loss 
of human life? This is a short-sighted approach.   
 Looking at the cyber arena through the lens of coercion (comprised of deterrence 
and compellence) begs the question: how can cyber actions, below the level of armed 
conflict, be effectively used during peacetime to change a victim’s behavior and elicit a 
desired response?  Instead of simply trying to destroy an adversary's systems, can one use 
it just enough to exact costs that provoke a response that is advantageous to an 
aggressor’s desire?  When assessing cyber options, cyber conflict, cyber war, or actors in 
the cyber realm, the academic analysis is often focused on military planning, military 
 
were not on display. This analogy is used to illustrate the difficulty in judging an adversary's 
cyber capabilities since there is no equivalent to a military parade in the cyber realm.   
66 Libnicki, Martin C.  Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.  Also, Koh, Harold Hongju.  "The Emerging Law 
of the 21st Century War."  The Brookings Institute.  Breyer Lecture presentation, April 1, 2016.   
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tactics, lethality, and the benefits to the military, not to diplomacy.67  However, the 
concept of using cyber for coercive diplomacy, as we will see in the case studies, can be 
effective for goals beyond simply military dominance, like eliciting a change in behavior, 




67 Flemming, Daniel and Neil Rowe. "Cyber Coercion: Cyber Operations Short of Cyberwar."  
ICCWS 2015 - The Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Cyberwarfare and 
Security.  Edited by Jannie Zaaiman and Louise Leenan.  2015.  p. 95  
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Attribution – Is It Still a Problem? Strategies for Achieving Attribution   
 One criticism of the use of cyber capabilities for successful coercive diplomacy is 
the issue of attributing the attack and understanding the demand. George notes that the 
"clarity of objectives and demands" and knowing the adversary are relevant variables for 
a successful use of coercive diplomacy.68 It is often difficult in the cyber realm to 
immediately attribute an attack with absolute certainty, but that assumes absolute 
certainty is required. Given ongoing tensions, victims can often make a confident 
assessment supported by technical cyber forensics within hours or days of an attack. 
Added to that, Healey provides a Spectrum of State Responsibility that can be used to 
assess attribution in more granularity and will be discussed in detail below. Taken 
together, the technical information combined with Healey’s Spectrum, show how the 
problem of attribution, a problem that is oft-used as an excuse for why cyber coercion is 
impossible, can be surmounted.  This research argues that given the less-than-lethal 
threat, where there is a decent confidence of the coercer's identity and the coercer's 
demand a victim can use the technical data to assist in determining a ranking on Healey’s 
spectrum, react accordingly and that “unequivocal attribution is not required.”69  
Cautioning, Rid and Buchanan offer a systematic model, the Q model, for attributing 
intrusive cyber operations and note that it is a layered, complex art that requires skill to 
 
68 George, Alexander.  Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. 
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991.  p. 76-81.  See also Alexander L. 
George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1994. p. 280-281. 
69 Hare, Forrest. "The Significance of Attribution to Cyberspace Coercion: A Political 
Perspective." 2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, 2012.  NATO CCD COE 
Publications.   
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be successful.70 While Rid and Buchanan’s Q model presents a useful strategy for how to 
tackle the problem of attribution, this dissertation offers a different approach that is an 
amalgamation of Sharp’s approach and Healey’s Spectrum combined with cybersecurity 
research and cyber assessments based on the specific code involved in a cyberattack.   
Substantial previous scholarship frames the value of cyber coercion as one that is 
significantly hindered by problems of attribution; that the ambiguity of attribution in 
cyberspace undermined the credibility of the threat and thus the potential for cyber 
coercion in general.71 The issue of attribution has been treated in the literature like an 
unbeatable bogeyman that prevents serious scholarship from assessing the usefulness of 
cyber coercion; it is not.72  
As Hare notes, "many have focused on the challenges of achieving conclusive 
attribution of malicious actors."73  For some scholars, the issue of attribution is of 
paramount importance, often citing that the attacker must be explicitly known in order to 
cause the effect sought and without proper attribution the rest of the coercion calculation 
is meaningless. However, this is a flawed interpretation; one that does not properly 
incorporate the abilities of the commercial cybersecurity industry to provide reasonable 
 
70 Rid, Thomas and Ben Buchanan.  "Attributing Cyber Attacks." The Journal of Strategic 
Studies. Vol 38, Num 1-2. p. 30.  
71 Libicki, Martin C. Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009; National 
Research Council, ed., Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks: Informing 
Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: National Academies 
Press, 2010). 
72 Many of the same problems afflict the study of certain national security issues but this has not 
prevented the emergence of thriving academic literature on these topics.  
73 Hare, Forrest. "The Significance of Attribution to Cyberspace Coercion: A Political 
Perspective." 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict.   NATO CCD COE Publication, 
Talinn, Estonia, 2012.  p. 126 
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attribution, as well as reasonable situational attribution using Sharp’s and Healey’s 
strategies described below, and therefore remove “attribution” as an obstacle to 
determining the value of cyber coercion. For states that may not be able to conduct 
attribution based on government capabilities, they are able to purchase these services 
from a variety of global cybersecurity companies who are extremely adept in reasonably 
determining the actor, as will be described further below.  A simplified taxonomy of 
attribution is the following:  
1. Government-operated: planned, funded and run by government/military 
officials using government/military infrastructure  
2. Government-associated: planned, funded and run by contractors associated 
with the government, and with tacit approval of the government  
3. Government-sponsored: government funded, run by non-government 
organizations responsible for the planning and operations  
4. Government-allowed: criminals and independent hackers who conduct 
activities on their own, sometimes with the encouragement of the government but 
not necessary, and the government allows them to conduct operations as long as 
they do not attack things the government does not want attacked 
 
As Rid and Buchanan remind us, attribution is “an exercise in minimizing 
uncertainty on three levels: tactically, attribution is an art as well as a science; 
operationally, attribution is a nuanced process not a black and-white problem; and 
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strategically, attribution is a function of what is at stake politically.”74  Jason Healey 
provided a more in-depth spectrum of state responsibility that can aid in determining 
attribution.  It helps to delineate whether a national “ignores, abets, or conducts and 
attack… [and] the spectrum starts from a very passive responsibility … up to a very 
active responsibility.”75 Healey’s Spectrum of State Responsibility is as follows:76   
1. State-Prohibited – the government will help stop third party attacks  
2. State-Prohibited but Inadequate – The government is cooperative but unable to 
stop third party attacks  
3. State-Ignored – the government knows about third party attacks but is unwilling 
to take any official action  
4. State-Encouraged – Third parties control and conduct the attack, but the national 
government encourages them as a matter of policy  
5. State-Shaped – Third parties control and conduct the attack but the state provides 
some support 
6. State-Coordinated – The government coordinates third party attackers such as by  
“suggesting” operational details  
7. State-Ordered – the government directs third party proxies to conduct the attack 
on its behalf  
8. State-Rogue-Conducted – out-of-control elements of cyber forces of the 
government conduct the attack  
9. State-Executed – the government conducts the attack using cyber forces under its 
direct control 
10. State-Integrated – the government attacks using integrated third-party proxies and 
government cyber forces 
 
Finally, scholar Travis Sharp offers a solution to this issue of exact attribution that 
often plagues analysis of cyber threats, by providing a working description of this 
spectrum of certainty that he calls the Known Coercer plus Known Demand Standard for 
 
74 Rid, Thomas and Ben Buchanan. “Attributing Cyber Attacks.” The Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 2015 Vol. 38, Nos. 1–2, p. 4. 
75 Healey, Jason.  “Beyond Attribution: Seeking National Responsibility for Cyber Attacks.” The 
Atlantic Council, January 2012.  
76 Healey, Jason.  “Beyond Attribution: Seeking National Responsibility for Cyber Attacks.” The 
Atlantic Council, January 2012. p. 2-3. 
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Classifying Cyber Coercion Attempts. Employing this spectrum of certainty, combined 
with Healey’s Spectrum of State Responsibility, and viewing it through the general 
taxonomy of attribution allows us to surmount the strict attribution problem while 
accounting for attribution using a given range. Sharp’s approach is shown in Figure 2:77 
 
Figure 2. 
                 Known Coercer + Known Demand 
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       Victim's Certainty about Coercer's Demand  
 
 In additional to the qualitative approach to help determine attribution, we can rely 
on commercial cybersecurity companies to illuminate provenance of an attacker through 
technical data. Determining attribution is a non-trivial issue for some second-wave 
scholars, so borrowing cybersecurity best practices to assess attribution overcomes this 
 
77 Sharp, Travis.  "Theorizing Cyber Coercion: The 2014 North Korean Operation Against Sony." 
Journal of Strategic Studies, 40:7, April 2017,  p. 898-926. 
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issue. There are two kinds of attribution in cybersecurity terms: intrusion cluster 
attribution and the definitive “county X did this attack” attribution.   
 Intrusion cluster attribution can usually be performed in a matter of hours with 
reasonable certainty of the actor. These are generally categorized as either an UNC, an 
uncategorized intrusion cluster, or an APT, an Advanced Persistent Threat. Some UNCs 
are eventually categorized as an APT, and some maintain UNC status.78 An APT is 
defined as “groups that receive direction and support from an established nation state.”79   
One prime example of this is the Russian intrusion set known as the “Dukes.”80 
This intrusion set has been around for over a decade and each iteration shares 
characteristics with previous generations. These characteristics include: the same IP 
hosting the malware; Russian wording found in the code; Russian time zones used in the 
compiling; hardcoded IPs; specific command and control code; reused domain names; 
similarities in the writing style of the code; similarities in how the code is organized; 
similarities in sections of the code showing up in the exact same order.81 Cybersecurity 
 
78 Berninger, Matt. “Going ATOMIC: Clustering and Associating Attacker Activity at Scale.” 
FireEye, March 12, 2019.  Located at: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-
research/2019/03/clustering-and-associating-attacker-activity-at-scale.html and accessed on 
January 15, 2021. See also:  Vanderlee, Kelli. “DebUNCing Attribution: How Mandiant Tracks 
Uncategorized Threat Actors.” FireEye, December 17, 2020.  Located at: 
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/products-and-services/2020/12/how-mandiant-tracks-
uncategorized-threat-actors.html and accessed on January 15, 2021.  
79 “Advanced Persistent Threat Groups.” FireEye. Located at: https://www.fireeye.com/current-
threats/apt-groups.html  and accessed on January 15, 2021. See also, Pieter Arntz, “Explained: 
Advanced Persistent Threat” MalwareBytes Labs, July 26, 2016. Located at:  
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/07/explained-advanced-persistent-threat-apt/ and 
accessed on January 15, 2021.  
80 F-Secure White Paper. “The Dukes 7 Years of Russian Cyber Espionage,”  September 2015.  




companies can take a piece of malware and perform a commonality look across all the 
other malware samples (of the same file type) within their own corporate storage (20+ 
billion examples) and against collections like Virus Total (~4 billion examples), to 
determine intrusion set attribution within a matter of hours and get a high confidence 
result.  What was a very difficult undertaking a decade ago, is now a nearly automated 
process based on a rich history of malware used across the world that private industry has 
catalogued.82 
 In the case of the first “Duke” referenced above, PinchDuke was used against 
Chechen targets in November 2008.83 The Russians hardcoded the targets. Since then 
there have been ten related intrusion sets created that have been used in over twenty 
hacking campaigns spanning over 12 years, and each have been identified by the 
cybersecurity industry.84   
The commercial cybersecurity industry may be able to attribute down to a detailed 
level of which actor within a country is responsible for a particular type of malware based 
on the characteristics described above. If the commercial cybersecurity industry is unable 
to attribute down to the level of a specific actor within a country and knowing the country 
of origin is not a detailed enough attribution for the cyber coercion calculation, then we 
can employ Healey’s Spectrum of State Responsibility to get a better level of attribution 
within a state.  
 
82 Ibid.  
83 Ibid. p. 4.  
84 F-Secure White Paper. “The Dukes 7 Years of Russian Cyber Espionage,” September 2015.   
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 As an example of the level of detail that the commercial cybersecurity industry 
can attribute, the F-Secure White Paper describes that in the initial 2008 PinchDuke 
malware, the software engineers used a particular command and control server. For the 
2010-2015 CosmicDuke malware they re-used this command and control server85 and  
borrowed techniques and components from PinchDuke. This was a clear indication that 
these two intrusion sets shared command and control features and therefore were run by 
the same outfit. 86   
Another example comes from Crowdstrike’s assessment in 2015 that it “observed 
multiple malware samples with suspected association to DPRK actors throughout 2015. 
…Many of the samples were linked back to campaigns beginning in 2014, suggesting 
either a continuation of previous activity, or a resurgence of those programs.”87 With over 
a decade of internet cyber aggression history, attribution in 2021 is no longer the 
insurmountable, mammoth challenge that it was in 2005 and should not be seen as a 




85 Ibid. p. 7. 
86 Ibid. p. 7-11, 25. 
87 Crowdstrike Intelligence Report. “2015 Global Threat Report.” Crowdstrike, 2015. p. 31 
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Key Concepts and Definitions 
Applying George to cyber: What is coercion in the cyber realm?  
States employ diplomacy and the use of force to achieve political objectives. The 
options for a state to threaten the use of force has expanded with the advent of the cyber 
domain. This study assesses the use of the cyber domain as a means of coercion to 
influence behavior, both between states and between states and non-state actors.  In order 
to understand the study, one must have a clear understanding of coercion theory and how 
it applies to cyber statecraft.  
 Coercion is the power to hurt88 and coercive diplomacy consists of knowing the 
fears and vulnerabilities of your adversary and effectively exploiting them.  Coercive 
diplomacy is conveying a sense of coercive reality to attempt to reverse actions already 
undertaken, deter future activities, or influence a future decision by an adversary through 
the use of threats and limited force to persuade. The proximate purpose of coercive 
diplomacy is to create fear and to communicate a fearsome reality if the adversary 
continues with its original plan.  Broadly defined, it is the use of threats to influence 
another’s behavior and encompasses both compellence, as coercion to act, and 
deterrence, or coercion not to act.89  "Writing on coercion requires modesty... the topic 
 
88 Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. 2nd ed., Harvard University Press, 1990. See 
also Byman and Waxman (2002) and Robert Pape’s Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in 
War. Cornell University Press, 1996. 
89 This is a broad reference to Schelling, Thomas. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1966. p. 2–6; and Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of 
Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might. New York: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 2002. p. 1 and Joseph Nye Jr., “”Nuclear Lessons for Cybersecurity?” Strategic 
Studies Quarterly, Winter 2011. 
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itself defies easy description."90  Scholars such as Schelling and modern theorists like 
George, Byman and Waxman provide detailed interpretations of their definition and use 
of coercion theory.   
 Schelling's definition of coercion includes both compellence and deterrence. He 
notes, "the threat that compels rather than deters often requires that the punishment be 
administered until the other acts, rather than if he acts.91  Schelling remarks:  
 To inflict suffering gains nothing and saves nothing directly; it can only make 
 people behave to avoid it. The only purpose, unless sport or revenge, must be to  
 influence somebody's behavior, to coerce his decision or choice. To be coercive,  
 violence has to be anticipated.  And it has to be avoidable by accommodation. The  
 power to hurt is bargaining power.  To exploit it is diplomacy - vicious  
 diplomacy, but diplomacy.92  
 
 For Schelling, it is the threat of this violence and/or damage, followed by more 
damage, that can make someone comply with one's demands or discontinue an unwanted 
behavior.  He asserted that coercion is the exploiting of the calculus of the costs and 
benefits of action, short of brute force, and operated by raising the costs or risks beyond a 
tolerable level.93  
 The adversary makes this decision based on their own cost-benefit calculation. At 
a high level, if the consequences of the threat of violence or destruction is less than the 
demand, according to the target of the threat, then it is unlikely the target will capitulate.  
 
90 Byman, D and M Waxman. The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the 
Limits of Military Might. UK: Cambridge University Press, RAND, 2002.  p. 23.  
91 Schelling, 1966.    
92 Schelling, Thomas. "The Diplomacy of Violence." Essential Readings in World Politics, Karen 
Mingst and Jack Snyder, eds. New York: WW Norton & Company, 2004. p. 301 
93 Schelling 1966.  
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If the threat of violence or destruction is greater than the perceived threshold the target of 
the threat is willing to endure, then they are more likely to yield. In short, "Coercion 
requires finding a bargain, arranging for him to be better off doing what we want — 
worse off not doing what we want — when he takes the threatened penalty into 
account."94 The literature on coercion suggests various conditions that need to be met in 
order for success.  
 Alexander George provided a comprehensive list of seven conditions for 
successful coercion: clarity of the objective, strength of motivation, asymmetry of 
motivation, sense of urgency, adequate domestic and international support, opponent's 
fear of unacceptable escalation, and clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of 
the crisis.95 George notes that no single condition can explain successful coercion but 
improving the status within each condition contributes to overall success. For George, 
successful coercion depends on the specific factors at play in a particular situation, those 
factors determine the strategy, and maximizing these seven conditions should result in 
successful coercion. Each of these seven conditions can be applied to the theory of cyber 
coercion as shown below, but do not fully explain the outcomes in the cases studied.  
  
 
94 Schelling, Thomas. "The Diplomacy of Violence." Essential Readings in World Politics, Karen 
Mingst and Jack Snyder, eds. New York: WW Norton & Company, 2004. p. 302 
95 George, Alexander.  Forceful Persuasion. Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace 
Publisher, 1991. p. 76-81. 
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Clarity of the objective 
 For George, clarity of the objective is not always essential, but the lack of clear 
objectives can be an obstacle to successful coercive diplomacy.96 A clear understanding 
of the objective by all involved and a defined demand ensures that the adversary will not 
misperceive what is at stake and will respond accordingly. For the cyber realm, due to the 
secret nature of operating in cyberspace, a lack of clarity of the objective can make 
bargaining and coercion more complicated, even when that objective has been 
communicated elsewhere. It can be difficult to definitively marry the actions taken in the 
cyber realm to the overt threats or demands made in another domain like the media or in 
diplomatic channels.   
 
Strength of Motivation 
 The coercer must be motivated to initiate the crisis and maintain that motivation 
throughout the crisis.97 The adversary should perceive a significant strength of motivation 
on the part of the aggressor for the coercion to credible and convincing. For strength of 
motivation in cyber, the coercer must not only be motivated to enter a crisis but willing to 
leverage cyber capabilities, some of which may be single-use, and therefore requires 
significant motivation to enter a crisis. A single-use cyber tool may also serve to signal 
that the aggressors have an extremely high level of motivation since they are willing to 
leverage that single-use tool for a particular situation and the victim should act 
 
96 George, Alexander.  Forceful Persuasion. Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace 
Publisher, 1991. p. 76. 





Asymmetry of Motivation  
 The complement to George's strength of motivation is asymmetry of motivation.  
"Coercive diplomacy is more likely to be successful if the side employing it is more 
highly motivated by what is at stake in the crisis than its opponent."98 One critical aspect 
of successful coercion is that if an adversary believes the coercer is more highly 
motivated to achieve their goals than the victim is to prevent them, then the coercion will 
be successful.99   For cyber, this can be more complicated, again given the secretive 
nature of cyber interactions. A victim may underestimate their motivation in a particular 
crisis until the coercer engages in cyber conflict, ranging from cyber disruption to cyber 
degradation, thus driving up the costs for the victim and changing the motivation calculus 
vis-a-vis the adversary.   
 
Sense of Urgency  
 The coercing power must convey a credible sense of urgency and, more 
importantly, the adversary must accurately perceive this sense of urgency.100 As George 
reminds us, the credible sense of urgency can encourage an adversary to comply and can 
lead to successful coercion.  However, a sense of urgency can also work against the 
 
98 George, Alexander.  Forceful Persuasion. Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace 
Publisher, 1991. p. 77.  
99 Ibid. p. 77.  
100 Ibid. p. 78. 
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aggressor when the adversary feels pressured to respond quickly and therefore prefers to 
go to war as opposed to capitulating to urgent burdensome demands.101  
 For cyber, a sense of urgency can be credibly communicated or proven with low 
level cyber actions that ratchet up the pressure on an adversary. A higher sense of 
urgency is often only felt after an aggressor has taken an action in the cyber realm and the 
adversary is suffering the consequences, but that might also have the backlash effect 
described above; a credible sense of urgency is a delicate balance to communicate from 
aggressor to adversary.  
 
Adequate Domestic and International Support  
 “A certain level of political support at home is needed for any serious use of 
coercive diplomacy.”102 The degree of domestic support may be partially dependent upon 
how long a crisis lasts, but overall, the domestic and international backing, or lack 
thereof, is a contributing factor the success or failure of coercive diplomacy.103  
 For cyber, if a coercive action gains broad domestic and/or international support, 
and the coercive threat is seen as something necessary and proportional, it ratchets up the 
pressure for the adversary to capitulate. As credible voices in the domestic and/or 
international arenas express support for a coercive action, the adversary may face 
domestic audience costs that force them to capitulate.  However, this can also backfire, 
and an adversary’s domestic support may increase if the polity feels bullied or cornered 
 
101 Ibid. p. 78. 
102 Ibid. p. 78. 
103 Ibid. p. 79. 
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by the international community, therefore decreasing the likelihood of successful 
coercive diplomacy.  
 As with most tools of diplomacy, for cyber coercion there is a fine line between 
success and failure and building the right coalition that heightens pressure while also 
allowing the adversary to save face when agreeing to the demands is tricky. As Robert 
Art argues, coercive compellence can be more difficult than deterrence because “it 
demands more humiliation from the compelled state.”104 Actions like blacking out online 
abilities (e.g. banking and financial sectors), disrupting cyber-dependent utility 
infrastructure, or publicly belittling a population or leader, can coalesce disparate public 
opinion in support of the coerce. If this happens, the coercer can decrease the likelihood 
of successful coercive diplomacy while simultaneously accidentally helping build support 
for their adversary’s position.   
 
Opponent's Fear of Unacceptable Escalation  
 To have successful coercion, a coercer needs to motivate an adversary to 
surrender to one’s demands, and a key factor is heightening pressure and signaling to the 
adversary that the coercer is willing to exceed the adversary’s acceptable aggression 
threshold. The coercer promises that the adversary will feel more pain, that the coercer is 
willing to escalate to a higher level of pain, and that level is unacceptable to the 
adversary, so the adversary ought to surrender to the coercer’s demands. For this to work 
 
104 Art, Robert J. “To What Ends Military Power.” International Security 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980): 
10.   
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successfully, there is a timing component, and it is beneficial if the coercer signals 
willingness to escalate in the initial or early interaction, so it is clear to adversary as they 
make their own strategic calculations.105   
 When applied to cyber, the opponents fear of unacceptable escalation can quickly 
be met if the target in question is one of national critical function such as electrical 
infrastructure, water supply, transportation systems or financial services. These are the 
most important functions in modern societies and threatening to disrupt them via cyber 
means may contribute to the success of a cyber coercion operation.  However, as 
demonstrated in the case study on Estonia, going beyond the threat and actually 
paralyzing some of these national critical functions can backfire on the coercer, 
prompting the leadership and/or population to consolidate and unify against the coercer 
as a common enemy.    
  
Clarity Concerning Precise Terms of the Settlement of a Crisis  
 As George notes, not only is the clarity of the objective necessary, but there must 
also be clarity of the coercer’s terms for resolution. “It may be necessary in some cases… 
for the coercing power to formulate rather specific terms regarding the termination of the 
crisis the two sides have agreed upon and to establish procedures for carrying out these 
terms and verifying their implementation.”106   
 
105 George, Alexander.  Forceful Persuasion. Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace 
Publisher, 1991. p. 79-80. 
106 George, Alexander.  Forceful Persuasion. Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace 
Publisher, 1991. p. 80.  
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 For the coercing power in cyber, a lack of clarity in the terms of the settlement 
can contribute to complicating an already obtuse exchange.  As noted above, due to the 
secretive nature of the cyber realm, it can be challenging to link overt demands to cyber 
actions and that challenge can also extend to the adversary’s understanding of what sort 
of palpable solution might be acceptable to a coercer. Therefore, it is of utmost 
importance that both coercer and victim are clear on how a coercive cyber interaction can 
end, and what each side wants and is willing to give to end a conflict before it escalates.   
 For the victim in cyber coercion the terms of settlement are important and can 
take several forms to include: a return to the previous operational state, if possible; a 
commitment from the coercer to remove itself from the victim’s networks; a request to 
return and/or delete files or data; or a request for an accounting of the cyber actions 
taken. As the victim in this interaction, however, they are the recipient of the threat and 
cyberattack and therefore likely do not have the power position in the negotiation to 
demand any terms of settlement. However, it is important to note the range of what a 




Deterrence and Compellence in Cyberspace: Counterforce, Countervalue, and Cyber 
Coercion 
 
A main component in coercion is target choice and different target types will 
result in different levels of audience costs and financial costs. In conventional warfare, 
targets are divided into two categories: countervalue targets and counterforce targets.  As 
noted earlier, countervalue targets are those that do not pose an overt military threat and 
are most often defined as civilian population centers such as towns and cities, but also 
include non-military government targets. Conversely, counterforce targets are those that 
pose a military threat, and consist mostly of government and military personnel and 
military controlled geographic targets. We can apply this target distinction to cyberspace 
and this research is scoped to look at soft, countervalue target choices.  
  In the case of North Korea versus Sony, successful cyber coercion resulted in 
imposing costs and destabilizing leadership through countervalue targeting since the 
target was a purely civilian commercial entity. In the case of Russia versus Estonia, 
Russia targeted countervalue targets including non-military government targets, a blend 
that eventually backfired in some respects but also provided a value to Russia. 
Tolerance for the victim audience costs of countervalue targets is often much 
lower than it would be for victim counterforce targets; plainly, states see daily efforts to 
hack, scan or intrude into military and government networks and systems107 and therefore 
 
107 Lindsay, Jon and Erik Gartzke. “Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability 
Paradox Revisited.” In Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter J. P. Krause, eds., The Power to Hurt: 
Coercion in Theory and in Practice. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. p. 181 
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there is a level of tolerance for that daily activity. Major hacking events against 
significant civilian targets occur less often, and when they do, they typically suffer larger 
audience costs for the victim. For cyber coercion, as costs grow it is often less painful for 
a victim to comply with the demand than to continue to suffer increasing audience costs. 
There is also a significant difference in audience costs between immobilizing a 
military vehicle located on a military base and disabling a CEO’s pacemaker to cause a 
fatal result. In the first case, it is a military counterforce target which is typically seen as 
government-backed and resourced and, in this example, safe because they are located on 
a base so therefore it would not necessarily have significant audience costs since it might 
not be publicized. In the latter example, this countervalue target would raise significant 
audience costs because it endangers the life of the person, the person is a civilian target, 
and the person could represent anyone in society, which intensifies both the fear and 
sympathy response of the audience.  
In the example of the military vehicle, the audience costs might be calculated 
differently if a military convoy was operating in hostile territory and all the vehicles were 
turned off and unable to drive, resulting in the soldiers taking fire and suffering 
casualties. However, it is still a counterforce target and may not garner the same level of 
audience costs that the CEO’s disabled pacemaker example does. As George notes in 
Forceful Persuasion, the specific circumstances in each situation determine the success 
or failure of coercive diplomacy: there is no exact formula or mathematical equation to 
achieve successful coercion. Coercion is an art and there are critical factors that can 




 Cyberspace is composed of three terrains: the internet and all interconnected 
computers; the world wide web, that is the nodes accessible via URL; and, all other 
systems that exist but are not connected to the internet or web.108 “Cyber conflict has 
changed only gradually over time; thus, historical lessons derived from past cases are still 
relevant today.”109 In the same way that ethics and international relations theory lessons 
from Thucydides still apply today, some 2400 years later, the lessons learned in the 1980s 
and 1990s cyberspace still apply today despite significant technological advancement.110   
 It is important to define the terms and concepts surrounding cyberspace, cyber 
conflict, and the issue of cyber coercion.  ‘Cyber warfare’ is a recent term: Oxford 
English Dictionary gives its first use as 1994111 and it is the oft-used catch-all term to 
refer any cyber conflict.  The topic of cyber conflict has received widespread media 
attention only in the most recent decade or so; the overarching doctrine governing hostile 
cyber interactions in the 1980s was “information warfare.” By the 1990s, it was 
considered “information operations” and the early aughts of the 21st century birthed 
 
108 Kello, Lucas.  "The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution." International Security. Volume 38, 
Number 2, Fall 2013.  p. 17.  
109 Jason Healey, ed. A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012. Washington DC: 
Cyber Conflict Studies Association, 2013. 
110 Moore’s law measures exponential technological advancement in information systems. It is the 
observation that the number of transistors in a dense integrated circuit (chip speed) doubles every 
two years, and the cost is halved during this same timeframe. A contemporary interpretation is a 
focus on the increase of cores per die instead of simply clock speed, as was the original Moore’s 
law. A core is a unit that runs in parallel with other cores; a die consists of several cores.   




widespread use of “cyber doctrine” and is the terminology that we continue to use 
today.112   
 In 1991, Dorothy Denning described cyber as a subcomponent of information 
warfare, which "...consists of offensive and defensive operations against information 
resources of a ‘win-lose’ nature.” Further, “[cyber] warfare is about operations that target 
or exploit information resources.”113 At the time, the term “cyber warfare” was used to 
describe technology-based combat operations that leverages information technology to 
control and command systems in an effort to exert power over an adversary. While 
electronic warfare dates back several decades, the cyber aspects of this category of 
warfare have only been seen largely since the 1990s.114   
 Since the mid-1990s, the popular naming convention detailing different kinds of 
“cyber activity” have been categorized in several ways, as referenced above. Cyber 
conflict is when states and non-state actors “use offensive and defensive cyber 
capabilities to attack, defend, and spy on each other typically for political and other 
national security purposes.”115 The terms “cyber conflict” and “cyber operations” are 
umbrella terms that include cyber war, cyberattacks, cyber exploitation, and cybercrime. 
For purposes of this research, cyber warfare will be defined as the state’s use of 
technology for its offensive or defensive strategy to control, destroy, or disrupt an 
 
112 Jason Healey, ed. A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012. Washington DC: 
Cyber Conflict Studies Association, 2013. 
113 Denning, Dorothy. Information Warfare and Security (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 
Longman, 1999), 21. 
114 Martin Libicki. What is Information Warfare. Government Printing Office, 1995. Page 7.   
115 Jason Healey, ed. A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012. Washington DC: 
Cyber Conflict Studies Association, 2013. 
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adversary's computer or network resources and systems in both the physical and 
nonphysical realms. Since the ramifications are “heavily damaging and destructive, 
similar to the effects achieved with traditional military force, [it is] considered to be an 
armed attack. An act of war that is mediated in full or part through cyberspace.”116  
 According to Herb Lin, "Cyberattacks refers to the use of deliberate activities to 
alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or networks used by an 
adversary or the information and/or programs resident in or transiting through these 
systems or networks.”117  Conversely, "cyber exploitation" refers to the deliberate 
activities designed to penetrate computer systems or networks used by an adversary for 
the purposes of obtaining information resident on or transiting through these systems.118  
Under the umbrella of cyber operations, cyber espionage and cyber monitoring for 
intelligence purposes are activities authorized under intelligence law, and outside the 
scope of this research. Similarly, cybercrime is outside the parameters of this research 
since that is the purview of law enforcement. The last key component of the cyber 
environment is cybersecurity and how the state and non-state actors can use cybersecurity 
practices to help their offensive, defensive and coercive strategies.119  
 Since 2000, "the Internet has become a general-purpose technology that 
contributed some $4 trillion to the world economy in 2016 and connects nearly half the 
 
116 Healey, Jason.  A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace 1986-2012. Washington DC: Cyber 
Conflict Studies Association, 2013. 
117 Lin, Herb. "Cyber Conflict and International Humanitarian Law." International Review of the 
Red Cross 94, No. 886. Summer 2012. p. 518 
118 Lin, Herb. "Cyber Conflict and International Humanitarian Law."  2012.  p. 518  
119 Kello, Lucas.  "The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution." International Security. Vol 38, Num 2, 
Fall 2013.  p. 17 
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world’s population."120 As society grows ever more reliant upon information technology 
and communications, the development of cyber network operations has emerged as a 
possible means of waging war. “...  [A] key stated fear is [cyber] warfare, or sneak 
electronic assaults that could crash power grids, financial networks, transportation 
systems and telecommunications, among other vital services."121 Historically, cyber 
threats have been generally viewed as acts of terrorism and consequently have been 
managed as such. Because the risks and potential for damage is vastly more increased, as 
the proliferation of and reliance on cyber networking increases, frequent attacks are more 
likely to occur in the form of cyber coercion or cyber warfare versus a physical 








120 Nye, Joseph. "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace." International Security, Vol. 41, No. 
3. Winter 2016/2017. p. 44 
121 Wolf, Jim. “U.S. Draws Attention to Information Warfare Threat.” December 26, 2000.  
http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=004ITd.  Accessed March 2, 
2016.   
122 However, squirrels and others of the animal kingdom remain a significant threat to physical 
critical infrastructure due to their destruction of power cables and other associated cabling as has 
been widely noted. One such observation is captured in Gallagher, Sean. “Who’s Winning the 
Cyberwar – the squirrels, of course.” Ars Technica, January 16, 2017.  Found at: 
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/01/whos-winning-the-cyber-war-the-
squirrels-of-course and accessed on November 27, 2020.    
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Types of Cyber Attacks 
What is a cyberattack? 123  
Examples of common cyberattacks include: Denial-of-Service (DoS), Malware (Trojans, 
Worms, Destroy data, Steal data, Poison data), phishing and spear phishing, website 
defacement and data breaches. These are described below.  
 
Denial-of-service (DoS) and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks 
A denial-of-service attack floods systems, servers, or networks with traffic to exhaust 
resources and bandwidth. As a result, systems are unable to complete legitimate requests 
and users cannot send nor receive information. Attackers can also use multiple 
compromised devices, sometimes thousands and often called botnets, to launch this 
attack. This is known as a distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attack.124  
 
Malware 
Malware is a term used to describe malicious software, including spyware, ransomware, 
trojans,  viruses, and worms. Malware breaches a network through a vulnerability, 
typically when a user clicks a malicious link or downloads email attachment that then 
installs risky software. Once inside the system, malware can do the following: 
 
123The following list is compiled from various sources including the following: Cisco Products.  
"What are the Most Common Cyber Attacks?"  Located at: 
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/common-cyberattacks.html and accessed on 
November 6, 2019 and Kaspersky. Located at  https://usa.kaspersky.com/resource-center/threats 
and accessed on November 6, 2019.  
124 Cisco Products.  "What are the Most Common Cyber Attacks?"  Located at: 
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/common-cyberattacks.html and accessed on 
November 6, 2019 
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  Blocks access to key components of the network (ransomware) 
  Installs malware or additional harmful software 
  Covertly obtains information by transmitting data from the hard drive  
  Disrupts certain components and renders the system inoperable 
 
Trojan 
A Trojan horse or Trojan is a type of malware that is often disguised as legitimate 
software. Trojans can be employed by cyber-thieves and hackers trying to gain access to 
users' systems. Users are typically tricked by some form of social engineering into 
loading and executing Trojans on their systems. Once activated, Trojans can enable 
cyber-criminals to spy on you, steal your sensitive data, and gain backdoor access to your 
system. These actions can include: 
  Deleting data 
  Blocking data 
  Modifying data 
  Copying data 
  Disrupting the performance of computers or computer networks 
Unlike computer viruses and worms, Trojans are not able to self-replicate. 
 
Worms 
Worms are a type of malware that replicates across networked computers independent of 
human interaction.  Typically, a worm's purpose is to consume bandwidth and use up 




Destroying data has multiple negative consequences. The most obvious is that data is 
missing and cannot be used for assessment. However, missing data can also significantly 
change the outcome of machine learning models, change the boundaries of models, and 
reduce the accuracy in evaluating large datasets.   
 
Steal data  
Stealing data is when an adversary gains access to a computer system to copy data and 
send it to a computer controlled by the adversary.  In this case, the original data is not 
altered, it is simply copied and sent out of the original network to one controlled by an 
adversary.   
 
Poison data  
Poisoning data is when an adversary is able to inject bad data into a computer system 
and/or database.  With the rise of machine learning and artificial intelligence, more 
systems are relying on data models to understand large datasets in data science. Injecting 
false data into the training pool for data models can result in serious negative 
consequences, move the model's boundaries, and result in significant drop in accuracy of 
results.   
 
Phishing and spear phishing attacks 
Phishing is an email-borne attack based on sending fraudulent communications that 
60 
 
appear to come from a reputable source. The goal is to trick the recipient to disclose 
sensitive data like credit card and login information or to click a link that installs 
malicious malware on the victim’s machine. Phishing is an increasingly common 
cyberthreat. Spear phishing is a more sophisticated version where the attacker learns 
about the victim and then pretends to be a trusted associate.   
 
Website Defacement 
Website defacement refers to the involuntary change of appearance of a website.  It can 
include pictures and/or words placed on a defaced website and can be in a graffiti style or 
replace the style of text for the purposes of misleading the audience.125  
 
Data Breaches 
A data breach is a theft of data by a malicious actor using one or more methods listed 
above.  Motives for data breaches include cyber coercion, crime (i.e. identity theft), and 
espionage.126 




125 TrendMicro.  “Website Defacement.” Located at:  
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/definition/website-defacement 
126 The motives of crime (e.g. identity theft) and espionage are outside the focus of this research. 
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Table 5: Typology of cyberattacks types and what was used against Sony and Estonia  
 





Denial-of-service (DoS) and distributed denial-of-service 
(DDoS) attacks to cause the failure of victim 
communications 
Yes Yes 
Denial-of-service (DoS) and distributed denial-of-service 
(DDoS) attacks to cause the failure of media 
communications and limit information 
No Yes 
Denial-of-service (DoS) and distributed denial-of-service 
(DDoS) attacks to cause economic failure 
Yes Yes 
Phishing and spear phishing attacks Yes No 
Malware attack Yes No 
Defacing websites  Yes Yes 




127 This is to illustrate the different types of attacks used. There is no argument that the type of 
attack matters as much as the information gleaned and to what extent that information is made 
public or exposed. 
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The Coercive Use of Cyber Actions  
Offense-Defense Theory and Cyber 
 Offense-defense theory attempts to discern how technology affects the likelihood 
of conflict. The intersection of offense-defense theory literature with how specific 
technology developments affect the likelihood of war is an important to examine. As 
assembled by scholars Robert Jervis, George Quester and Stephen Van Evera,128 the 
offense-defense theory, at its most basic, says that when states believe they can conquer 
one another more easily, war will be prevalent. Offense-defense theory refines the Realist 
argument and, using it as a lens to approach the usefulness of cyber debate, serves further 
to clarify the position of various theorists and academics as well as provide a different 
perspective from which to view the cyber debate.  Offense-defense theory typically leans 
toward favoring the defensive posture, however conventional wisdom for cyberspace 
argues that due its wide attack surface, multiple avenues to exploit vulnerabilities, and 
various cyber characteristics tip the balance in favor of being offense dominant.129 A 
small number of prominent cyber-focused scholars disagree with this conventional 
wisdom and believe it is a nuanced balance where high value target attacks can be 
extremely difficult and costly, where quality of target matter more than quantity and that 
 
128 Quester, G. H. (1977). Offense and Defense in the International System. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons. Jervis, R. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30(2): 1978. 
p. 167-214. Van Evera, Stephen.  “Offense, Defense and the Causes of War.” International 
Security, Spring 1998, Vol. 22, No. 4. p. 5-43 
129 This conventional wisdom is demonstrated in the following: Kello, Lucas. “The Meaning of 
the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft,” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2 
(Fall 2013), p. 7–40; Lieber, Keir. “The Offense-Defense Balance and Cyber Warfare,” in Emily 
O. Goldman and John Arquilla, eds., Cyber Analogies. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2015. p. 96–107. 
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determining the offense-defense balance may be highly dependent upon the specific 
dyadic interaction.130 The basic underlying cause for the rapid offense–defense cycle of 
cyberweapons is that cyberspace is more malleable.131 Lindsay and Gartzke nicely distill 
the various competing factors involved in determining offense-defense balance in 
cyberspace, noting that:  
  
Widespread belief that offense is easier than defense in cyberspace, that stronger 
states are increasingly vulnerable while weaker actors are increasingly 
empowered, and that the anonymity of cyber operations precludes effective 
deterrence leads many to argue that cyberspace brims with unprecedented, even 
revolutionary dangers. Yet national security officials, defense firms, media 
pundits, and a burgeoning private cybersecurity industry all have incentives to 
exaggerate the threat, while the extreme secrecy of cyber operations complicates 
sober assessment. 132 
 
Offense-defense theory also calls into question the various definitions offered by 
scholars in the international relations (IR) field. There are four major characterizations 
accepted in IR literature concerning offense-defense. Of those four, three specifically 
focus, in part, on the integration of technology in military engagements.  The fourth 
depends upon military skill and ability which, when viewed through the lens of cyber, 
supports the notion that offense-defense theory is directly related to determining the 
usefulness of cyber as a tool of coercive diplomacy. Briefly, the competing definitions 
 
130 This small number of scholars includes: Rid, Thomas. “Cyber War Will Not Take Place.” The  
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 35, No. 1. p. 28; Gartzke, Eric and Jon R. Lindsay. “Weaving  
Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense and Deception in Cyberspace.” Security Studies, 24:316–348,  
2015. 
131 Smeets, Max. “A matter of time: On the transitory nature of cyberweapons.” Journal of 
Strategic Studies, 2018: 41:1-2, 6-32.  p. 12. 
132 Lindsay, Jon and Erik Gartzke. “Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability 
Paradox Revisited.”  In Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter J. P. Krause, eds., The Power to Hurt: 
Coercion in Theory and in Practice.  p. 179-180.  
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are as follows: 
1. Jervis, Quester and Lynn-Jones are of the same opinion and narrow definition that 
offense-defense theory is determined by the choice of technology available to 
states.  In addition, the balance is also affected by one states’ investment in 
offense in order to counteract a rival’s defense interests.133 
2. Kaufman and Glaser see that offense-defense balance is best analyzed by 
addressing a particular pair of states and then investigating “the ratio of the cost of 
the forces that the attacker requires to take territory to the cost of the defender’s 
forces.”134 Gilpin agrees with Kaufman and Glaser, writing, “the defense is said to 
be superior if the resources required to capture territory are greater than the value 
of the territory itself; the offense is superior if the cost of conquest is less than the 
value of the territory.”135 
3. Van Evera offers an extremely broad definition that incorporates technology, 
military doctrine, military posture, geography, social order, collective security 
systems, alliances and a history of balancing or band wagoning.136   
4. Biddle asserts that the success of offensive action is due to the offensive state’s 
 
133 Jervis, Robert. “Realism, Neorealism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate.” 
International Security, 1999, Vol. 24, No. 1.  See also, Glaser, Charles. “Realists as Optimists: 
Cooperation as Self-Help.” International Security, 1994/95, Vol. 19, No. 3; Lynn-Jones, Sean. 
“Does Offense-Defense Theory Have a Future?” Based on a talk delivered to the Research Group 
in International Security at McGill University on October 20, 2000.  Held by the National Library 
of Quebec. 
134 Glaser, Charles and Chaim Kaufmann.  “What is Offense-Defense Balance and Can We 
Measure It?” International Security, Spring 1998, Vol. 22, No. 4. p. 46. 
135 Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1981. p. 63. 
136 Van Evera, Stephen.  “Offense, Defense and the Causes of War.” International Security, 
Spring 1998, Vol. 22, No. 4. 
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comprehension of the adversary’s center of gravity, its ability to attack that center 
and the adversary’s failure to prevent an attack.137 
 
Offense-defense theory holds that, when defensive capabilities are easier to 
achieve than offensive, then war is less likely and security is strengthened.138 With the 
introduction of cyber vulnerabilities, offensive and defensive capabilities of an adversary 
must be re-addressed. For purposes of this research Robert Jervis’ definition, will be 
used.  Expanding on his outline, this explanation states that the two fundamental 
variables that guide the theory are:  
1. Offense-defense balance: the judgment on whether conquering territory or 
defending it will be most successful.  
2. Offense-defense differentiation: determining whether forces and capabilities 
that provide for offensive measures are different than those which support 
defensive action.139  
 
 In cyber statecraft, a common refrain is that offense just has to succeed once; 
defense has to be right all the time. This idea is part of the calculation in determining the 
conventional wisdom that in cyberspace offense is dominant. “Cyberattacks are cheap, 
 
137 Summarized in Lynn-Jones, Sean. “Does Offense-Defense Theory Have a Future?” Based on a 
talk delivered to the Research Group in International Security at McGill University on October 
20, 2000.  Held by the National Library of Quebec. 
138 Walt, Stephen.  “International Relations: One World, Many Theories.”  Foreign Policy, Spring 
1998. p. 31.  
139 Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics, January 1978, Vol. 
30, No. 2.  p. 187-194. 
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whereas cyber defense is expensive.”140 According to Libnicki, “if the offense-defense 
curves continue to favor the offense, one could argue that either the potential damage 
from a cyberattack would be unacceptable or the resources that must be spent on defense 
are unaffordable.”141  
Van Evera sees technology as favoring either offensive or defensive posture 
depending on how an individual state wishes to employ it.142 An important component of 
state decision making and the means-ends relationship are the assumptions made about 
the relative strengths of offense and defense that directly impact the penchant for 
conflict.143 Clearly, if a state believes it holds offensive supremacy, that is, it expects 
conflict to be quick and victorious, then it will be more inclined to enter into conflict than 
a state that holds the opposite view.  
Slayton looks at cyber through the lens of offense-defense theory and argues that 
the idea of offense dominance in cyberspace is flawed. She asks important questions 
about the offense-defense balance in cyberspace and provides a framework for analyzing 
it in cyberspace operations. However, she neglects basic characteristics about networked 
systems and underestimates industrialized state's reliance on the internet for daily 
functioning.  Slayton notes “…although digital industrial control systems (ICS) have 
 
140 Lieber, Keir. “The Offense-Defense Balance and Cyber Warfare,” in Emily O. Goldman and 
John Arquilla, eds., Cyber Analogies. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. p. 96. 
141 Libnicki, Martin. Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar.  Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2009. p.61. 
142 Van Evera, Stephen.  “Offense, Defense and the Causes of War.” International Security, 
Spring 1998, Vol. 22, No. 4. 
143 Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics, January 1978, Vol. 
30, No. 2.; Van Evera, Stephen.  Causes of War: Power and the Roots of International Conflict. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.  
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been exploited by cyberweapons, achieving a desired physical effect is much more 
expensive than simply exploiting software vulnerabilities.”144 However, this is not always 
true.  
As recently seen at an Oldsmar, Florida water plant, a bad actor accessed the 
plant’s software and made seemingly minor changes in the acceptable water treatment 
levels, resulting in potentially catastrophic physical repercussions by poisoning the water 
supply.145 Luckily, an employee on duty at the time watched the hack happen and was 
able to alert and override the change, but the timing was serendipitous. A more 
meticulous bad actor hacker could have accessed the system outside of business hours, 
therefore avoiding detection. What may have been considered prohibitively expensive 
when Slayton wrote in 2016, is no longer true in 2020. Lindsay offers that  
...conventional wisdom holds that a multitude of technical factors favor offense 
over defense in cyberspace and that the difficulty of attribution undermines the 
credibility of deterrence; therefore, weaker actors can attack the control systems 
of superior adversaries to achieve levels of physical disruption possible previously 
only through kinetic bombing.146   
 
 Farwell and Rohozinski offer that “Clausewitz believe that in warfare, the 
advantage rested with the defense.” Cyber reverses that equation. It also offers the 
potential to build the fog of war through the ability to effect disruption, deception, 
 
144 Slayton, Rebecca. “What is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance?” International Security 41:3. 
Winter 2016/2017. p. 91. 
145 Mathews, Lee. “Florida Water Plant Hackers Exploited Old Software And Poor Password 
Habits.” Forbes, February 15, 2021. Located at: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2021/02/15/florida-water-plant-hackers-exploited-old-
software-and-poor-password-habits/?sh=3514b8b5334e and accessed on February 21, 2021 
146 Lindsay, Jon R.  "The Impact of China on Cybersecurity." International Security, Vol. 39, 
Num 3. p. 29.   
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confusion and surprise."147 The global diffusion of technological means and instruments 
allows any state to create sophisticated networking and communications abilities, thus 
increasing its defensive potential but also increasing potential vulnerabilities for an 
adversary to exploit.  
Akin to other aspects of cyberspace operations, assessing the offense-defense 
balance in cyberspace is tricky because unlike conventional arms that can be seen, 
quantified, and its capabilities analyzed, the secretive nature of cyberspace offensive 
capabilities adds to the difficulty in judging the offense-defense balance. Defensive 
capabilities of an adversary may be easier to unearth by penetration testing, port 
scanning, and other red team techniques as well as the adversary’s national publications 
identifying their defensive strategies, critical infrastructure and public cybersecurity 
budget documents. These resources do not exist for offensive cyber since public 
declaration would render offensive tools moot. As Nye notes, “though information 
warfare is not new, cyber technology makes it cheaper, faster, and more far-reaching, as 
well as more difficult to detect and more easily deniable.”148  These factors contribute to 
the proliferation of cyber capabilities and the murkiness of determining the offense-
defense balance in cyber statecraft.  Further, they tend to favor the offensive use of cyber 
capabilities, which is well-suited for cyber coercion.   
  
 
147 Farwell, James P. and Rafal Rohozinski. "The New Reality of Cyber War." Survival, Vol 54, 
Num 4, p. 114.  
148 Nye, Joseph. "Information Warfare versus Soft Power." Project Syndicate, Prague, May 2017.  
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The Anarchical World, the United Nations, Power, Laws, Norms and Coercion  
Why are states and non-state actors allowed to threaten to harm or use force via 
cyber capabilities against other states and non-state actors?  Is that simply a function of 
the anarchical world of self-help or are there international institutions that can intervene? 
What is the role of the United Nations in cyber statecraft, if any?  What does assistance 
for cyberattacks and cyber coercion look like in a self-help world?   
Understanding the limitations and assistance available for states and non-state 
actors suffering cyberattacks and cyber coercion in an anarchical world is integral to 
understanding the calculation of an aggressor state or non-state actor using cyber 
capabilities to achieve a political goal. For example, if there is no enforcement 
mechanism to punish the aggressor or no mutual aid agreement to assist a victim, then an 
aggressor is free to pursue cyber statecraft unrestricted as opposed to other coercive 
means and threats where they may be restricted.149 This assumes, however, that the 
Realist, anarchical worldview is prevailing; there is a competing perspective by liberal 
institutionalists that increasing cooperation and aid among states through international 
institutions and agreements can lead to a positive outcome.   
It is useful for the discussion on cyber coercion to understand these two 
 
149 For other types of capabilities in conflict there exist various international treaties and/or 
international institutions that play a role in “refereeing” their use, to varying degrees of success. 
Two prominent examples of these treaty restraints are: the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC) and the Mine Ban Convention against the use of landmines, etc. The international 
community has codified via treaty, that some types of weapons and/or how they are used against 
specific populations should not be allowed as well as providing for mutual aid if, e.g., someone 
threatens the use of chemical weapons under the CWC. Of course this is for states opting into the 
treaty, but it also speaks to the formation of norms around a particular capability. 
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competing worldviews and their real-world implications for a state or non-state actor to 
choose cyber coercion to achieve a political end. One could argue that these differences 
in worldviews are emblematic of the differences seen in the approach to cyberspace 
between members of the European Union and other significant powers in the cyberspace 
world. That is, EU member states have pushed for international agreements on norms of 
behavior in cyberspace, a charter to unite under common principles respecting 
international law in cyberspace and efforts to create greater stability through a reduction 
in cyberattacks. Meanwhile, other significant powers in cyberspace have declined to join 
these efforts reflecting an unwillingness to artificially limit options for using offensive 
and defensive cyber statecraft.   
To better understand the theoretical underpinnings of these differing world views 
we turn to a debate in the mid-1990s. Theories that rely upon the possibility of conflict 
reduction through the formation of international institutions are inherently flawed. This is 
the argument put forth by the preeminent scholar of Offensive Realism, John 
Mearsheimer. Disagreeing, Robert Keohane offers great optimism about the benefits that 
nations reap from participating in the international institutions, writing that  
“when states can jointly benefit from cooperation…we expect governments to 
attempt to construct such institutions. Institutions can provide information, reduce 
transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for 
coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity.150  
 
Juxtaposing Mearsheimer’s Realist view151 with Robert Keohane’s utilitarian, 
 
150 Keohane, Robert and Lisa Martin. “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.” International 
Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995): 42 
151 Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001.  See also, John Mearsheimer 
71 
 
rationalistic, Institutionalist view152 provides contrasting accounts of the usefulness of 
international institutions as means to reduce conflict. This contrast can be applied to the 
study of cyber statecraft as a means to view different perspectives when examining an 
aggressor’s choice to employ cyber capabilities for coercive purposes or a state’s choice 
to enter into, or refrain from, international agreements on behavior in cyberspace.   
“According to Realist theory in political science, states exist in an anarchical 
international system and must therefore rely on self-help to protect their sovereignty and 
national security.”153  When applying this to cyber statecraft, Realism dictates that each 
state should only rely on itself to deter and defend against cyberattacks and that 
international cooperation will not protect a victim state from a determined aggressor. 
Rebutting that theory is the idea that cooperation through international 
institutionalism, where the state has shared common interests, can provide a pathway and 
powerful incentive for states to cooperate, as well as compete, to avoid conflict. States 
seek to maximize their nation's welfare, military security, and power. In an increasingly 
integrated world, states are constrained to work together for mutual advantages. The 
cyber realm is an excellent example where states are strongly motivated to work together 
to reduce the threat of cybercrime and cyberwarfare. Failure to do so would incur 
significant costs and would reduce their standard of living, and thus their long-term 
 
“The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter, 
1994-1995), p. 5-49 
152 Keohane, Robert and Lisa Martin. “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.” International 
Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995): 39. See also, Keohane, Robert. After Hegemony. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1984.  
153 Quoted in Sagan, Scott. “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of 
a Bomb” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3. p. 57.  Original idea from Kenneth Waltz, Theory 
of International Politics.  New York: Random House, 1979. 
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viability. However, as noted above, we see some states opt out of these international 
agreement efforts and it is important to understand how they may view them differently 
from those proposing and promoting these agreements.   
Arguably,  “…‘institutionalist’ theories [are] largely a response to realism and 
…directly challenges realism’s underlying logic.”154  Mearsheimer’s assumptions are as 
follows: the world exists in anarchy; states seek survival; states possess offensive military 
capability; states will act rationally; and, states are uncertain about one another’s 
intentions and it is this uncertainty that drives the power maximizing desire.155  
Keohane’s argument against the last assumption is that although international institutions 
may not always reduce uncertainty and transaction costs and therefore they may not 
necessarily strengthen cooperation, the possibility of increased information sharing 
through these bodies exists so that undermines Mearsheimer’s last basic assumption. 
Mearsheimer’s logic stems from the realist paradigm, naturally on the systemic 
level, and is highly pessimistic about the role that international organizations can play in 
reducing conflict.  He claims “…institutions have minimal influence on the state 
behavior, and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War 
world,”156  but he systematically disregards the constructive aspects of international 
institutions.  When applied to cyberspace, the usefulness of international institutions need 
 
154 Mearsheimer, John. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security, 
Issue 19, No. 3.  Winter 1994/1995.  p. 7. 
155 Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.  W.W. Norton & Company: New 
York, 2001.  
156 Mearsheimer, John. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security, 
Issue 19, No. 3.  Winter 1994/1995.  p. 7. 
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not be completely discounted when looking at how to reduce cyber conflict in the 
international system through cooperation or coercion; the attempts in recent years to 
create international institutions to achieve a reduction in cyber conflict are a testimony to 
their burgeoning influence in the cyber realm.  That being said, Mearsheimer’s insight 
may explain why several significant cyber actors refuse to sign onto international cyber 
agreements restricting cyber activity.   
Mearsheimer contends that although international institutions may be a factor in 
forming cooperation among states, “…there is little evidence that they can get great 
powers to act contrary to the dictates of realism.” 157  This criticism appears to be shared 
by states that have thus far rejected the appeals to enter into an international agreement 
that will restrict their own use of cyber capabilities while having zero effect on their 
adversaries. Since international institutions lack the authority to enforce cyber-focused 
agreements, states and non-state actors may decide that employing cyber capabilities may 
be beneficial to achieve their goals and may not want to artificially limit their ability to 
exercise these capabilities.   
Keohane seeks to challenge the assumption that one state can never be certain 
about another’s intentions158 and sees that the “logic of institutionalist theory, with its 
focus on the informational role of institutions, appears solid.”159 Keohane posits that, 
 
157 Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.  W.W. Norton & Company: New 
York, 2001. p. 364. 
158 This is why George’s condition of “Clear Objective” is so important to successful coercive 
diplomacy; ambiguity of intentions between states can introduce unnecessary friction. .   
159 Keohane, Robert and Lisa Martin. “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.” International 
Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995): 51. 
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through the use of international institutions, states may be able to increase and facilitate 
communications and secure more information, therefore affording the opportunity to 
convey — and divine —  future intentions.  This is one method by which states can 
increase cooperation, decrease cheating, comprehend the objectives of another state and 
perhaps alter its own behavior in light of another states aims or willingness to work 
together.160 Increased sharing of information through institutions can provide insight into 
others’ intentions and lead to policies that maximize potential instead of policies that 
assume a worst-case scenario (given an uncertain, anarchic world) and therefore are 
unable to maximize utility.161 Cyberspace has been an anarchical environment since its 
inception and is plagued by the unknown intentions and capabilities of adversaries. 
Several international efforts have attempted to build consensus and cooperation over the 
past twenty years, but only in recent years has there been slight progress on this front.  
In cyber statecraft, there have been several attempts to create venues for 
cooperation and agreement. One example is the 2018 Paris Call for Trust and Security in 
Cyberspace, which was an attempt to unite under common cyber behavior principles to 
govern cyberspace and reaffirm the applicability of international law, IHL and the UN 
Charter in an effort to create greater stability in cyberspace. The Paris Call was a pledge 
to unite under nine principles to provide greater international security in cyberspace. 
Several local and federal governments signed on as well as private sector and civil 
society participants. However, at the 2019 NATO CCDCOE CyCon, the leading cyber 
 
160 Keohane, Robert and Lisa Martin. “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.” International 
Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995): 44 
161 Ibid. p. 44. 
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defense conference in Europe, the utility of the Paris Call was debated because several 
major actors in cyber statecraft, such as Russia, China, India and the United States, 
refused to sign on to the Paris Call. This resulted in scholars calling into question the 
power of its influence and repeating the criticism endemic to international institutions: 
the lack of enforcement mechanisms.162 
The debate between Mearsheimer and Keohane is used as an example because it 
exemplifies the debate happening across the world on how best to deal with the 
challenges of cyber statecraft. Should states seek to restrain behavior by international 
agreements that are difficult to enforce but can serve to limit some bad behavior in 
cyberspace? Or, it is in a state’s self-interest to refuse to enter into international 
agreements so that one may operate in cyberspace unconstrained? 
 
Cyber Statecraft: International Norms 
 Despite the fact that the internet has been popularly used since the 1990s, and 
widely used globally since the early 2000s, only in recent years has the international 
community coalesced seriously around formalizing norms for behavior. The “topic of 
ICTs in international security is not new in the United Nations, it has been on the agenda 
of member states since 1998”163 and the UN has convened six Groups of Governmental 
 
162 Firsthand account from this researcher who was an attendee at the 2019 NATO Cooperative 
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Cycon in Tallinn, Estonia, May 28-31, 2019.  
163 Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament 
Affairs, United Nations, remarks presented at “Deciding on the Rules of the Road for 
Cyberspace: The Who, What, Where, When, How” at the Institute of International Cyber 
Stability, June 9. 2020.   
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Experts (GGE) since 2004 to examine how ICTs impact international security. And yet 
these norms are an evolving process, with several still being codified. The idea of cyber 
norms was further explored during the 2009 NATO Cyber Conference in Tallinn, 
Estonia, but the initial norms of behavior in cyberspace were not widely agreed upon 
until 2015.164 And, like any system of international norms, these cyber norms must be 
agreed to by all willing participants.  The cyberspace norms of behavior continues to be 
an evolving conversation in the international community with the formation of the 2018 
Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, the formation of the 2018 United Nations 
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in 
Cyberspace, consisting of 25 Member states, and the creation of the 2018 United Nations 
Open-Ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of ICTs in the Context of 
International Security (OEWG) that was open to all UN Member states.  
In March 2021, in a first for the OEWG, the UN Member states agreed to endorse 
a report on recommendations to advance peace and security in cyberspace. This marks 
the first time all Member states have agreed to a report to advance the norms surrounding 
state behavior toward cybersecurity; however, of note, the report and subsequent 
endorsement includes “…11 voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behavior 
 
164 Those non-binding norms, as adopted by the UN GGE in 2015, are: (1) ‘States should take 
appropriate measures to protect their critical infrastructure from ICT threats, taking into account 
General Assembly resolution 58/199 on the creation of a global culture of cybersecurity and the 
protection of critical information infrastructures, and other relevant resolutions’ (norm G), and (2) 
‘States should respond to appropriate requests for assistance by another State whose critical 
infrastructure is subject to malicious ICT acts. States should also respond to appropriate requests 
to mitigate malicious ICT activity aimed at the critical infrastructure of another State emanating 
from their territory, taking into account due regard for sovereignty’ (norm H). 
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and [it] recognized that additional norms could be developed over time.” 165 While an 
excellent first step, to echo Mearsheimer’s criticisms of liberal institutionalism, the fact 
that it is not legally binding and that there is a lack of an enforcement mechanism means 
that some Member states may have agreed with no intention of abiding by it. Iran decided 
to ‘disassociate’ from it, citing ‘unacceptable content’ which did not block consensus on 
the report, but is a move rarely seen at the UN. It may provide Iran a future excuse not to 
abide by the recommendations in the report.    “In the end, no country was fully pleased 
with the contents of the report. Iran even went so far as to “disassociate” itself from 
it, given “unacceptable content.” While it did not ultimately block consensus on the 
report, disassociation is an uncommon UN practice which provides Iran with some 
basis to claim it is not bound by the report’s conclusions. Specifically, “… the Islamic 
Republic of Iran is not obliged with any term, content, paragraph, conclusion, and 
recommendation of the report that is not in line with its principled positions.”166 
That being said, Keohane would argue that this first agreement provides the 
foundation for future international cooperation, an ability to grow consensus and share 
information, and venue for future cybersecurity negotiations among states.  Engaging in 
cyber coercion may sometimes be the choice between maximizing one’s power or 
sacrificing that opportunity to be part of a cooperative team. Mearsheimer argues that the 
 
165 United Nations General Assembly: Open-ended Working Group on Developments in the Field 
of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. Final 
Substantive Report, March 10, 2021.  Located at:  https://front.un-arm.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/Final-report-A-AC.290-2021-CRP.2.pdf   
166 United Nations General Assembly: Open-ended Working Group on Developments in the Field 
of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. Compendium of 




former will prevail, but as this first endorsement of the OEWG report by the Member 
states shows, there is room for Keohane’s theory to prevail.   
 
Cyber Statecraft: International Law 
 To properly analyze cyber coercion actions, it is necessary to understand the 
larger cyber operations framework and how it interacts with international law.  The 
Tallinn Manual167 lists eight factors to "identify cyber operations that are analogous to 
other non-kinetic or kinetic actions that the international community would describe as 
uses of force:  severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability of effects, 
military character, state involvement and presumptive legality.”168 Meanwhile, Koh 
notes: “We must distinguish between hacking, network exploitation and network attack. 
We must translate the "spirit" of existing international law to the new tools of 21st 
century war.”169  
 In cyberspace and computer network operations, there are a number of competing 
and overlapping factors, norms and laws against targeting civilian infrastructure and the 
private sector. However, the soft target private sector and civilian infrastructure is 
routinely targeted, as it was in both case studies in this research.  “The use of cyberattack 
 
167 The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare is a continuously-
updated collection of expert opinions of a number of academics and practitioners operating in 
their personal capacity. It is a is a product of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of 
Excellence but does not reflect the views of the NATO CCD COE or NATO and is not meant to 
reflect NATO doctrine. Original volume:  Schmitt, Michael N. Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
168 Tallinn Manual.  p 48-51.  
169 Koh, Harold Hongju.  "The Emerging Law of the 21st Century War."  The Brookings Institute.  
Breyer Lecture presentation, April 1, 2016.   
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is governed by “jus in bello” or the Law of Armed Conflict. These laws are derived from 
international conventions and treaties (such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions) and 
from customary international law. They set forth rules that govern the use of force during 
armed conflict.”170 There are three principles from the Laws of Armed Conflict that apply 
to cyberspace and assist in judging the legality of cyber statecraft actions. These are:   
1. The principle of distinction requires attacks to be limited to legitimate military 
objectives and that civilian objects shall not be the object of attack. Article 23 
of the Hague Convention, for example, forbids belligerents “to destroy or 
seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of war.”171  
2. The principle of proportionality requires that the use of force in self-defense 
must be limited to that which is necessary to meet an imminent or actual 
armed attack and must be proportionate to the threat that is faced. Attacks on a 
military objective which cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or 
damage civilian property, in excess of that needed to obtain concrete and 
direct military advantage are prohibited.172  
3. The principle of discriminate attack prohibits attacks that cannot reasonably 
be limited to a specific military objective, and which are indiscriminate or 
haphazard in their inclusion of civilian targets. Article 27 calls for belligerents 
 
170 Lewis, James A. “A Note on the Laws of War in Cyberspace.” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, April 2010. p. 2.  
171 Ibid.  
172 Ibid.  
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to take all necessary steps to avoid damage to “buildings dedicated to religion, 
art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places 
where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at 
the time for military purposes.”173 
 Under the Laws of Armed Conflict, in cyber statecraft, an aggressor must assess 
the civilian collateral damage potential before engaging in an action, the same operational 
process that is required for kinetic actions. “The goal of the protections for civilians 
found in the laws of war is not to shield them from the dangers of military operations but 
to avoid capricious attacks undertaken solely to harm civilian targets.”174 However, also 
akin to the kinetic realm, these laws are only adhered to by willing participants; if a 
pariah state or non-state actor wishes to engage in destructive cyber statecraft behavior 
targeting civilian entities, they do, as is described in both case studies in chapters four 
and five.  
 The Laws of Armed Conflict and cyber norms and their application to cyber 
statecraft are only as good as when they are widely-adopted, used and operationalized.  
There have been a number of global cyberattacks that violate these laws and norms, and 
those attacks are often from states that also consistently violate other international laws 
and norms, such as Russia and North Korea.175  
 How useful are cyber norms and the application of international law to 
 
173 Ibid.  
174 Ibid.  
175 As repressive regimes, Russia and North Korea have violated international norms and laws on 
a variety of issues ranging from international sanctions violations to human rights to extrajudicial 
murder.   
81 
 
cyberspace?  If the state agrees with the norm framework and cooperates (good 
international institutionalists) but a state that does not buy into the cooperation agreement 
then attacks (the realist, self-help world of anarchy) then does the institutionalist 
agreement matter? It becomes an agreement among friends, and some may see that 
agreement as limiting when in conflict with a state that does not agree to these 
limitations.   
 On March 5, 2020, for the first time in the history of the Security Council, Estonia 
raised the issue of cybersecurity. According to the President of Estonia, Kersti Kaljulaid: 
 “Our goal [in going to the UN Security Council] was to start creating the new  
normal; that if a country comes under cyberattack, then they will have at the 
Security Council a place to report about it, complain about it, and ask other 
countries to react, take positions, and maybe one day also take action. …We still 
don’t have a clear understanding of how we are able to protect our sovereignty [in 
cyber].176 
 
 Although the United Nations noted in June 2020 that the subject of cyber (aka 
ICTs) has been part of the UN international conversation since 1998, serious attention has 
only coalesced around the subject in recent years. Countries like Estonia, who suffered 
significant cyberattacks in 2007, were forced to confront the importance of cybersecurity 
needs and became an early adopter of best practices to create a secure digital environment 
in the country.  As noted by the Estonia President at an international conference on cyber 
stability:  “When we finally had a really good conference on the 8th of May in the UN 
Security Council, somebody quipped that it was probably a small step for Estonia but a 
 
176 President of Estonia, Kersti Kaljulaid, remarks presented at “Deciding on the Rules of the 
Road for Cyberspace: The Who, What, Where, When, How” at the Institute of International 
Cyber Stability, June 9. 2020.   
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big step for the world and I have to say that it doesn’t exactly sound modest if I confirm 
but we felt a little bit this way.  Our point has been proven.”177  
 This section provided the greater context to fully understand the environment in 
which cyber coercion occurs, the different perspectives on how to approach the issue of 
cyber statecraft and how different powers view constraints on employing these cyber 
capabilities. Equipped with a better understanding of the constraints, or the lack thereof, 
in cyber statecraft, and how the strategic choices of state actors to conduct cyber coercion 
fits within the larger cyber operations framework, the next section proceeds to describe 
the argument of this research.   
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When a state decides that they would like another state or non-state actor in the 
international community to change their behavior toward a particular issue, a state has 
several levers of power it can use to exercise to exert pressure.  These levers range from 
diplomatic demarche to public embarrassment to economic sanctions to cyber coercion to 
kinetic action and a whole host of additional options in between. This research focuses on 
cyber coercion where the targets are soft, countervalue targets178  in an open, democratic 
society, and identify and examine what variables contribute to determining a variety of 
victim responses.  
Once a state or non-state actor has decided to engage in cyber coercion, it must 
design a strategy, choose targets, select the tactics and initiate the operation. There are a 
number of variables that go into this calculation.  In examining previous coercive 
diplomacy dynamics, George identified seven conditions that favor coercive diplomacy 
(Clarity of the objective, Strength of Motivation, Asymmetry of Motivation, Sense of 
Urgency, Adequate Domestic and International Support, Opponent's Fear of 
Unacceptable Escalation, and Clarity Concerning Precise Terms of the Settlement of a 
Crisis). However, for cyber coercion this set of variables must be expanded to include     
1) financial costs for the victim, 2) audience costs for the victim,179 3) leadership 
 
178 Countervalue targets are those that do not pose an overt military threat and are most often 
defined as civilian population centers such as towns and cities, but also include non-military 
government targets. Conversely, counterforce targets are those that pose a military threat, and 
consist mostly of government and military personnel and military controlled geographic targets. 
179 Byman and Waxman in The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits 
of Military Might refer to audience costs, but only in terms of a cautionary tale. They describe it 
as the problem of “overcoercing” and may lead adversaries to “take risks it would otherwise 
84 
 
destabilization potential through targeting of leadership, and 4) the amount of pressure on 
leadership.  These variables are defined in the following ways:  
1) Financial costs for the victim – the actual financial costs incurred by the victim 
to include the cost of rehabilitating or replacing the hardware and software, rebuilding 
their network, legal costs associated with the ramifications from a cyberattack, the 
financial losses incurred from an inability to function for a period of time and any other 
financial ramifications stemming from the consequences of the cyberattack.   
2) Audience costs for the victim – traditional audience costs refer to the 
consequences a leader incurs from their constituency if they escalate a crisis and then 
back down. “If a state backs down, its leaders suffer audience costs that increase as the 
crisis escalates. These costs arise from the action of domestic audiences concerned with 
whether the leadership is successful or unsuccessful at foreign policy”180 For purposes of 
this research, which includes a commercial industry victim that is not beholden to a 
constituency, but instead to customers and business associates, that definition is expanded 
to include the reputation costs for the company in its dealings with various business 
associates and retaining customers. Further, this expanded definition is not only limited to 
the consequences of backing down and being unsuccessful at foreign policy like a state 
actor, but also includes all the consequences to its corporate reputation from engaging 
with, or ignoring, a cyber adversary.   
 
avoid and to escalate a conflict in order to stay in power.” Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman. 
The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 36-37. 
180 Fearon, James. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” 
American Political Science Review, Vol 88, No. 3, September 1994: 577-592.  
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3) Leadership destabilization potential through targeting of leadership – if 
leadership is specifically targeted in a cyber coercive act there can be a higher potential 
for leadership destabilization based on the nature of the attack against leadership. If 
leadership is targeted and the result is embarrassing or compromising information that is 
then revealed (either broadly or narrowly) leadership may have to step down or be 
relieved of duties. If leadership is undermined or punished during a cyber coercion 
negotiation, the victim’s ability to bargain can be severely weakened and their ability to 
negotiate can be superseded by personal demands.  
4) The amount of pressure on leadership – akin to specifically targeting 
leadership, the amount of pressure on leadership is a function of the nature of the 
cyberattack.  That is, if the cyberattack paralyzes the victim for days or weeks and people 
are unable to work and unable to carry on their daily activities, the pressure on leadership 
will be high. Further, if there is a personal disparaging angle to the cyber coercion, the 
amount of pressure on leadership will be high. Conversely, if the nature of the 
cyberattack does not reach a level of high incapacitation nor deride the leadership nor 
significantly impact daily life, the leadership may feel low pressure to resolve the 
conflict.  
The assumptions for this research are the following:  
1) An aggressor seeks to change the behavior of the victim and that is why the 
aggressor is engaging in cyber coercion and not solely for the sake of being 
belligerent or destructive.  
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2) Through the use of advanced cybersecurity analysis best practices and 
leveraging private industry’s unique aperture combined with Healey’s Spectrum 
of State Responsibility and Sharp’s Known Coercer plus Known Demand 
Standard, we can achieve sufficient attribution of an aggressor.   
3) The aggressors in these case studies, Russia and North Korea, follow an 
essentially Realist understanding of the world – i.e. along the lines of 
Mearsheimer’s belief of an anarchical world of self-help which contributes to 
their individual choices to engage in cyber aggression as opposed to working 
through a cooperative solution via an international institution.  
 
This research argues that certain variables from George’s list of seven conditions 
that favor coercive diplomacy matter more in cyberspace than others in getting a victim 
to change their behavior and misestimating those variables can lead to failure. Further, 
this research argues that audience costs and/or financial costs have significant 
consequence in altering a victim’s behavior over time, but only when there is asymmetry 
of motivation and fear of escalation. Related, as described in the case studies in chapters 
four and five, targeting soft targets that suffer higher audience costs and higher financial 
costs compared with counterforce targets is a specific decision by an aggressor that may 
or may not contribute to changing a victim’s behavior, depending on the aggressor’s 
targeting choices.  Lastly, that leadership destabilization may be a consequence of cyber 
coercion, and while it may not directly change a victim’s behavior vis-à-vis the demand 
over time, leadership destabilization is an important consequence of cyber coercion.   
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Research Question  
The primary research question of the dissertation is: what effect does the variation 
in coercive strategy, relative conditions that favor coercive diplomacy (i.e. to what degree 
does a cyber campaign satisfy the seven conditions listed by George) and an expanded set 
of additional variables have on victim responses to cyber coercive measures over time 
when the target choice focuses on soft, countervalue targets?  For this dissertation, the 
dependent variable (DV) is how each victim responded to the threatening computer 
network operations (CNO) action, including if the victim response changes over time and 
it is measured by the reported actions taken by the victims. Previous literature only 
looked at the result in the binary of success or failure in changing a victim’s behavior and 
was artificially restrictive to the immediate temporal value; this expands the definition of 
effective coercion from a binary understanding to a spectrum of five and extends the time 
range across three temporal values. The options for the DV values comprise an escalation 
spectrum and include: 181  
Deterrence/compellence – victim acquiesces to aggressor's demand 
Status quo ante – the victim does not change their behavior, may ignore the 
action,  and does not acquiesce.  
Defend – victim does not acquiesce and instead builds up defenses in response  
Counterattack – victim does not acquiesce and instead attacks the Coercer  
 
181 The options for the dependent variable are borrowed from the economic coercion and 
sanctions literature, specifically Daniel Drezner’s “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion.” 
International Organization, 57, Summer 2003, p. 646.   
88 
 
Combination of these responses – victim acquiesces and builds up defenses or  
victim defends and also launches counterattacks or victim defends and engages in 
deterrence and compellence against aggressor.   
 
In order to thoroughly examine this question and test the associated hypotheses, 
this research will consist of an in-depth comparative case study approach.   It will assess 
the strategies of cyber coercion and the cost imposition through the examination of victim 
responses across two case studies182: North Korea's actions against Sony Pictures 
Entertainment in 2014, and Russian's actions against Estonia in 2007, are well-suited to 
test the conditions of competing theories and theory building.183 Further, as noted earlier 
in this chapter, this research will separately address in-depth the strategies to surmount 
the purported “attribution problem” that is oft-discussed as a major impediment to 
examining the actions and outcomes of cyber coercion.  
 North Korea is a regional power and Estonia is a small power, albeit one that is 
bolstered by NATO. Russia is a strong power, and Sony Pictures Entertainment is a 
relatively vulnerable private sector company based in the United States and 
headquartered in Japan. North Korea's use of cyber capabilities for coercive purposes 
against Sony Pictures Entertainment and Russian's actions against Estonia each provide a 
showground to test the focused questions, test the variables that favor successful coercion 
 
182 Geddes, B.  "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in 
Comparative Politics." Political Analysis 2(1): 1990.  p. 131-150.  
183 George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett.  Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.  
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and for theory building using the lessons resulting from examining these cases.  Being 
able to test these questions and conditions against both a regional power and a strong 
power aggressor, where the victims of these cases are soft, countervalue targets in a 
democratic country and a company operating in a democratic country, matters when 
discussing audience costs.  That is, the audience in a democratic country has a greater 
ability to know what threats might accompany a public use of cyber action than they 
would under an authoritarian regime. The victim suffers greater audience costs when the 
media is free to operate, and the victim may incur greater financial losses and pressure on 
leadership in a free society when a cyberattack occurs and private information is 
revealed. 
 The independent variables include the relative responses to George’s seven 
conditions within each case (Clarity of the objective, Strength of Motivation, Asymmetry 
of Motivation, Sense of Urgency, Adequate Domestic and International Support, 
Opponent's Fear of Unacceptable Escalation, and Clarity Concerning Precise Terms of 
the Settlement of a Crisis), and an expanded set  of variables that includes financial costs 
for the victim, audience costs for the victim, leadership destabilization potential for the 
victim, and targeting of leadership and/or pressure on leadership.  These variables are 
produced by taking the results from the structured focused data drawn from primary and 
secondary sources. There are caveats to constructing these variables: namely, states and 
companies have an incentive to withhold this information so as to minimize the public 
consequences of their victimhood, lessen embarrassment, preserve their dignity and 
attempt to drive down the overall audience costs. These variables are based on publicly 
90 
 
released information from the victim, publicly available leadership statements, 
information released from related victims and legal cases, and information based on the 
commercial cybersecurity industry assessments and its independent access to data. Below 
is a table showing how each of the independent variables apply to each of the case study 
dyads:  
 
Table 6:  
Independent variables Russia v. Estonia North Korea v. Sony 
Choice of Target  
Countervalue 
including non-
military government  
Countervalue 




Leadership as a target, potential 
destabilization 
Yes, a target 
No potential 
destabilization  
Yes, a target 
Yes potential 
destabilization  
Attribution Yes Yes 
Audience costs for the victim High High 
Financial costs for the victim High High  
Pressure on Leadership  Yes Yes 
Clarity of objective Yes Yes 
Strength of motivation Yes Yes 
Asymmetry of motivation No Yes 







Opponents fear of unacceptable escalation No Not at first, but later 
Clarity concerning precise terms of the 
settlement of a crisis  
Yes Yes 
 
184 In Forceful Persuasion, George notes that any successful coercive diplomacy requires a 
certain level of domestic support and that, a lack of domestic support can constrain the use of 
coercive diplomacy.  Further, he notes that the presence or absence of international support can 




 The hypotheses for this research examining victim response are the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: George’s seven conditions that favor coercive success (Clarity of the 
objective, Strength of Motivation, Asymmetry of Motivation, Sense of Urgency, 
Adequate Domestic and International Support, Opponent's Fear of Unacceptable 
Escalation, and Clarity Concerning Precise Terms of the Settlement of a Crisis) fully 
explain the outcome without reference to any further factors (i.e. the null hypothesis.)  
 
Hypothesis 2: All other variables being equal, the greater the financial and/or audience 
costs faced by a victim where there is asymmetric motivation (i.e. one participant in the 
coercive dyad is more invested in the issue than the other) combined with a potential for 
leadership destabilization, the more likely the victim is to acquiesce to the demands of the 
aggressor over time. 
 
Hypothesis 3: If an aggressor chooses solely countervalue, soft or commercial targets that 
suffer higher audience costs and offer few-to-zero counterattack options, and a fear of 






This section outlines how the data for the variables are constructed, what sources 
are relied upon for the data, how the data will be used to measure what effects the 
variables (annotated earlier in this chapter) have on the victim responses, and how the 
cases were selected. The research methodology used in this study will be a qualitative 
study of mixed research methods focusing on George and Bennett's “structured, focused 
comparison”185 between two paired exploratory most-similar case studies to evaluate 
each case against shared criteria. This allows each the values of the independent variables 
to be measured consistently.186 The second method used will be process-tracing as 
outlined by Bennett and Checkel, Collier, Bennett, Mahoney, Hall and Ricks and Liu.187  
 
185 George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005. Chapter 3, p. 67-72. 
186 The case study research design is guided by the following: George, Alexander and Andrew 
Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2005; John Gerring and Lee Cojocaru. “Selecting Cases for Intensive Analysis: 
A Diversity of Goals and Methods.” Sociological Methods & Research, 2016, Vol. 45(3) 392-
423. John Gerring. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Strategies for Social Inquiry) 
2nd Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017; David Collier (ed.) “Case Selection, 
Case Studies, and Causal Inference: A Symposium.” Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section 
for Qualitative and Mixed-Method Research, 2008 2:2-16; John Gerring. “What is a Case Study 
and What is it Good For?” American Political Science Review, 2004 98(2): 341-354; and James 
Mahoney. “After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research” World Politics 62, no. 1 
(January 2010): 120-147. 
187 Bennett, Andrew, and Jeffrey T. Checkel. “Process Tracing.” In Process Tracing: From 
Metaphor to Analytic Tool, edited by Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, 3–38. From the 
Series: Strategies for Social Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. See also: 
David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing.” PS: Political Science and Politics , October 
2011, Vol. 44, No. 4.  
823-830; Andrew Bennett. "Process Tracing and Causal Inference." Rethinking Social Inquiry: 
Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, edited by Henry Brady and David Collier. Plymouth, UK: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; Second edition, 2010.   
Peter Hall “Tracing the Progress of Process-Tracing.” European Political Science, 2013. 12(1). p 
20-30; Jacob Ricks and Amy Liu. “Process-Tracing Research Designs: A Practical Guide.” 
American Political Science Association, October 2018. p. 842-846. 
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This qualitative study is necessary, and a deeper examination of these specific 
cases is essential, because it is valuable to understand through structured focused 
questions and process-tracing which factors, how they were operationalized and why they 
did or did not exert causal influence that led these victims to respond the way they did to 
cyber coercion.  These methods, used in tandem, will serve this purpose by describing in 
detail the factors that were and were not present in each case study and demonstrating 
how each factor contributed or did not contribute to the outcome. Further, this research 
illuminates the mistake of focusing on binary outcomes in a cyber coercive act and shows 
that examining the degree of effectiveness shown by the victim response over time 
produces a different result and a richer understanding than the simplified, one-moment-
in-time might suggest.  
The scope of this project is focused on soft, countervalue targets in open, 
democratic systems. Soft, countervalue targets often incur higher audience costs, affect a 
larger proportion of society than, say, a counterforce target, and the ramifications for 
financial loss and leadership pressure can be different from those suffered by 
counterforce targets.  The focus on open, democratic systems is due to better 
measurement of public pressure and audience costs than is possible or expected in an 
authoritarian state where public opinion can be manufactured or suppressed.   
One limitation of this type of research that is illuminated in the case studies and is 
pointed out earlier is that aspects of these cyber activities are secretive by nature and 
therefore insight into these activities can be difficult to observe. Unless the coercer or the 
victim chooses to disclose the non-public overtures, diplomatic messaging or threats 
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involved prior to and in the aftermath of a cyber operation, this research must rely on 
primary sources such as the public statements of officials, the commercial cybersecurity 
industry notifications of intrusion, the commercial forensic cybersecurity industry 
assessments and the public statements from victims to collect the data. As well, this 
research also relies on secondary sources such as news reports and interviews with 
leaders and critical figures who were involved in the negotiations.   
 
Structured Focused Questions and Process-tracing 
To understand how the independent variables shape the victim’s decision-making 
and trace the process over time following a coercive cyberattack, this research will 
construct data from the case studies via structured focused questions. This method of 
analysis is structured such that the same questions will be asked of each case study. 
Chapters four and five present the structured focused comparison comprised of an 
identical set of questions to illuminate the values for the independent variables, consisting 
of the seven conditions that favor coercive diplomacy and the extended additional 
variables.188 This process allows me to isolate my variables of interest and hold them 
constant across the cases.  
This data will be combined with process-tracing that draws on the chronology 
sections to understand the in-depth, step-by-step decision making by a victim in the 
aftermath of a cyber crisis. This data will be used to test the hypotheses on victim 
 
188 George, Alexander. Forceful Persuasion. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 
1991.  p. 76-81. See also Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of 
Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. p. 279-288. 
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response to cyber coercion in chapter six. “Process-tracing is an indispensable tool for 
theory testing and theory development not only because it generates numerous 
observations within a case, but because these observations must be linked in particular 
ways to constitute an explanation of the case.”189 In process-tracing, researchers not only 
examine their theories of interest, but also must compare and contrast rival theories.190 
By applying the same structured focused questions to each case, the data revealed 
can be used to appropriately compare the findings in each case. I will test the hypotheses 
for this third path, this middle road theory between the two extreme cyber camps, against 
the identified case studies focused on the North Korea hack of Sony Pictures and Russia's 
cyberattack against Estonia in 2007 and build a framework within each case to show 
victim response variation depending on the strategies employed.191 Process tracing will 
use the historical evidence from each case to draw conclusions about the causal 
explanation for that case.192  
 The structured focused questions that will be asked of each dyad are the 
following:  
What were the targets of the cyberattack?  
 
189 George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett.  Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.  p. 207.  
190 Hall, Peter. “Tracing the Progress of Process-Tracing.” European Political Science, 2013. 
12(1). p 20-30. See also: Jacob Ricks and Amy Liu. “Process-Tracing Research Designs: A 
Practical Guide.” American Political Science Association, October 2018. p.842-846. 
191 George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett.  Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.  See also David Collier. “Understanding 
Process Tracing.” PS: Political Science and Politics , October 2011, Vol. 44, No. 4 (October 
2011), p. 823-830 
192 Bennett, Andrew and Jeffrey Checkel.  "Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best 
Practices," in Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel (eds.) Process Tracing: From Metaphor to 
Analytic Tool. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014.  
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What was the nature of the attack? How was the attack conducted?  
Was leadership targeted?   
What was the understanding about attribution at the time of the attack? Did this change 
over time?  
What were the audience costs?  What were the audience costs over time?  
What were the financial costs? What were the financial costs over time?   
What was the pressure on leadership during the cyber crisis?  
 
George’s seven conditions as structured focused questions: 
What was the victim’s understanding of the clarity of the objective? 
What was strength of motivation of the coercing power?  
What was the asymmetry of motivation between the adversaries?193  
What was the victim’s understanding of the coercer’s sense of urgency?  
Is there adequate domestic and international support for the victim and the coercer?  
What is the opponent's (victim’s) fear of unacceptable escalation? 
What is the clarity concerning precise terms of the settlement of a crisis for the victim 
and the coercer?   
   
 
193 In Forceful Persuasion, George refers to the measurement of asymmetry of motivation as 
“what is critical in this respect, however, is that the adversary believe that the coercing power is 




The research purpose of this project is to examine what effect the variation in 
coercive strategy, factors present or not present that favor coercive diplomacy have on 
victim responses to cyber coercive measures over time when the targets are a soft, 
countervalue targets in open, democratic societies. This research identifies four additional 
variables beyond George’s seven criteria and these two cases are suitable for testing these 
additional variables and explaining the divergent outcomes. The methodological 
approach is to study cases in what Gerring and Cojocaru, refer to as ‘exploratory most-
similar with background conditions similar’ positive and negative case studies where 
there are shared background conditions, but lead to divergent outcomes.194 The case 
selection is also informed by Mahoney and Goertz’s counsel on small-N qualitative 
research and the value of including negative cases that are extremely similar to positive 
cases “to test theory about the causes of outcomes of exceptional interest.”195 Gerring 
notes,  
“A most similar exploratory design uses cases that “exhibit similar background 
conditions (Z) and different outcomes (Y). …As always, the research design is 
more informative if it analyses change through time rather than values at a 
particular point in time.”196 
 
194 Gerring, John and Lee Cojocaru. "Selecting Cases for Intensive Analysis: A Diversity of Goals 
and Methods." Sociological Methods & Research, 2016, Vol. 45(3) 392-423. See also, John 
Gerring. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Strategies for Social Inquiry) 2nd 
Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 79; and James Mahoney and Gary 
Goertz. "The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research" 
The American Political Science Review, Nov. 2004, Vol. 98, No. 4, pp. 653-669 
195 Mahoney, James and Gary Goertz. The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative in 
Comparative Research. American Political Science Review Vol. 98, No. 4 November 2004. p. 
653-669. 
196 Gerring, John. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Strategies for Social Inquiry) 
2nd Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
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The purpose of including a positive and negative case is to trace the process on 
why one victim responds to an aggressors demand with a partial acquiescence response 
while another victim made a diametrically opposite decision and not only refused to 
acquiesce but instead heavily defended itself. Beyond that, this victim then coordinated 
with international institutions and neighboring partners to bolster cyber defenses and 
resilience for the long-term. Other examples of most-similar negative cases that are part 
of the population and were considered but excluded from this study include Iran’s 2012 
attacks against the U.S. financial sector, Iran’s 2012 attack against Saudi Arabia’s 
Aramco, and North Korea’s 2013 attack against South Korean financial and media 
outlets. These cases did not share the same background characteristics but are good cases 
to consider for further research.   
The best selection for a most-similar case to the North Korea-Sony cyberattack is 
the Russia-Estonia case. This research is centered on the North Korea vs. Sony case as 
the positive case and Russia vs. Estonia as the negative case. These two cases share 
distinctive, theoretically significant background factors.197 In both cases, these 
background vectors include the following:  
• In both cases the victims had adversaries who formally declared their demands in 
public and to governing bodies (For North Korea it was to the United Nations and 
for Russia its was in the Russian government) in months prior to the conflict; 
 
197 Gerring, John. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Strategies for Social Inquiry) 
2nd Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
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• In both cases they were able to make reasonable attribution in light of the public 
demand;  
• In both cases they were dealing with an aggressor who was extremely committed 
to the demand;  
• In both cases the victim was a democracy or operating in a democracy and 
therefore more vulnerable to audience costs and financial costs than an 
authoritarian regime that controls the media and can subsidize losses without 
oversight;  
• In both cases, the victim of the attacks included significant civilian infrastructure 
that disrupted civilian life for an extended period;  
• In both cases the aggressor is a country that is considered “Not Free.”198  
The ranking of “Not Free” also has theoretically relevant underpinnings for this 
research: namely, these states maintain ubiquitous surveillance over their own 
populations internally, to include the internet, which contributes to the idea that if cyber 
coercive acts were originating in their country, they have means to not only be aware of 
it, but also to control it. With regard to the externalities of being a “Not Free” state, in the 
realm of cyber coercion, this also means that these states buck the international norms of 
civil liberties, political pluralism, freedom of expression, openness and transparency, and 
may be less receptive to following international norms of behavior against pursuing 
 
198 “Russia.” Freedom House, 2007.  Located at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2007/russia and accessed on December 18, 2019. See also “North Korea” Located at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/country/north-korea/freedom-world/2017 and accessed on December 
18, 2019.  
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civilian targets.  
The case selection was also based on two additional factors: first, this research 
sought dyads where the victims were democratic countries or located within democratic 
countries because these victims are beholden to variables like audience costs and 
financial costs in a way that authoritarian regimes are not. The regime type matters 
because in a democracy there is more oversight to take on higher exogenous costs than 
there would be in an authoritarian economy where the government will subsidize the 
financial loss with no transparency to the populace. Further, democratic regimes are more 
forthcoming with credible information since they must answer to their general public. 
When dealing with the cyber realm that is already shrouded in secrecy, gaining insight 
into cyber actions in non-democratic countries, where the leaders are not obligated to the 
populace and credible information surrounding these actions is highly unlikely to be 
published due to authoritarian media control, is extremely difficult and the information 
published often lacks reliability. In order to have best access to transparent, accurate 
information, including government statements, documents and interviews, examining 
cases with democratic victims provides greater assurance of the preciseness of the data 
which is necessary for accurate process tracing. Therefore, democratic victims were 
specifically part of the case selection process because the level of detailed information 
that is required for accurate process-tracing would not be available nor be able to be 
relied upon in a non-democratic or authoritarian regime victim.  
The other main factor for case selection were victims that rely significantly upon 
their IT infrastructure in order to conduct daily functions. Comparing cases where 
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upwards of 80% of the target population engages with and is reliant upon the digital 
world daily with a victim where engagement is less than 40% would not be as robust a 
study because the victim would have ample alternatives to conduct daily life and would 
not be as drastically affected by variables like audience costs or domestic support. 
Therefore, I sought cases where the IT usage of the victim was high overall and on par 




Numbers versus Words199 
 Generally, selecting cases based on the dependent variable is a major pitfall in 
research and doing so carries a dire warning to avoid it.  As Achen and Snidal caution, 
selecting cases based on the dependent variable commits “inferential felonies” that can 
significantly undermine the validity of one's findings.200 However, they also concur that 
“[t]here is nothing wrong with nonrandom samples so long as they are not treated as 
random. Indeed, there may be good reasons not to choose cases randomly.”201 King, 
Keohane and Verba’s seminal text insisted that qualitative studies ought to avoid 
selecting cases based on the dependent variable so as not to bias the findings.202 
However, this advice is largely criticized by qualitative methodologists as pertaining 
more to quantitative and statistical research than to qualitative research.203 As described 
below, Mahoney and Collier caution that this advice applies to large-N quantitative 
studies and not necessarily to qualitative causal models under investigation.204 
Supporting this view, Gerring highlights “[w]hen the goal is exploratory, it is 
difficult to envision a viable case-selection strategy that takes no notice of the values for 
 
199 This wording is borrowed from Gary Goertz and James Mahoney’s Tale of Two Cultures: 
Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences. Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 2012. p. 19.  
200 Achen, H. and Duncan Snidal. "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies." 
World Politics Vol. 41, No. 2 (Jan., 1989), pp. 143-169. p. 160 
201 Ibid. p. 162 
202 King, Gary, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference 
in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.  
203 Collier, David and James Mahoney. “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative 




the outcome of interest.205  When engaging in causal process tracing, it requires variation 
on the dependent variable, so it is essential that one must take this need for variation into 
account when selecting cases. This study seeks to identify a new hypothesis, and by 
extension a theory, and is considered exploratory.206 As Gerring notes:  
“Exploratory case selection strategies that select cases based on their outcome, Y, 
violate a well-worn piece social science folk wisdom not to select based on the 
dependent variable. This is indeed problematic if a number of cases are chosen, 
all of which lie on one end of a variables spectrum (they are all positive  or 
negative), and the researchers subjects this sample to cross case analysis as if it 
were representative of a population. …However, this is not the proper or usual 
employment of cases chosen in an exploratory fashion. First of all, when cases are 
selected based on the outcome it is usually change in the outcome that is of 
primary interest.”207 
 
 Similar to George’s caveat about creating conditional generalizations and not 
seeking to construct comprehensive generalizations on why coercive diplomacy 
sometimes succeeds or fails,208 this research on cyber coercion seeks to do the same but 
examines an expanded set of variables and provides a strategy to surmount the attribution 
issue that is specific to cyber coercion and often prevents researchers from pursuing this 
line of interrogation. If this research sought to create an unencumbered widely 
generalizable theory about cyber coercion, or was heavily reliant on quantitative data, or 
 
205 Gerring, John. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Strategies for Social Inquiry) 
2nd Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 67.  
206 Ibid. p. 65.  
207 Ibid. p. 65. 
208 George, Alexander L. and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd 
ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. p. 268. 
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used a different methodology, then there may be a concern about selection bias.  
As Mahoney and Goertz explain, when the objective is to generalize about causal 
effects for large populations and approach it from a statistical perspective, the standard 
that all cases ought to be weighted equally absolutely applies.209 However, if the goal is 
to examine the constellation of factors on specific cases that lead to particular outcomes, 
and why and how they lead to those outcomes, then selecting particular cases is 
necessary. “Hence, the qualitative concern with substantively important cases seems 
puzzling from the perspective of the quantitative culture.”210 
Mahoney211 further expounds on this idea with the following:  
qualitative researchers would never use random selection even among cases from 
a useful cell…. Instead, they will often select cases about which they have 
excellent knowledge or can readily obtain such knowledge. In this culture, 
knowing a great deal about a case contributes significantly to within-case analysis 
…and can improve one's chances of carrying out valid inference212 
 
If this were a different type of study, such as a large-N quantitative study, 
selection bias would be a major concern because it could invalidate the quality of the 
results.213  However, given the exploratory objective of this research and the specific 
 
209 Goertz, Gary and James Mahoney’s Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Research in the Social Sciences. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2012. p. 171 
210 Ibid. p. 171 
211 James Mahoney previously ran the summer program called the Institute for Qualitative and 
Multi-Method Research (IQMR) at the Consortium on Qualitative Research Methods at Syracuse 
University and is a leading academic in social science methodology.  
212 Goertz, Gary and James Mahoney’s Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Research in the Social Sciences. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2012. p. 19. p 170 
213 Collier, David and James Mahoney. “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative 
Research.” World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 1, October 1996 
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methodology used, it is essential that the value of the outcome be considered during case 
selection.  More specifically, in selecting a positive and a negative most-similar case 
from the population of cases available, it is inherent to include the outcome in the 
selection criteria. Further, in conducting causal process-tracing there needs to be variance 
on the dependent variable and this method of case selection is an acceptable and 






This interdisciplinary study will make an original contribution to the literature in 
two ways: first, by providing a framework to show under what conditions the cyber realm 
can be employed for in the coercion dynamic to yield certain victim responses in cyber 
coercive diplomacy and, second, by providing case studies to test and analyze the 
proposed framework.   
Explaining how victims choose to respond to state-driven cyber coercion over 
time requires a reevaluation of how we understand aggressive actions in cyber statecraft, 
and how to apply George’s seven conditions that favor coercive diplomacy in the cyber 
realm. The two camps of cyber conventional wisdom say either cyber actions are trivial 
and have little effect on the international system (the optimists) or that they will result in 
cyber-driven disaster and destruction (the pessimists).  This research suggests that 
motivation of both aggressor and victim and whether this is equal or asymmetric as well 
as financial and/or audience costs shape the victim responses to cyber statecraft actions.  
Further, that these victim responses are neither the extremes of trivial nor disastrous but 
are part of the modern international relations landscape and the evolving toolbox for 





CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET  
 
The internet is an integral part of life in modern society so how is it possible that 
it continues to be so vulnerable to cyberattacks?  What makes the internet – and therefore 
a victim – susceptible to these different kinds of cyberattacks and can it be fortified? To 
thoroughly understand cyber coercion you must first understand the terrain that allows 
cyberattacks to occur.   
In international relations, terrain can be a significant factor for analysis; in the 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer discusses the stopping power of water 
and how large bodies of water inhibit the power projection of military power and the 
consequences this has on global hegemony.214  For theory building, it is important to 
thoroughly understand the constraints and intricacies of the environment in which a 
theory is operationalized. Is there an equivalent feature in cyberspace to Mearsheimer’s 
theory about the limitations presented by large bodies of water?  
 In short, no, but it more interesting to understand why not. One could argue that 
closed systems could come close to Mearsheimer’s idea of a cyberspace feature that 
limits adversarial power projection, but when looking at the open, public internet, there is 
no equivalent feature. So, what is the terrain and why can it not be secured for soft and 
 
214 Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W. W. Norton & Company, 2001. 
Another scholar who examines historical hostilities within a particular terrain is Robert Pape in 
Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War as well as in “The True Worth of Air Power.” 
Foreign Affairs, Issue 2 - March/April 2004, 116-130. Pape provides historical analyses of how 




hard targets alike? Part of difficulty is based on how the internet grew up.  
We have an internet today that was not built with the idea of a trusted digital 
infrastructure in mind and updating it is not a simple task; it a system of systems. Part of 
the modern problem of cyberattacks is that society has built our daily lives, our 
economies, our critical technologies and our crucial services on a system that was not 
designed nor constructed for the level of connectivity and reliance that we use it for 
today. The original internet was created by a small group of people whose moonshot goal 
was to openly share information across the world in near real-time; security, especially as 
we know it in present day, was not a concern for this massive undertaking at the time. 
However, now, this “interdependence has created great opportunities and great 
vulnerabilities, which strategists do not yet fully comprehend.215 
 
Where It All Began 
 Internetworking, or “internet” as it is more commonly known, is simply the 
practice of connecting multiple computer networks.216 In May 1961, a graduate student 
named Leonard Kleinrock at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology wrote a 
dissertation proposal called “Information Flow in Large Communication Nets”217 and, 
 
215 Nye Jr., Joseph. “”Nuclear Lessons for Cybersecurity?” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 
2011. p. 18. 
216 “Protecting the Cybersecurity of America’s Networks.” The Brookings Institution. February 
11, 2021. Located at:  https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/02/11/protecting-the-
cybersecurity-of-americas-networks/ 





with a small group of fellow academic researchers, would change how people 
communicate all over the world; Leonard Kleinrock would later be considered the father 
of Modern Data Networking.218   
In the proposal, his research focus included “…the nets under consideration 
consist of nodes, connected to each other by links. The nodes receive, sort, store, and 
transmit messages that enter and leave via the links… ” and he followed this proposal 
with a July 1961 paper theorizing about how packet switching technology would 
operate219 which forms the basic structure of the modern-day internet. 
 In 1962, two researchers, J. C. R. Licklider and Welden E. Clark wrote a paper 
following the Spring Joint Computer Conference titled “On-Line Man-Computer 
Communication”220 that envisioned using networked computers to exchange data and 
access programs, identified critical research areas necessary to improve human-computer 
interactions and laid out four major long-term problems, namely:   
The first of these areas is computer appreciation of natural written languages, in 
their semantic and pragmatic as well as in their syntactic aspects. The second is 
computer recognition of words spoken in context by various and unselected 
talkers. The third is the theory of algorithms, particularly their discovery and 
simplification. The fourth is heuristic programming. We believe that these four 
areas will in the long term be extremely important to man computer symbiosis, 
but that man-computer partnerships of considerable effectiveness and value can 
 
218 Cohen-Almagor, Raphael. “Internet History.” International Journal of Technoethics, 2(2), 45-
64, April-June 2011. p. 47. 
219 The archived theory paper can be found at:  
https://www.lk.cs.ucla.edu/data/files/Kleinrock/Information%20Flow%20in%20Large%20Comm
unication%20Nets0.pdf 
220 Licklider, JCR and Welden Clark. “On-line Man-Computer Communication. Proceedings of 
the Spring Joint Computer Conference. Archived at the Internet Archive and located at:  
https://archive.org/details/online-man-computer-communication/page/n3/mode/2up   
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be achieved without them. We suspect that solutions in these areas will be found 
with the aid of early man-computer symbioses, rather than conversely.221 
 
Aspects of the four problems that Licklider and Clark identified 58 years ago continue to 
be worked on, updated and improved upon today. We have successfully created computer 
appreciation of natural written languages, but it continues to develop. Siri, Alexa, the 
suite of digital personal assistants and various accessibility tools that recognize voice 
have satisfied the second major problem of computer recognition of words spoken at a 
basic level, but that, too, continues to develop. The third and fourth long-term problems, 
computer algorithms and heuristic programming, continue to be areas of great discovery 
and expansion.   
 This research formed the basis for a U.S. Department of Defense-funded project, 
begun in 1962 and headed by Licklider, at the Advanced Research Project Agency 
(ARPA)222 that would eventually grow to be called the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency Network, or ARPANET. ARPANET was one of several Cold War projects that 
were part of a series of innovative technological research projects initiated in the 
aftermath of the Soviet Union’s successful Sputnik satellite launch. ARPANET grew 
slowly; in 1965 the proof of concept was successfully tested via a low-speed dial-up 
 
221 Licklider, JCR and Welden Clark. “On-line Man-Computer Communication. Archived at the 
Internet Archive and located at:  https://archive.org/details/online-man-computer-
communication/page/n3/mode/2up.  Page 122. Licklider and Clark’s paper includes a prescient 
statement, especially when writing in 1962: “Twenty years from now, some form of keyboard 
operation will doubtless be taught in kindergarten, and forty years from now keyboards may be as 
universal as pencils, but at present good typists are few. Some other symbolic input channel than 
the typewriter is greatly needed.” page 115.  
222 Over the years the agency has changed its name four times from Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (ARPA) to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and back again. 
The current name in 2021 is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).   
111 
 
telephone line223 that connected a computer in Massachusetts with one in California.224 
 By 1969, ARPANET was officially launched, connecting four computer nodes in 
the first long-haul network that included the University of California at Los Angeles 
(UCLA), the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) in Menlo Park, California, the University 
of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB), and the University of Utah. In the next decade, 
ARPANET would expand dramatically; it consisted of 35 nodes by 1973, and in 1974 a 
set of new protocols called Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the Internet 
Protocol (IP) were implemented.225 These protocols govern how a network establishes 
and breaks connections, organizes and routes data packets, and checks for errors. The 
TCP/IP protocol is still widely in use today, a testament to the open architecture 
implementation, although several other protocols have also been developed in the 
intervening 46 years. The following diagrams226 show the growth of ARPANET from 
initial 4-node network success to significant growth by 1977:  
  
 
223 To put the magnitude of this endeavor in context, it was only 62 years earlier that the first 
radio transmission from the United States crossed the Atlantic Ocean. The first U.S. radio 
transmission across the Atlantic Ocean came from Marconi Station on Cape Cod to England. The 
message was from President Theodore Roosevelt to King Edward VII in London, praised wireless 
telegraphy and greeted the monarch.  
https://www.edn.com/marconi-sends-transatlantic-wireless-message-january-19-1903/ 
224 “The History of the Internet” via The Department of Computer Science Old Dominion 
University. Located at: https://www.cs.odu.edu/~tkennedy/cs300/development/Public/M02-
HistoryOftheInternet/index.html#:~:text=1965%3A%20Working%20with%20Thomas%20Merril
l,area%20computer%20network%20ever%20built.   Accessed February 1, 2021.  
225 Cohen-Almagor, Raphael. “Internet History.” International Journal of Technoethics, 2(2), 45-
64, April-June 2011. p. 50. 
226 Shultz, Colin. “See How Fast ARPANET Spread in Just Eight Years.” Smithsonian Magazine. 
August 28, 2013. Located at:  https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/see-how-fast-
arpanet-spread-in-just-eight-years-2341268/ and accessed on February 1, 2021.  
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Figure 3:  
 
 
 It took 15 years to grow from MIT graduate student Leonard Kleinrock’s idea and 
theoretical conception to a government-funded innovation project with rapid expansion to 
eventually become a fully-fledged operational system of networked computers with 
transatlantic connectivity. This would continue to grow, innovate and improve in the 
1980s, and by “January 1983, enough individual networks had networked with each other 
that the ARPANET had evolved into the internet, although the original ARPANET itself 
was not formally decommissioned until 1990.”227 With the expansion of the internet, 
came fear and doubt. Fear that all of our critical and financial systems would come 
 
227 “ARPANET.” Defense Advanced Research Project Agency. Located at: 
https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/ARPANET_final.pdf.  Accessed February 2, 2020.  
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crashing down in the Y2K fiasco that was New Year’s Eve 2000. And doubt that the 
internet would ever be more than a “passing fad” and that this new-fangled technology 
was not going to significantly impact our daily lives, as the December 5, 2000, Daily 




 Although this popular publication quipped that people may give up on the internet 
21 years ago, that did not happen.  According to the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), the primary source for global radio and telecommunications connectivity 
information and the United Nations agency for information and communication 
technologies (ICTs), about 4 billion people or more than 51% of the global population is 
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using the internet as of 2019.228 Industry leader, Cisco, estimates that nearly two-thirds of 
the world’s population will have internet access by 2023, totaling 5.3 billion users.229 
That number refers to overall users, not devices. Cisco estimates that by 2023 the number 
of connected devices will be three times the total global population. “There will be 3.6 
networked devices per capita by 2023, up from 2.4 networked devices per capita in 2018. 
There will be 29.3 billion networked devices by 2023, up from 18.4 billion in 2018.”230 
Each device represents a potential cyberattack vector for an aggressor and a vulnerability 
for a user.  
 The distribution of internet users, however, is uneven as shown in this map from 








228 International Telecommunications Union, Statistics. Located at:  https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx.  Accessed on February 2, 2021.  
229 Cisco Annual Internet Report (2018-2023) White Paper.  March 9, 2020. Located at: 
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/executive-perspectives/annual-internet-
report/white-paper-c11-741490.html.  Accessed January 8. 2021.    
230 Ibid.  
231 Pew Research, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/02/8-charts-on-internet-use-
around-the-world-as-countries-grapple-with-covid-19/ 
232 Cisco Annual Internet Report (2018-2023) White Paper.  March 9, 2020. Located at: 
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/executive-perspectives/annual-internet-
report/white-paper-c11-741490.html.  Accessed January 8. 2021.    
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Figure 6.   Internet users as a percentage of regional population 
 
Region 2018 2023 
Global 51% 66% 
Asia Pacific 52% 72% 
Central and Eastern Europe 65% 78% 
Latin America 60% 70% 
Middle East and Africa 24% 35% 
North America 90% 92% 
Western Europe 82% 87% 
 
The lop-sided distribution of internet users means that countries and entities that are more 
reliant on the internet for its critical services may also be more vulnerable to potential 
cyberattacks and activities like cyber coercion. 
 In addition to the physical connectivity that the internet provides, modern day 
internet consists of networked devices, so the other significant component to 
understanding the landscape of contemporary cyberspace is Moore’s Law. Originally, 
Moore’s law is the observation that the number of transistors in a dense integrated circuit 
(the chip speed) doubles every two years, and the cost is halved during this same 
timeframe. It is an economic argument as well as a technological one; faster chips allow 
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faster processing, increased complexity and capacity, advanced processes, and increased 
performance. A contemporary interpretation is a focus on the increase of cores per die 
instead of simply clock speed, as was the original Moore’s law. A core is a unit that runs 
in parallel with other cores and a die consists of several cores.  
Considerations of Moore’s law matters when analyzing offensive and defensive 
operations and capabilities in cyberspace, especially when comparing operations 
differentiated in time by more than two to four years. The difference between what was 
possible in cyberspace in 2002 compared with 2006, or 2010 compared with 2016, or 
more drastically, what was possible in 2002 versus what is possible in 2020 is massive. It 
is no longer a one-to-one comparison when analyzing capabilities across an 18-year time 
span due, in part, to the effect of Moore’s law. This is a contributing factor to why it is 
difficult to do long range longitudinal study on cyberspace operations unless explicitly 
accounting for the technical differences as a factor in the final analysis, which several 
scholars fail to factor in. If a scholarly argument is based upon an assumption about a 
technological capability at the time, it may not have great explanatory value in the future 
due to the constantly innovating environment and increase in speed and capability that 
Moore’s law demonstrates.  
For example, when writing in Winter 2016/2017, Slayton highlights that the 
Chinese firewall is not as impervious as one may think and can be “easily 
circumvented,”233 citing studies that use data from 2006, 2007 and 2010.234 While that 
 
233 Slayton, Rebecca. “What is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance?” International Security 41:3. 
Winter 2016/2017. p. 75.  
234 This reference from Slayton’s paper is a paper that was eventually published in 2007 and 
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may have been true during the time frame of the original study, it ill-advised to assume 
that is still the case in 2016, given the significant generational improvement in 
technology in the intervening years between 2010 and when she is writing, let alone with 
the present day 2021.235 This is simply one example where the explanatory value of an 
argument loses power because it is based on data that is, conservatively, at least five 
generations old, technologically speaking.  
This disconnect exemplifies one aspect of the challenge when writing about the 
intersection of cyberspace and international relations. Since technological capabilities 
significantly improve (i.e. Moore’s law) in a relatively short timeframe (e.g. two years) it 
can be difficult to look across studies from even the last decade and draw accurate 
conclusions about the present-day state of cyber capabilities.  For example, when 
conducting operations in cyberspace, speed of execution can make the critical difference 
between success and failure; the difference between being victorious and being caught. 
The speed of execution can also have several dependencies including the connectivity 
speed of the network, hardware speed of the devices in the network, efficiency of the 
code written to run the commands, and the complexity of the network. If an adversary is 
able to gain access to a network undetected and is able to navigate through the network 
 
relied on data from 2006 and earlier on China’s technology for packet inspection on traffic: 
Richard Clayton, Steven J. Murdoch, and Robert N.M. Watson, “Ignoring the Great Firewall of 
China,” paper presented at the Sixth Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Robinson 
College, Cambridge, United Kingdom, June 28–30, 2006.  The second reference from Slayton 
relied on data from 2007 and 2010 in a work by David J. Betz and Tim Stevens, “Analogical 
Reasoning and Cyber Security,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 44, No. 2, April 2013, p. 147–164. 
235 For a thorough discussion of the Great Firewall of China in recent years, see James Griffiths. 
The Great Firewall of China: How to Build and Control an Alternative Version of the Internet. 
London: Zed Books, 2019.  
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unnoticed (e.g. if a potential victim does not have adequate cybersecurity practices, poor 
cyber hygiene, a lack of critical controls, lack of monitoring, etc.) then the importance of 
the need for speed disappears.236  This is the likely scenario for the hack of Sony Pictures 
Entertainment; it appears from the amount of the data stolen and the extent to which the 
network was wiped that the hackers had the luxury of time to navigate through the 
network, gather extensive data, and leave behind malware that destroyed the hardware. 
  
 
236 For a complete accounting of the recommended critical controls that SPE lacked at the time, 
see Gabriel Sanchez. “Case Study: Critical Controls that Sony Should Have Implemented.”  
SANS White Paper,  June 1, 2015.   
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CHAPTER 4: SONY PICTURES ENTERTAINMENT CASE STUDY  
 
Figure 7: A photo of a screen showing what is apparently the skull splash page that 
appeared on Sony company computers when the attack started, posted by someone who 
said he was a former Sony employee who was sent the image by current Sony employees. 
The image was first posted on Reddit.237 
 
 The conventional wisdom on the case study of North Korea's actions against Sony 
Pictures Entertainment is that the cyber coercion was a failure because the movie was 
eventually released. As one scholar, writing about deterrence failures in cyberspace 
 
237 Zetter, Kim. “Sony Got Hacked Hard: What We Know and Don’t Know So Far.” Wired, 
December 3, 2014. Located at: https://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-know/ and 
accessed December 2, 2019.   
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noted, “and millions of Americans watched The Interview”238 implying that the fact that 
some Americans watched the movie means that the North Korean effort was a failure.  As 
another scholar remarked: 
“…an obvious [example] of an attempted coercion effort in cyberspace that did 
not succeed is the North Korean effort to stop the release of The Interview by 
attacking Sony. When you walk through the coercion theory as commonly 
understood, every single advantage was on the North Korean side there and you 
would expect that course of activity to work… and… I mean, it didn’t. The 
Interview became this preposterous movie that somehow turned into a cause for 
freedom of speech online – rent it online and do your part for American freedom 
of speech.239 
 
 When examined in detail over an expanded timeframe, it was not a failure; it may 
not have fully achieved its original goal of the victim completely cancelling the film, but 
North Korea's actions caused Sony Pictures to take several, costly steps and limit release 
of the film, due in part to a number of factors including audience costs, over time. Sony 
Pictures changed its behavior due to the cyber coercion.  The release date was first 
cancelled and then the release plans modified, promotion of the film was cancelled, the 
market share for the eventual film release was heavily pared down resulting in financial 
losses, and another film called "Pyongyang" from Fox was cancelled240 due to the fear of 
additional cyberattacks.  A foreign government was effectively demanding censorship of 
 
238 Lindsay, Jon. “Tipping the scales: the attribution problem and the feasibility of deterrence 
against cyberattack.” Journal of Cybersecurity, 1(1), 2015, 62. 
239 Evans, Ryan. “Is Cyber Half the Battle?” War on the Rocks interview with Ben Buchanan, 
Erica Borghard and Fiona Cunningham, podcast audio, May 12, 2020.  
https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/is-cyber-half-the-battle 
240 "Sony Cancels 'Interview' Release After Theatres Drop Out While Fox Folds Similar Movie." 
NBC News, December 17, 2014.  Accessed via https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sony-
hack/sony-cancels-interview-release-after-theaters-drop-out-while-fox-n270281 on April 2, 2018.   
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a multinational corporation located in the United States, and being successful, at least 
partially, to get the company to change its behavior, as measured over three different 
temporal values. North Korea’s actions and the subsequent audience costs resulted in a 
Sony Executive losing their job, North Korea embarrassed important business associates 
of Sony Pictures when they publicly released damaging and humiliating emails, and Sony 
suffered significant financial losses all while getting a reduced viewership of the film 
North Korea wanted shut down.241 Tracing the process and parsing out the details of the 
cyber operation against Sony Pictures Entertainment will show the additional factors 




 In 2014, Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) produced a satirical comedy called  
“The Interview” starring Seth Rogen and James Franco playing a talk show host and his 
producer hired to kill North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. It was a farce comedy, but 
North Korea perceived it as an affront. In response, the cyberattack campaign against 
Sony Pictures Entertainment was a multi-stage strategy, not a hasty action, which is 
evident once the components, specific actions and timeline of the hack are examined.  
This was not a simple cybercrime to pilfer funds; this cyberattack had a purpose: to halt 
 
241 Hess, Amanda.  "Inside the Sony Hack."  Slate, November 22, 2015.  Accessed via 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/11/sony_employees_on_the_hack_one_year
_later.html on March 28, 2018.   See also "Company-Wide Consequences of Sony’s Data 
Breach" Promisec Report, 2017.   
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distribution of “The Interview,” to punish Sony Pictures Entertainment for its production, 
and to leave lasting damage to its networks and systems. The particular cyber capabilities 
used, how they were used, the timing of the stages of the cyberattack and the actions 
taken by the aggressor reveal the coercive strategy.  The attackers penetrated Sony 
Pictures Entertainment networks, stole vast quantities of data, destroyed the computers 
and servers and then engaged in a deliberate, multi-phase leak to increase pressure on the 
company.   
 Sony Pictures Entertainment was alerted to the attack on November 24, 2014, but 
the attackers likely had been inside Sony Pictures Entertainment systems for months. The 
culprits claimed to be a group called “Guardians of Peace” or “GOP” but in reality, it was 
a group known to the cybersecurity world as Lazarus, which is attributed to North 
Korea.242 This group stole large amounts of data, including unreleased films, internal 
emails, and the personally identifying information of about 47,000 employees and 
actors.243 They then proceeded to leak sensitive, internal documents from Sony Pictures 
Entertainment in the ensuing weeks in an effort to ratchet up the pressure on Sony 
Pictures Entertainment.  
 It worked, at first, but Sony Pictures Entertainment eventually decided it would 
not fully comply with the coercion demand and proceeded with a limited video release.  
 
242 Tsing, William. "The Advanced Persistent Threat files: Lazarus Group." MalwareBytes Labs, 
March 12, 2019. Located at: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2019/03/the-
advanced-persistent-threat-files-lazarus-group/  and accessed on January 15, 2021. 
243 Fritz, Ben and Danny Yadron. “Sony Hack Exposed Personal Data of Hollywood Stars; 
Breach Includes Social Security Numbers for 47,000 Employees and Actors, Including Sylvester 
Stallone, Judd Apatow and Rebel Wilson. The Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2014.  
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This limited video release was significantly scaled down from the planned December 
holiday release. Sony Pictures Entertainment changed its behavior due to the cyberattack; 
it did not fully comply with the demand of the aggressor, but it did partially, it lost money 
in doing so, a Sony Pictures Entertainment Executive lost their job, and future Sony -
Pictures Entertainment and other production company’s planned films with North Korean 
angles were scrapped. North Korea’s actions were able to significantly impact the 
behavior of this multinational company and others in the entertainment industry. The 
cyberattack resulted in a successful partial compellence from the victim and deterred not 
only the victim but other potential players from producing films with North Korea-based 
plotlines.  
 Backlash of some form was somewhat expected by Sony Pictures, but the 
extensive method of coercion appears to have been a surprise. Earlier in the year, in June 
2014, Sony Pictures President Doug Belgrad sent a note to Sony Entertainment Chief, 
Michael Lynton, his boss, noting the sensitive nature of depicting the assassination of a 
living leader and offering his assistance to address the concerns. Soon thereafter, Mr. 
Lynton approved more than one-half million dollars to digitally scrub images of former 
North Korean leaders from the movie. By July, executives at Sony in Japan, the parent 
company, expressed concern and did not want a farcical movie to endanger international 
relations for Japan and North Korea. In order to distance itself slightly from the movie, it 
was not promoted on Sony Pictures’ website, and it carried the brand Columbia Pictures, 
a Sony label, but not Sony Pictures.244 The plan was that the movie was going to be 
 
244 Fritz, Ben, Erich Schwartzel and Barret Devlin. “Sony Pulls Korea Film “The Interview;” U.S. 
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released, with some distance between the movie and the company, but nothing overly 
drastic. 
Cyberattack 
 The cyberattack campaign consisted of completely destroying a significant 
portion of Sony’s computer network, making the recovery of data impossible, rendering 
the hardware unusable, publishing nine rounds of stolen internal data, suffering additional 
public threats, and leaving an inability for Sony Pictures Entertainment to use parts of the 
computer network for weeks to months.  The crisis phase lasted 25 days, from November 
24, 2014, to December 19, 2014, with months more of network remediation and dealing 
with the public relations fallout. The attack resulted in causing Sony Pictures 
Entertainment to lose millions of dollars in number of ways.  
 The loss included having their information technology systems crippled, some for 
months and some forever that required new equipment; limiting release of the film; 
losing revenue from the anticipated sales of the leaked films; and, suffering great public 
embarrassment in having their catty, mocking internal documents exposed, especially in 
an industry that trades on flattery and fawning. Due to the nature of the content of the 
messages, SPE also had to deal with significant, long-term fallout of the humiliation in 
the business world in which they operate, resulting in the removal of a leader at Sony 
Pictures Entertainment.  
 According to the CEO, Michael Lynton, “the bigger challenge was that the folks 
 
Blames Pyongyang for Hack; Studio Scraps Dec. 25 Debut After Terrorist Threats Prompted 
Movie Chains to Skip Film.” The Wall Street Journal, December 18, 2014. 
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who did this didn’t just steal practically everything from the house; they burned the house 
down. They took our data. Then they wiped stuff off our computers. And then they 
destroyed our servers and our computers.”245 In addition to this damage, “four unreleased 
movies produced by Sony were leaked online to file-sharing websites. The pirated copies 
of films available online include “Fury,” “Still Alice,” “Annie,” “Mr. Turner” and “To 
write love on her arms,” all of which are due for official release”246 in December 2014 
and in 2015 with one of the films being downloaded 1.2million times in a week.  This 
was a further financial loss for SPE due to lost revenue from the future releases of these 
films.247 The CEO noted that he believed the GOP also stole “The Interview,” but chose 
not to release it.248  
 Overall, the cyberattack malware crawled through the network, destroying half of 
its global computer system. “It erased everything stored on 3,262 of the company’s 6,797 
personal computers and 837 of its 1,555 servers.”249 Further, to ensure failure of any 
recovery efforts, the data was overwritten seven different ways and the startup software, 
needed to run the initiation of the system, was destroyed thus reducing the machines to a 
 
245 Ignatius, Adi. “They Burned the House Down: An Interview with Michael Lynton Recovering 
from the most devastating hack in corporate history.” Harvard Business Review, July–August 
2015.  
246 Osborne, Charlie. “Sony hires FireEye's Mandiant following internal security breach.” 
ZDNET, December 1, 2014. 
247 Osborne, Charlie. “Sony hires FireEye's Mandiant following internal security breach.” 
ZDNET, December 1, 2014.  
248 Ignatius, Adi. “They Burned the House Down: An Interview with Michael Lynton Recovering 
from the most devastating hack in corporate history.” Harvard Business Review, July–August 
2015. 
249 Elkind, Peter. “Inside the Hack of the Century.” Fortune Magazine (New York, NY),June 25, 
2015. p. 66. 
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chunk of useless metal.250 This was a well-planned and smartly executed attack that left 
the victim with a severely damaged network, an inability to operate in key areas, a huge 
financial bill for the hardware and remediation, and a multi-phase leak of internal 
documents that served to ratchet up the pressure on leadership with each subsequent leak.  
One example of the type of data stolen and leaked is the following folder list that, 
likely the hackers, called “Password” and proceeded to dump all files they found on the 
network that contained passwords. This folder was included in the second round of 
published files on December 3, 2014 and is shown in Figure 8.251  
  
 
250 Ibid.  
251 “A Breakdown and Analysis of the December 2014 Sony Hack.” Risk Based Security, 
December 5, 2014.  Located at: https://www.riskbasedsecurity.com/2014/12/05/a-breakdown-
and-analysis-of-the-december-2014-sony-hack/#thebeginning and accessed on December 16, 
2018.   
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Figure 8:  
 
 On December 8, 2014, Sony Pictures Entertainment sent a letter to SPE 
employees calling it a “brazen cyberattack.”252 The letter also warned employees that 
their personally identifying information (e.g., social security number, medical 
information, driver’s license, etc.) was stolen and provided arrangements with a third-
party identity protection company, at Sony’s cost, for the employees to contact. 
 Sony Pictures Entertainment initially did not acquiesce to the demand to withhold 
the film, especially given that they had already made costly additional digital edits of the 
film to make it less gory in the summer of 2014 to assuage Sony executives in Japan 
concerned about increasing tensions with North Korea.253 When the cyberattack was 
 
252 Letter to Sony Employees, Sony Pictures Entertainment, December 8, 2014.  
253 Seal, Mark. “An Exclusive Look at Sony’s Hacking Saga.” Vanity Fair, February 4, 2015. 
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initially discovered, Sony Pictures ignored the demand and focused on the technical 
problems with the network, managing employee expectations, and keeping the business 
running using analog options such as fulfilling payroll without a computer system. 
However, following the subsequent rounds of leaked data, additional threats and refusal 
from major distributors to air the film, Sony changed course and cancelled the release.  
That decision was then reversed on December 21, 2014, and changed to a limited release, 
paring down how and where it would be released, along with releasing it via streaming 
services, resulting in additional financial losses. SPE decided to release the movie 
through whatever limited means might be available but also balanced this desire with 
ensuring that “the rights of its employees and the rights of the movie-going public are 
going to be protected.”254  Meanwhile, other production outlets cancelled films featuring 




254 Lee, Edmund. “You Will Get to See "The Interview," Sony Lawyer Says.” Vox, December 21, 
2014.  
255 "Sony Cancels 'Interview' Release After Theatres Drop Out While Fox Folds Similar Movie." 
NBC News, December 17, 2014.  Accessed via https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sony-
hack/sony-cancels-interview-release-after-theaters-drop-out-while-fox-n270281 on April 2, 2018.   
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Chronology for Process Tracing 
March 2014:  The movie, The Interview, has the second test screening with studio 
executives present. The co-producers and directors Seth Rogen and Evan Goldberg, said 
“The audiences loved the movie, and so the studio was thrilled.”256 
 
June 2014: Lynton sought and received assurances from a RAND Corporation senior 
defense analyst, in consultation with the State Department’s special envoy for North 
Korean human rights issues, that the North Korean antagonistic narratives concerning the 
movie was just rhetoric and “that this is typical North Korean bullying, likely without 
follow-up, but you never know with North Korea.”257  
 
June 2014: North Korean state KCNA news agency said, “making and releasing a movie 
on a plot to hurt our top-level leadership is the most blatant act of terrorism and war and 
will absolutely not be tolerated.”258 Typical of the DPRK, continued hyperbolic 
statements came out from its spokespeople, including “"The U.S. has gone reckless in 
such provocative hysteria as bribing a rogue movie maker to dare hurt the dignity of the 
supreme leadership of the DPRK," a foreign ministry spokesman said in a statement.”259 
According to leaked emails, Kazuo Hirai, the Tokyo-based CEO and President of Sony, 
the parent company of SPE, was extremely concerned about the film, especially 
considering the volatile relationship between Japan and North Korea.260   
 
June 25, 2014: Seth Rogen replied to the threat by tweeting, “People don't usually wanna 
kill me for one of my movies until after they've paid 12 bucks for it. Hiyooooo!!!”261 
 
July 2014: The North Korean UN Ambassador Ja Song Nam argued against the 
production and distribution of the film in a letter to the UN Secretary General, stating that  
"To allow the production and distribution of such a film on the assassination of an 
incumbent head of a sovereign state should be regarded as the most undisguised 
sponsoring of terrorism as well as an act of war.”262 
 
 
256 Seal, Mark. “An Exclusive Look at Sony’s Hacking Saga.” Vanity Fair, February 4, 2015. 
257 Seal, Mark. “An Exclusive Look at Sony’s Hacking Saga.” Vanity Fair, February 4, 2015. 
258 Bennett, Bruce. “Did North Korea Hack Sony?” RAND, December 11, 2014.  
259 Neuman, Scott. “North Korea Threatens War Over New Seth Rogen Comedy.” NPR, June 25, 
2014.  See also “DPRK accuses U.S. film of insulting its leadership” Xinhua, June 25, 2014.   
260 Seal, Mark. “An Exclusive Look at Sony’s Hacking Saga.” Vanity Fair, February 4, 2015. 
261 Rogen, Seth. June 25, 2014.  https://twitter.com/Sethrogen/status/481811214737997825  
262 Beaumont-Thomas, Ben. “North Korea complains to UN about Seth Rogen comedy The 





September 2014: Discussions continued at SPE and with Sony regarding making changes 
to the film to ease tension with North Korea.  Amy Pascal exchanged emails with Kazuo 
Hirai discussing changed to the final scene.  She wrote: “There is no face melting, less 
fire in the hair, fewer embers on the face, and the head explosion has been considerably 
obscured by the fire, as well as darkened to look less like flesh.”263 
 
November 21, 2014: Co-chairmen of Sony Pictures Entertainment, Amy Pascal and 
Michael Lynton as well as other SPE executives were sent an email from a group called 
“God’sApstls,” demanding compensation and to “pay the damage, or Sony Pictures will 
be bombarded as a whole.”264 Unfortunately, neither Pascal nor Lynton saw the email, 
Pascal’s going to her spam folder and Lynton’s being buried in his inbox.  
 
November 24, 2014: Sony Pictures Entertainment employees arrived to find the “Hacked 
By #GOP” message on their computer screens framed by red skeletons with the warning:  
“We’ve obtained all your internal data including your secrets and top secrets. If you 
don’t obey us, we’ll release data shown below to the world.” The data referenced were 
five links that contained the internal communications of SPE that had been harvested 
over the weeks prior.265   
 
Amy Pascal,  the co-chairman of Sony Pictures Entertainment, was greeted by this 
message on her screen upon arriving at the office and then she phoned SPE CEO Michael 
Lynton.  Lynton advised her that he had been notified by the SPE CFO David Hendler 
and that they had been hacked. He informed Amy that they would shut down the SPE 
computer network, including any customer-facing sites, that there was no ability to log on 
and that the 3500 employees were instructed to shut down their computers, not to e-mail 
or download anything on the company lot and were sent home.266  Within hours the fact 
Sony was hacked was made public.  
 
November 26, 2014: Four torrent links were published that contained unreleased movies 
from Sony that GOP obtained during the cyberattack. The films included include “Fury,” 
“Still Alice,” “Annie,” “Mr. Turner” and “To write love on her arms,” which planned to 
be released in December 2014 and in 2015.267 One of these films was downloaded over 
1.2million times in one week.268 
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December 1, 2014: Round One Published - the first round of hacked data is published and 
consists of a full cache of data files totaling 24.87GB of compressed files that contain 
33,880 files and 4,864 folders.  The data consist of thousands of social security numbers, 
personal information, human resources information, dates of birth, contact phone 
numbers, compensation details, retirement plans, termination plans, executive salaries, 
copies of passports, and other sensitive documentation.269  Sony Pictures Entertainment 
hires well-known cybersecurity firm, FireEye, led by Kevin Mandia, to assist.  
 
December 1, 2014: When asked if North Korea was involved with the cyberattack, the 
spokesman for North Korea’s United Nations mission said, “I kindly advise you to wait 
and see.”270 
 
December 3, 2014: Round Two Published – the second round of hacked data is published 
and, although smaller in size, this one consists of the most sensitive data, totaling more 
than 11,000 files. It includes full security certificate information, authentication 
credentials and a variety of internal and external account credentials used at Sony 
Pictures Entertainment to conduct business.271 The published documents also included 
everything needed for daily maintenance on the Sony network, including the “files 
detailing how to access QA, [quality assurance] staging, and production database 
servers – with a master asset lists that map the location of database (Oracle, Sybase, 
and SQL) and enterprise servers globally.”272 
 
December 5, 2014: Round Three Published - The GOP contacts cybersecurity companies 
and interested journalists to offer them more data. The links consist of just over 100GB of 
data and is titled “Financial data of Sony Pictures”. It contains bank statements and 
account information, financial reports and forecasts, budget reports and receipts going 
back to 1998. It also contains licensing contracts with other major corporations, 
additional personal data and copies of driver’s licenses and federal tax returns,  273 
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December 7, 2014: Some SPE employees receive threatening emails saying “It’s false if 
you think this crisis will be over after some time. All hope will leave you and Sony 
Pictures will collapse. This situation is only due to Sony Pictures.”274 
 
December 8, 2014: Round Four Published – the fourth round of hacked data is published 
and consists of two large files totaling 2.8GB and including nearly 20,000 emails, 
including co-chairman Amy Pascal’s email inbox and the President of Sony Pictures 
Television Steve Mosko’s inbox, as well as 3,550 full contact details of names, emails 
and home addresses of Sony contacts.  Accompanying the data is a message from the 
GOP claiming that they know nothing about the threatening email sent to employees and 
reiterating the demand for The Interview to be cancelled.275 Amy Pascal’s emails will 
reveal racist emails she wrote as well as emails where she belittles and mocks many of 
the Hollywood elite.  
 
December 9, 2014: Sony Entertainment CEO Michael Lynton received an email 
FireEye’s Kevin Mandia and forwarded it to the Sony Pictures Entertainment workforce.  
It included the following:  
 
This attack is unprecedented in nature. The malware was undetectable by industry 
standard antivirus software and was damaging and unique enough to cause the 
FBI to release a flash alert to warn other organizations of this critical threat. 
In fact, the scope of this attack differs from any we have responded to in the past, 
as its purpose was to both destroy property and release confidential information to 
the public. The bottom line is that this was an unparalleled and well-planned 
crime,276 carried out by an organized group, for which neither SPE nor other 
companies could have been fully prepared.277 
 
December 10, 2014: Round Five Published – the fifth data cache published included five 
1GB links that contained the internal SPE business dealings with dozens of companies, 
potential partnerships, how Sony works with Internet Service Providers to monitor illegal 
downloads and more financial data.278  
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December 10, 2014: Round Six Published – on the same day as the fifth round, the GOP 
published the sixth round of data. This round consisted of some of the email of Leah 
Weil, Senior Executive Vice President and General Counsel for Sony Pictures 
Entertainment and included sensitive legal conversations and related emails with 
employee information. 
 
December 11, 2014: Sony goes on record about the cyberattack and Amy Pascal 
apologizes for the discriminatory, derisive and objectionable communications that the 
data dump revealed.  
 
December 13, 2014: Round Seven Published – the seventh data cache published included 
6.45GB of uncompressed data consisting of 6,560 files in 917 folders. It includes 
business tracking files, business acquisition files and the working files of the former Sony 
Executive and VP of Worldwide Digital and Commercial Strategy.279  
 
December 13, 2014:  SPE demanded that media outlets stop reporting on the stolen and 
leaked data.280 
 
December 14, 2014: Round Eight Published – the eighth data drop is another email spool, 
this time for the Senior Vice President, International Distribution for Sony Pictures 
Releasing International. The file was 5.53GB uncompressed and contained at least 72,900 
emails in 7 primary folders. The bulk of the emails, 54,793, are in the Sent folder and 
dating back to May 20, 2008, with 12,414 in the inbox, and 4,276 in the deleted folder.281 
 
December 14, 2014:  Sony Pictures lawyer David Boies stated in a letter to media outlets 
that “in an ongoing campaign explicitly seeking to prevent SPE from distributing a 
motion picture, the perpetrators of the theft have threatened SPE and its staff and are 
using the dissemination of both private and company information for the stated purpose 
of materially harming SPE unless SPE submits and withdraws the motion picture from 
distribution.”282 
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December 15, 2014: Cybersecurity bloggers and journalists receive a cease-and-desist 
letter from SPE demanding that they stop publishing details about the company’s recent 
hacking and delete any company data they collected that was published by the hackers 
that they may have downloaded to assess the breach.283 
 
December 16, 2014:  A threat was posted online on Pastebin along with a series of links 
“purporting to be provide more documents from the attack, labeled ‘mlynton,’ an 
apparent reference to Sony Pictures chief executive Michael Lynton.”284 The Pastebin 
threat invoked September 11, 2001 and was the following:  
 
Warning 
We will clearly show it to you at the very time and places “The Interview” 
be shown, including the premiere, how bitter fate those who seek fun in 
terror should be doomed to. 
Soon all the world will see what an awful movie Sony Pictures 
Entertainment has made. 
The world will be full of fear. 
Remember the 11th of September 2001. 
We recommend you to keep yourself distant from the places at that time. 
(If your house is nearby, you’d better leave.) 
Whatever comes in the coming days is called by the greed of Sony 
Pictures Entertainment. 
All the world will denounce the SONY. 
 
Later that day, the five largest theatre chains asked Sony to delay the film’s 
release out of concern that the threats would deter movie-goers over the critical holiday 
season. At the time, Sony declined and planned to proceed with the film’s Christmas Day 
opening.   
 
December 16, 2014: Round Nine Published – as alluded to earlier in the day, the ninth 
release consisted of the email archive of the CEO of Sony Pictures, Michael Lynton. The 
two files totaled 1.84GB and contained email since November 2013, including 12,482 
emails in the inbox, nearly 7,000 deleted emails and 7,085 contacts, among other data. 
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December 16, 2014: Later that day, following the threat and the ninth data dump, Sony 
Pictures canceled the New York premiere of the film scheduled for December 18, 2014, 
and the main stars, Seth Rogan and James Franco, canceled upcoming media promotion 
appearances.286  
 
December 17, 2014: The threats and cyberattack campaign worked: other corporate 
entities were deterred from showing the movie, which was what North Korea had been 
requesting for months, and Sony decided not to release the film further. In response to 
speculation about releasing it on video-on-demand platforms, Sony Pictures said there 
will be “no further release plans of any kind.”287 This decision would change in the 
future, but it was the publicly declared decision as of December 17th 
Although the Department of Homeland Security “dismissed the terrorist threat as 
lacking credibility,”288 a spokesperson for one of the major theater chains noted that they 
wanted to ensure their patrons could enjoy entertainment in a safe environment and “must 
take threats against movie theatres very seriously and the recent unprecedented 
cyberattacks against Sony Pictures are no exception.”289 In an interview later, the SPE 
CEO noted that “a lot of the e-commerce players and large cable operators and satellite 
operators were concerned about getting hacked themselves” and therefore would not 
agree to release the film.290 
Sony spokesperson declares that “Sony Pictures has no further release plans for 
the film”291 and pulled the planned Christmas Day release of the film.   “Sony executives 
briefly considered alternative options, including releasing it only via video-on-demand or 
on television, said a person at the studio.”292 Not only did the cinemas fear suffering 
violent attacks if they showed the film, Comcast Corporation, the giant cable provider did 
not want “to offer the movie on-demand due to its political sensitivity.”293  By the 
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December 17, 2014: Fox’s production company, New Regency, canceled its plans for a 
“film  set in North Korea, in which Steve Carell was to have starred.”296  Regal 
Entertainment Group, a major cinema chain, released the following statement: “Due to 
the wavering support of the film The Interview by Sony Pictures, as well as the 
ambiguous nature of any real or perceived threats, Regal Entertainment Group has 
decided to delay the opening of the film in our theatres.”297 
 
December 19, 2014: The GOP published the following announcement:  
 
This is GOP. 
You have suffered through enough threats. 
We lift the ban. 
The Interview may release now. 
But be carful.  (sic) 
September 11 may happen again if you don’t comply with the rules. 
Rule #1: no death scene of Kim Jong Un being too happy 
Rule #2: do not test us again 
Rule #3: if you make anything else, we will be here ready to fight 
This is Guardians Of Peace. 
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December 21, 2014: According to Sony Pictures Entertainment’s lawyer, David Boies, 
Sony reversed course and decided to distribute the film. He noted: “What Sony is trying 
to do is to get the picture out to the public but at the same time to be sure the rights of its 
employees and the rights of the movie-going public are going to be protected.”298  
 
December 23, 2014: CEO of Alamo Drafthouse Cinema, Tim League, announced on 
Twitter that “Sony has authorized screenings of THE INTERVIEW on Christmas Day. 
We are making shows available within the hour. #Victory.”299 
 
December 23, 2014: Crowdstrike’s CEO, Dmitri Alperovitch, announced that its analysis 
of the attack resulted in North Korean attribution based on tracking this group since 2006. 
“We have also seen them engage in destructive attacks just like the Sony attacks, 
including the use of some of the same infrastructure. Some of the I.P. addresses that were 
used in the attack on Sony were also used in some of the past attacks. And parts of the 
malware, the malicious code that was used at Sony, has been shared across some of the 
previous attacks.”300 Mark Rogers of Cloudflare is less certain on attributing the attack to 
North Korea at this time.301 
 
December 24, 2014 – January 18, 2015: Sony released “The Interview” for rental or 
purchase in the United States via streaming services including Xbox Video and 
YouTube.302 
 
December 25, 2014: A total of 331 cinemas, largely independent and smaller cinemas,  
screened the opening of “The Interview.”303 
 
January 5, 2014: Sony CEO, Kazuo Hirai, makes his first public statement on the 
cyberattack and thanks “employees and partners for making “The Interview” available to 
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January 13, 2015: In a rare press briefing, An Myong Hun, North Korea’s deputy U.N. 
ambassador, denied that North Korea was responsible for the Sony Pictures 
Entertainment cyberattack. “My country has nothing to do with the Sony hacking.”305 He 
also noted that North Korea offered to undertake a joint investigation into the 
cyberattack.306 
 
January 20, 2015: Sony reported total sales of approximately $40 million in rentals and 
sales for ‘The Interview’. Sony spent roughly $75 million in production and promotion of 
the film.307  
 The Lazarus Group first appeared in 2009308 and “came to substantial media 
notice in 2013 with a series of coordinated attacks against an assortment of South Korean 
broadcasters and financial institutions using DarkSeoul, a wiper program that overwrites 
sections of the victims’ Master Boot Record.”309 The commercial cybersecurity industry 
assessed that the Lazarus Group is run by the North Korean government and the 
“…large-scale breach of Sony Pictures was attributed to Lazarus.”310 
 
February 4, 2015: After postponing the release of their 2014 earnings because the 
cyberattack took relevant systems offline, Sony Pictures provided the data on February 4, 
2015, in a call with investors and analysts. At the time, SPE estimated the cost incurred 
for the cyberattack “to include approximately 15 million U.S. dollars (1.8 billion yen) for 
investigation and remediation costs.”311 
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February 5, 2015: Amy Pascal, co-chairman of Sony Pictures Entertainment, announced 
she was stepping down from her job after 27 years “after she endured a prolonged public 
relations disaster when hacked private e-mails showed her making racially charged jokes 
about the president”312 among other embarrassing and inappropriate comments that were 
leaked. “Over 27 years, she rose through the management ranks and became known in 
Hollywood for her ability to create relationships with stars, directors and producers and to 
spot blockbuster films.”313 Although SPE claimed this transition was in the works for a 
while and was unrelated to the cyberattack, she later claimed that she had been fired due 
to the ramifications from the cyberattack.314 Given the nature of the leaked data; it is 
highly unlikely that she would enjoy the same close relationships with stars, directors and 
producers after her mortifying and loathsome emails were leaked so, as she noted, 
stepping down from her position was a direct consequence of the leaked emails, despite 
SPE’s attempt to claim otherwise. 
 
October 2015 – April 2016: The class action lawsuit against Sony by former employees 
who were victims of the data breach was settled.  The total bill for Sony will be about 
$15 million, including $8 million in damages to the plaintiffs, $4 million to maintain the 
ongoing identity protection via services from AllClear, and over $3 million to the 
attorneys.315   
 
February 2016: Over a year after the cyberattack, security researchers across a number of 
cybersecurity companies working together determine that the Lazarus Group, run by the 
North Korean government, is responsible for the Sony Pictures Entertainment hack as 
well as over 45 malware families used in other prominent cyberattacks.316 The CEO of 
Novetta, a leading cybersecurity firm, noted: “This wasn't a spontaneous capability that 
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was developed a year prior to and in the months leading up to [the Sony hack]. It's an 
established capability that does provide insight into the nature of the attack and the fact 





Structured Focused Questions 
Targets  
What were the targets of the cyberattack?   
The types of attack vectors used for the Sony Pictures Entertainment cyberattack 
were using various kinds of malware to gain access, defacing their internal websites, 
stealing data for a period of months or longer prior to Sony Pictures Entertainment being 
aware of the breach and, finally, strategically leaking the data in nine rounds of 
distribution on the internet. Since Sony Pictures Entertainment is a private, commercial 
entity, it was solely a soft, countervalue target. 
The cyberattack rendered the network unable to be used on the morning of 
November 24, 2014. As Sony Pictures Entertainment would soon learn, not only were 
they unable to log on, but significant portions of the network had also been destroyed 
beyond any recovery ability. Employees were told that their email and network were 
down due to a hacking and to go home.317 This is one more aspect of the financial losses 
for Sony from this incident; the time lost when their employees were unable to work.  
Further, when the aggressors engaged in the cyberattack, they focused on stealing 
the email files of several leaders of Sony Pictures Entertainment and other prominent 
Sony executives, human resources files, credentials and passwords, and internal 
documents. The aggressors leaked this data out in chunks over the following weeks. This 
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served to increase the pressure on leadership, and intensify the audience costs, especially 
when the leaked emails of certain executives included salacious remarks about a number 
of well-known people.  
 
Nature of Attack 
What was the nature of the attack? How was the attack conducted?  
The types of attack vectors used for the Sony Pictures Entertainment cyberattack 
was malware and the “adversaries embedded their custom malware with a hard-coded 
list of machines as well as credentials for administrators in the environment, ”318 
which implies that the adversary spent time collecting information on and about the 
network before launching the cyberattack.   which implies that there was a significant 
reconnaissance period before the initiation of the actual destructive attack itself.  
“After the adversaries had taken all the information they sought, they dropped 
a wiper malware payload onto the network, which deleted data from hard drives and 
overwrote the boot sectors to prevent the machines from booting.”319 These were 
overwritten multiple times, meaning the data was overwritten and deleted repeatedly 
“to wipe the hard drives and make it impossible for even a sophisticated forensics 
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team to recover the data.”320 This cyberattack severely punished the victim by 
destroying their computer systems, deleting their data beyond any hope of recovery.  
The ramifications from the attack and strategically leaked data were drawn out 
over several weeks in what appears to be a calculated decision to escalate the pain for the 
victim, so they would comply with the request. The attackers used different methods to 
distribute the data.  For the release of what was likely the stolen movies, they used 
Pastebin, a favorite cloud repository for hackers, to post a package and links to files 
“hosted on four sites consisting of 26 parts, broken out into 25 1GB files, and one 894 
MB rar file.” 321 The attackers claimed to have over twelve terabytes of stolen data,322 
which is a massive amount of data, especially when a considerable amount is expected to 
be flat files, or text files.   
The stolen and leaked data, in addition to the personally identifying information 
of tens of thousands of employees and actors, consisted of extremely candid emails 
between Sony employees, some of whom were executives. As noted above, these emails 
ranged from disparaging and belittling remarks about various actors to downright 
offensive and racist remarks. Beyond that, the documents also revealed questionable 
business practices.323  
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Leadership as a Target, Potential Leadership Destabilization 
Was leadership targeted?   
Yes. The email communications among the Sony Pictures Entertainment 
leadership and senior executives were a key element in the audience costs and 
embarrassment the company suffered. Not only were email exchanges of some executives 
inappropriate and reprehensible, but some were also quite specific about negative feelings 
toward certain popular actors, which could make future work with those actors 
problematic or impossible. Stealing this sensitive information about the inner workings, 
private feelings and internal tensions among Sony Pictures leadership and then publicly 
publishing this information was a strategic decision to increase pressure on the 
leadership.   
In the immediate aftermath of the cyberattack, Sony’s Chief Executive Kazuo 
Hirai declared that he was confident in the performance of Sony Entertainment CEO 
Michael Lynton and Sony Pictures co-chairman Amy Pascal, and he did not place any 
blame on them for the cyberattack.324 Amy Pascal would later step down from her 
position after nearly 30 years with Sony, claiming publicly that she had been fired from 
her position due to the fallout from the cyberattack campaign.325 This leadership 
destabilization due to the coercive cyberattack that specifically targeted leadership is a 
 
December 5, 2014.  Located at:  https://www.riskbasedsecurity.com/2014/12/05/a-breakdown-
and-analysis-of-the-december-2014-sony-hack/ and accessed on November 30, 2019 
324 Fritz, Ben, Erich Schwartzel and Barret Devlin. “Sony Pulls Korea Film “The Interview;” U.S. 
Blames Pyongyang for Hack; Studio Scraps Dec. 25 Debut After Terrorist Threats Prompted 
Movie Chains to Skip Film.” The Wall Street Journal, December 18, 2014. 
325 McNary, Dave. “Amy Pascal Talks Getting ‘Fired,’ Sony Hack and Angelina Jolie Emails in 
Candid Interview.” Variety, February 11, 2015.  
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sizeable consequence. To be clear, she was fired because the content in her leaked emails 
meant she was unable to carry on with her duties, not because Sony Pictures was 
vulnerable to a cyberattack. Had those stolen emails never been leaked, she would not 
have to be starting over. “I'm 56, it’s not exactly the time that you want to start all over 
again. But it’s kind of great and I have to and it’s going to be a new adventure for me.”326 
 
Attribution 
What was the understanding about attribution at the time of the attack? Did this change 
over time?   
There is now an abundance of linkages tying the Lazarus Group to North Korea, 
and as of February 2016, attributing the Sony Pictures Entertainment cyberattack to the 
Lazarus Group. However, even in 2014, given the totality of circumstances, Sony 
Pictures Entertainment, working with the cybersecurity private industry partners, 
assessed that the attack most likely came from North Korea and that it was related to the 
months of North Korea demanding that Sony Pictures Entertainment cancel the film 
release and the threats to cinemas who planned to screen the film.327. This was further 
substantiated by major cybersecurity professionals such as Dmitri Alperovitch, co-
founder and CTO of the security firm CrowdStrike, who stated “there's no question that 
 
326 “Ex-Sony Chief Amy Pascal Acknowledges She Was Fired.” NBC News, February 12, 2015.  
Located at: https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sony-hack/ex-sony-chief-amy-pascal-
acknowledges-she-was-fired-n305281 
327 Fritz, Ben, Erich Schwartzel and Barret Devlin. “Sony Pulls Korea Film “The Interview;” U.S. 
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North Korea is behind the Sony hack.”328  
 Later, it became clearer that “Lazarus was initially known for its involvement 
in…a number of high-profile disruptive attacks, including the 2014 attack on Sony 
Pictures that saw large amounts of information being stolen and computers wiped by 
malware.”329 The Lazarus Group has honed its skills since approximately 2009, and their 
preparation “culminated in the ‘scorched Earth’ attack that struck Sony in November 
2014 — a hack that wiped out many of the company's servers, resulted in the theft of 
terabytes of data, and ultimately brought the entertainment giant to its knees.”330 
 As noted earlier in the examples of the Dukes, some hackers (nation-state and 
independent) will re-use code, re-use IPs, re-use sequence of actions, etc. because it is 
easy to re-use what works. Researchers from three major cybersecurity companies and a 
data analytics company, Symantec, Kaspersky Lab, AlienVault Labs, and Novetta, 
respectively, teamed up and “based on a years’ worth of analysis…  identified more 
than 45 unique families of malware used by the Lazarus Group. The researchers found 
these malware families primarily through the attackers' re-use of passwords, identical 
snippets of code, encryption keys, obfuscation methods for avoiding detection, 
command-and-control structures, and other telling code details and techniques.”331 
 
328 Zetter, Kim. “Experts are Still Divided on Whether North Korea is Behind the Sony Attack.” 
Wired, December 23, 2014. p. 6.  
329 Symantec Threat Hunter Team. “FASTCash: How the Lazarus Group is Emptying Millions 
from ATMs.” Symantec Enterprise Blog: Threat Intelligence, November 8, 2018.  Located at: 
https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/fastcash-lazarus-atm-
malware and accessed on December 8, 2019.    
330 Zetter, Kim. “The Sony Hackers Were Causing Mayhem Years Before They Hit the 
Company.” Wired, February 24, 2016.  
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 Symantec listed numerous links between Lazarus and software the group had left 
behind after launching an earlier, less virulent, version of the malware in February. One 
was a variant of software used to wipe disks during the Sony Pictures attack, while 
another tool used the same internet addresses as two other pieces of malware linked to 
Lazarus.332 Looking back at 2014 from a 2017 cyberattack, Symantec researchers noted: 
“The same Internet connection was used to install an early version of [the 2017 attack] on 
two computers and to communicate with a tool that destroyed files at Sony Pictures 
Entertainment.”333  This is one method to reasonably link cyberattacks over time to a 
particular group.  
 According to Broadcom, a global technology company that designs and develops 
key components and infrastructure software solutions, an attack in 2016 repurposed a 
trojan horse that was used in the attack against Sony. The group Lazarus was linked to 
Backdoor.Destroyer,334 a highly destructive Trojan that was… used in an attack against 
Sony Pictures Entertainment.335 
 
332 Menn, Joseph. “Symantec Says ‘Highly Likely’ North Korea group behind ransomware 
attacks.” Reuters, May 22, 2017.  Located at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyberattack-
northkorea/symantec-says-highly-likely-north-korea-group-behind-ransomware-attacks-
idUSKBN18I2SH and accessed on December 6, 2019.   
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attacks.” Reuters, May 22, 2017.  Located at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyberattack-
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334 “Backdoor.Destover.” Symantec Security Center, December 3, 2014. This security warning 
provides the background information on the trojan horse, what actions it performs, what IPs it 
connects to, and recommendations for system administrations.    
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 At the time of the attack with the information known in the immediate aftermath, 
including the public statements from North Korean diplomats and various leadership,  
employing Healey’s Spectrum of State Responsibility, would rank the attack between 4, 
State-Encouraged, and 9, State-executed.336  Looking at the public statements from Sony 
Pictures, while the CEO noted that they were less concerned with who did than how to 
protect their employees, the attribution was likely between 5, State-shaped and 10, State-
integrated. Combining this with Sharp’s Known Coercer + Known Demand model, where 
he denotes the victim’s certainty about coercer’s identity as “more certain” for this case 
and therefore this was a case of cyber coercion, along with the technical information 
known at the time, the victim was able to surmount the attribution obstacle.   
 
Audience Costs  
What were the audience costs?  What were the audience costs over time? 
 The audience costs were extensive. It included the fallout from Amy Pascal’s 
reprehensible emails and the inappropriate emails concerning Hollywood elites 
culminating in her firing, to Sony being openly criticized for capitulating to the North 
Korean demands. There was outcry that a U.S.-based company was ceding to North 
Korean demands, therefore infringing on the First Amendment right to freedom of 
expression, and self-censoring.  
 
336 Healey’s Spectrum of State Responsibility was created long after the 2007 Estonia attacks, but 
it is a useful tool to employ in assessing the cyberattack.  
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There were also audience costs with business associates, having their private 
information strewn across the internet, and their contractual agreements made public.  
“Firms have a financial incentive not to disclose intrusions that could undercut public 
confidence in their products and stock prices.”337 While recent attacks in 2020s have 
brought increased attention to the issue of cyber coercion (and, related, cybercrime via 
ransomware) as a 2011 McAfee white paper notes, “the public (and often the industry) 
understanding of this significant national security threat is largely minimal due to the 
very limited number of voluntary disclosures by victims of intrusion activity compared to 
the actual number of compromises that take place.”338 This is partly why the North 
Korean hacker’s decision to publicly disclose the internal communications of Sony 
Pictures Entertainment was significant for the business-related audience costs that Sony 
Pictures Entertainment suffered. It could not simply and quietly dismiss the situation and 
move on; conversely, the embarrassing internal notes were splashed across all mediums, 
from Hollywood rags to cybersecurity research papers.  
The audience costs faced by cyber coercion may differ from other forms of 
coercion given the nature of cyber and some of the advantages it provides to an 
aggressor. Unlike diplomatic threats or economic sanctions, in the case of Sony Pictures 
Entertainment, an advantage for the North Korean strategy is that SPE had the constant 
 
337 Nye Jr., Joseph. “”Nuclear Lessons for Cybersecurity?” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 
2011. p. 28. 
338Alperovitch, Dmitri. “Revealed: Operation Shady RAT.” McAfee White Paper, 2011. p. 3.  The 
author was referring to a different type of intrusion, commonly referred to as a “RAT” or remote 
access tool,  but the sentiment that commercial industry is less willing to publicly disclose 
hacking activities levied against them applies regardless of the type of technique used.  
151 
 
question of “what else is coming?” as the tranches of internal data were released over 
weeks and it suffered the repercussions to its employees, business associates, reputation 
and increased audience costs. Other methods of coercion, like land grabs, supporting an 
insurgency or air strikes may not apply when coercing commercial entities since they 
would likely invite a state response.  That being said, “coercers seldom rely on one 
instrument at a time.”339 In the Sony Pictures case study, once a threat of physical 
violence was made over two weeks into the attack, despite being not a credible threat, 
secondary victims like the cinema chains took the threat more seriously because it was 
bolstered by the extensive cyberattacks.  The original threat to SPE not to release the film 
followed by the destruction of the computer network, the release of internal business 
data, the doxing of personal information of employees and the non-credible threat of 
violence was all made excruciatingly public.  This served to increase the audience costs 
and make it more difficult for SPE to back down in the face of North Korean demands for 
self-censorship.   
 
Financial Costs 
What were the financial costs? What were the financial costs over time?   
The total financial cost of the cyberattack campaign against Sony Pictures 
Entertainment is estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Experts estimate 
the overall cost to be about $200 million, including $80 million in direct damages and 
 
339 Byman, D and M Waxman. The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the 
Limits of Military Might. UK: Cambridge University Press, RAND, 2002. p. 120.  
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more than $120 million in indirect damages (e.g. class action lawsuits from Sony 
employees for mishandling personal information, legal fees, remediation costs, leaked 
trade secrets, etc.)340 Sony Pictures Entertainment, on its Third Quarter Financial 
Statement, ending December 31, 2014, estimated the cost “to include approximately 15 
million U.S. dollars (1.8 billion yen) for investigation and remediation costs relating to 
the …cyberattack.”341  Sony Pictures spent $44 million to make The Interview and about 
$30 million more to market it.  Since it was distributed on a severely limited theatre 
release and on video, it only brought in only $2.8 million at the box office and $15 
million across all digital streaming services in its opening, far below the original expected 
revenue.342 Overall, Sony reported total sales of approximately $40 million in rentals and 
sales for ‘The Interview’ after spending nearly $75 million in production and 
promotion.343    
  
 
340 Brinded, Lianna. “The Interview Tipped to Cost Sony Pictures $200 Million Following Hack 
and Cancellation.” International Business Times, December 18, 2014.   
341 Contained in the financial statement itself is a note that the cyberattack prevented Sony 
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estimated results, to include an estimation of the costs associated with the cyberattack. 
“Consolidated Financial Results Forecast for the Third Quarter Ended December 31, 2014, and 
Revision of Consolidated Forecast for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 2015” Sony News and 
Information. Tokyo, Japan. Located at: https://time.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/150204_sony.pdf and accessed on December 17, 2018.  
342 Tassi, Paul. “'The Interview' Made $15M At the Digital Box Office On A $44M Budget.” 
Forbes, December 29, 2014.  




Pressure on Leadership 
What was the pressure on leadership during the cyber crisis?  
 There was significant pressure on the leadership of Sony Pictures during the 
cyberattack campaign. This came in a number of forms including: personal pressure due 
to the embarrassment of having their own disgraceful emails exposed, pressure to remove 
the malware from their systems, pressure to reconstitute the servers and data that were 
wiped, where possible, pressure to get everyone back to a productive environment, 
pressure to ensure that the employees are cared for now that their personal data was 
exposed, pressure to stay on a production schedule and pressure to minimize the 
considerable public relations fallout from this cyberattack campaign.  
When the threat of violence was made on December 16th against any cinema 
showing the movie, the major theatre companies decided that this unsubstantiated threat 
exceeded their comfortability and refused to show the film. This also put pressure on 
Sony’s leadership; if they demanded theatres show the film and a violent act occurred, 
they would be responsible.  However, if they capitulated to the threat, they were letting 
the North Korean’s coerce them. The major theatre chains simply refused to show the 
film, so Sony’s executives decided to cancel the film and then changed that decision to a 
release to independent theatres and on video-on-demand.  They did not fully acquiesce to 
the North Korean demands, but instead released the movie in a much more limited 
fashion.  
Weeks later, several computers at Sony Pictures Entertainment were still off for 
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fear of re-infection.344 This was a devastating attack for the company, for the company’s 
reputation, losing company proprietary information and unreleased films, revealing poor 
security practices regarding the handling of personally identifying information, and 
costing the company millions. All due to one film that was perceived to be insulting to 
the Dear Leader.   
 The CEO of the cybersecurity firm Crowdstrike noted:  
Another thing that makes this unprecedented is the action that the theater chains 
and studios are taking to suppress release and stop production of movies about 
North Korea. This is the first time that I can remember where a victim of a 
cyberattack has been forced to take an action in the physical world against their 
will, which sets a very dangerous precedent.345 
 
 
George’s seven conditions as structured focused questions: 
Clarity of the Objective 
What was the victim’s understanding of the clarity of the objective? 
 In this case study, the victim anticipated problems with North Korea, perhaps not 
to the extent that bore out, but they were aware of the aggressor’s objective of getting the 
film suppressed.  Subsequent to the cyberattack, by December 14, 2014, the company 
was quite clear that they were being coerced into not releasing the film.  The Sony 
Pictures lawyer, David Boies sent a letter to a number of media outlets threatening them 
 
344 Cieply, Michael and Brooks Barnes. “Sony’s Dirty Laundry, For All to See.” The New York 
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with liability if they published stories on the leaked emails, but the letter is illuminating is 
its understanding of the clarity of the objective. In his letter Mr. Boies noted the 
following:  
“in an ongoing campaign explicitly seeking to prevent SPE from distributing a 
motion picture, the perpetrators of the theft have threatened SPE and its staff and 
are using the dissemination of both private and company information for the 
stated purpose of materially harming SPE unless SPE submits and withdraws the 
motion picture from distribution.”346 
 
This shows that Sony Pictures was unambiguously clear about the demand from 
the aggressor.   
 
Strength of Motivation of the Coercer 
What was strength of motivation of the coercing power?  
 The coercing power, North Korea, was strongly motivated because it interpreted 
the film as a direct insult and a threat to the North Korean leader. North Korea had been 
publicly speaking out against the film for six months prior and felt so strongly, its 
representative to the UN sent a letter to the UN General Secretary, Ban Ki-moon, 
demanding that the United States ban production and distribution of the film, claiming 
that allowing its production is sponsoring terrorism and an act of war.347 Evidently, North 
Korea felt extremely motivated to prevent the release of the film.   
 
346 Hesseldahl, Arik. “Here's Sony Lawyer's Letter Telling Publishers to Stop Publishing Leaks.” 
Vox, December 14, 2014. Located at: https://www.vox.com/2014/12/14/11633802/sony-
demands-end-to-publishing-leaks-from-stolen-data 
347 Beaumont-Thomas, Ben. “North Korea complains to UN about Seth Rogen comedy The 
Interview.” The Guardian, July 10, 2014. Located at: 
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Asymmetry of Motivation 
What was the asymmetry of motivation between the adversaries?  
 There appeared to be an asymmetry of motivation between the adversaries.  The 
North Koreans sought to disrupt the release of the film and pursued a strategy that would 
result in extreme punishment for Sony Pictures Entertainment for the perceived 
disrespect of the Kim Jong-un. In the words of the SPE CEO, he was mainly focused on 
how to keep the business going, keep production on schedule, tend to his employees, and 
figure out how to reconstitute his computer networks more than he was concerned with 
who executed the attack.348 For North Korea the production of this film was an act of war 
and terrorism; to Sony Pictures this was a terrible, costly, embarrassing cyberattack, but 
they were not willing, at first, to immediately cancel the film.  Their first actions were 
focused on providing information and assistance for their employees and, second, to 
legally compel media outlets to stop reporting on the leaked internal emails. There was a 
complete asymmetry of motivation. Following the threat of violence, the film and its 
promotion events were cancelled and, later, a different decision was made for a limited 
release and release via video-on-demand. 
 Sony Pictures Entertainment and the Sony parent company cared about the North 
Korean rhetoric when tensions began to increase the summer prior to the planned release 
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associated with the assassination of the North Korean leader. It is also why the SPE CEO 
reached out to a major think tank for its perspective on North Korea’s bluster and 
whether SPE needed to be more concerned about the narratives.   
 Initially, when the cyberattack was discovered on November 24, 2014, SPE cared 
about the demand, but in the chaos of trying to discover the extent of the attack, the 
extent of the stolen data, identifying and contracting with FireEye for assistance, it is not 
clear how quickly SPE was able to link the cyberattack to the North Korean demands, but 
certainly by November 28, 2014, it was being publicly floated.349 
 SPE received threatening messages warning that its internal data would be 
released. As the stolen data began to be published, pressure on leadership increased. The 
SPE CEO noted that he was dealing with several things at once including keeping the 
business running while setting up analog communications, dealing with employees 
concerned that their private information would be splashed across the internet and 
potential identity theft, figure out how to make payroll without working computer 
systems and of course managing the flood of press requests and stories coming out about 
the internal emails.350  Looking back on the cyberattack nearly nine months later, the SPE 
CEO noted “I actually haven’t been concerned about who did this. I’ve been more 
concerned about getting the business up and running and making sure folks here feel 
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calm enough and secure enough to keep on with their jobs.” This statement neglects to 
mention how the CEO felt about the threat of physical violence and what weight that 
carried in his decision on December 21, 2014 to reverse and release the film on a limited 
distribution and via streaming. It is likely that the outrage from customers voicing their 
anger that Sony was acquiescing to North Korea’s demand to self-censor increased the 
audience costs to a level that affected the motivation of the leadership to change their 
original decision.  
 
Victim Understanding of Urgency 
What was the victim’s understanding of the coercer’s sense of urgency?  
 Sony understood North Korea’s demand and its sense of urgency, beginning the 
summer prior to the planned movie release. When the leaking of the stolen data from the 
cyberattack began a month prior to the planned release date, the SPE CEO was clear 
about the aggressor’s sense of urgency.  This urgency was underscored by the subsequent 
threat of violence made a few weeks after the initial leak of stolen data.  
 
Adequate Domestic and International Support 
Is there adequate domestic and international support for the victim and the coercer?  
 The victim in this case study was a commercial entity, a multi-national company, 
so its domestic support came in several forms. This included several Hollywood elites 
who were outspoken that a company should not be attacked and bullied into muzzling its 
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free speech rights to make this satirical film.351 And, on the other side, the President of 
the United States said it was a mistake for the company to cancel the film, citing that a 
dictator should not be able to “impose censorship in America.”352 International support 
for Sony Pictures is difficult to measure since countries did not offer any public 
statements of support, however, Sony’s parent company located in Japan obviously did.   
Since North Korea is a closed, authoritarian state, attempting to measure domestic 
support for the regime’s activities is a meaningless exercise since approval ratings for the 
government’s activities is artificially dictated by the government.  During the 2014 
timeframe, this research did not uncover any public, international support for North 
Korea’s actions.   
 
Fear of Unacceptable Escalation 
What is the opponent's (victim’s) fear of unacceptable escalation? 
This cyberattack revealed the private, internal emails of the company’s leadership 
and they were ugly. As these documents were leaked and the links posted, Sony Pictures 
Entertainment had no way of knowing if the leaked tranche of documents would be the 
first of five or the first of ten tranches or if the links posted consisted of everything that 
was stolen or if there was more damaging information to come to light. Given the 
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repercussions from the initial batches that were posted, there was considerable pressure 
on the leadership at Sony Pictures Entertainment to not escalate further. Beyond the 
public embarrassment, the information systems at Sony were suffering in the aftermath of 
the attack, with some computers completely unusable and significant data deleted, and 
the business itself was in jeopardy of failing to maintain its financing and production 
schedule. Sony Pictures Entertainment was fearful of further escalation, not knowing 
what else was stolen and could be leaked or what other systems had been compromised 
and the data could be destroyed remotely but were equally concerned about protecting 
their employees.353   
As for the decision from the major theatre chains not to air the film, part of this 
decision was that they did not want to become a target of cyberattacks themselves, 
according to the statements from the SPE CEO and from a spokesperson for one of the 
five major cinema chains in North America on December 17, 2014. This represents 
secondary deterrence; that is, similar to the movie studios that cancelled future films with 
a North Korean angle, the cinema chains were not the direct targets of the cyberattack, 
but in changing their behavior due to the cyberattack and subsequent threat of violence, 
they are a secondary coercee who chose to change their behavior lest it become the next 
North Korean cyberattack victim, or worse. 
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Clarity on Terms for Settlement 
What is the clarity concerning precise terms of the settlement of a crisis for the victim 
and the coercer?   
 Sony Pictures dismissed the terms of the coercion settlement, at first, but as the 
attack progressed and additional internal documents were leaked, it clearly understood 
that the purpose of the attack was to prevent the release of a movie that was critical of the 
North Korean leader. The letter from the SPE lawyer clearly articulates that SPE 






The conventional wisdom says that Sony Pictures “won” this cyber confrontation. 
After all, The Interview was produced and was shown in some theaters and on video-on-
demand. However, the conventional wisdom is wrong, too narrowly focused on the 
binary of winning/losing and too limited temporally. The most interesting aspect is to 
uncover not only why and how it is wrong, but what the data proves about this cyber 
coercive act, what the conventional wisdom ought to be regarding the outcome, and what 
factors led to this outcome.  
Sony Pictures Entertainment was on the receiving end of extraordinary cyber 
pressure, later coupled with a threat of violence, and this resulted in a series of significant 
decisions at Sony Pictures that led to Sony Pictures capitulating partially to the North 
Korean demand. Beyond that, there was secondary deterrence in the form of other 
Hollywood studios cancelling North Korean-focused movies and large theatre chains 
refusing to show the film for fear of incurring the North Korean cyber wrath and 
suffering a similar cyberattack or, worse, being subjected to actual physical violence.   
Sony Pictures suffered the “gradual turning of the screw”354 with the cascade of 
cyber leaks that included damning, damaging or embarrassing information in each 
tranche released. The cyberattack primed the landscape and put Sony on the defense, so 
when the threat of physical violence came, even though law enforcement did not find it to 
be a credible threat, it caused a high level of consternation and caused several related 
 
354 George, Alexander.  Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. 
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163 
 
companies to change their decision-making regarding The Interview as well as other films 
with a North Korean plot. Effectively, the cyberattack and the additional threat of 
violence resulted in a secondary deterrence; no company wanted to take the chance that 
they might be the next cyberattack victim, jeopardizing all their internal security, 
financial documentation, personal emails, employee files, business contracts, and 
computer networks. Further, although the threat of physical violence was determined not 
to be a credible threat, on the heels of the extensive Sony Pictures cyberattack, no 
company wanted to take the chance. 
The threat of violence alone may not have resulted in the cinema closings, but on 
the heels of the massive cyberattack, it signaled that the aggressor had a significant 
commitment to the demand and was an extremely motivated actor.  Simply, the 
cyberattacks made this otherwise relatively implausible threat more credible to the 
business owners. The question was: was North Korea motivated enough to carry out a 
physical attack at a cinema?  No major theatre chain operator wanted to find out. The 
combination of the cyberattack, the nature of the cyberattack and the threat of physical 
violence that amplified the effectiveness of the coercion resulted in Sony Pictures and 
several related companies changing their behavior, changing their decision-making and 
those changes significantly reduced the distribution of the film.  This of course resulted in 
less earning for the film than originally anticipated along with the hefty remediation costs 
for the destroyed systems from the cyberattack.   
Sony had other levers of pressure to exert over the theatres in an effort to 
convince them to air The Interview, if they were motivated to do so. Sony Pictures could 
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monetarily penalize them, or possibly threaten to withhold future blockbusters, or give 
exclusivity to one chain over others to entice them to air The Interview, but they did not 
exercise these options and allowed the limited release in independent theatres.355 Sony 
Pictures was not sufficiently motivated to pressure the distributors and understood the 
distributors fear of incurring additional cyberattacks against their companies if they 
agreed to air the film.  
The cyberattack against Sony was successful in compelling Sony Pictures and the 
theatre companies to change their decision. As well, it served to deter Sony Pictures from 
pressuring these companies and deterred other studios from moving forward with North 
Korea-related films out of fear of drawing the ire of North Korea and causing additional 
future cyberattacks. That is a significant factor and part of the reason why the 
conventional wisdom that “Sony won” is terribly incorrect.  American companies 
restrained their decisions about future activities based on the fear that their actions could 
result in making them the next cyberattack target, or physical attack target, and, instead, 
made a decision that would not incur North Korea’s wrath. This coercive cyberattack 
resulted in changing the behavior and effectively deterring the activities of multiple 
American companies.   
The North Korean strategy to slowly release information and destroy the SPE 
computer networks put pressure on SPE leadership to cancel the film, which is what 
originally occurred.  However, with the subsequent releases of stolen data, the increased 
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importance and scandal of the information released, and the ensuing threat of physical 
violence, the audience costs for SPE reached a level that SPE could not ignore. That is, 
Americans were extremely upset that a U.S.-based company was attacked by a foreign 
country and forced to self-censor, and some Hollywood elites were extremely outspoken 
on the subject. So, SPE leadership reversed its decision and moved to release the film 
through the means it had available. This is why the conventional wisdom is that Sony 
Pictures “won” this conflict, however, this research has shown that it is not the full story.   
 The SPE CEO also noted that, in light of his experience with the cyberattack, that 
he and “everybody is more cautious about what they put in e-mail, and the instinct 
nowadays is more often to pick up the phone or meet in person, particularly when you’re 
talking about difficult stuff.”356  Another way of looking at this firsthand account from 
the victim is that, in the future, he and his associates have permanently changed their 
behavior online due to the North Korean cyberattack. That is not a failure for North 
Korea, that is a long-term behavior change and a successful outcome for Pyongyang’s 
strategy. 
 This case study provides ample avenues for additional policy research and 
development, as will be discussed in the section on future policy work.  Areas and topics 
include disincentives for targeting commercial targets, penalties for engaging in hack and 
leak tactics of commercial entities and cyberattack disclosure requirements.   
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CHAPTER 5: ESTONIA CASE STUDY 
 
 A fight over the relocation of a Red Army statue and World War II-era Russian 
soldier remains in April 2007 ignited tensions resulting in a two-phase Russian cyber 
operation against Estonia, one of the most digitally-reliant countries in Europe at the 
time. Coupled with a few days of public demonstrations and rioting, the Russian 
cyberattacks lasted for weeks and successfully suspended online and ATM services of 
Estonian banks, inhibited the government's ability to communicate among agencies and 
the news media were unable to produce the news; the entire country had been targeted.357 
While it was a momentous show of force by Russia, it was not successful in achieving the 
goal — Estonia did not change its behavior and went ahead and relocated the statue and 
the remains. Moreover, this attack demonstrated to the Estonians, and to all of Europe, 
how a country could be paralyzed by cyberattacks and therefore greater investment in 
cyber security was required. While it was a tactical and technical success for Russia, 
Estonia turned it into a strategic advantage for the Estonians. The conventional wisdom is 
that  
 The three-week long DDoS achieved several different outcomes including the 
expression of [Russian] diplomatic discontent; the flexing of “virtual” muscles; 
and the capturing of the Estonian government’s attention. …The  DDoS did not 
target a sector or a specific organization but a nation’s information 
infrastructure… [and] …the world was witness to what it had long heard about 
but up until this point had never seen – cyberattacks shut down a country’s 
information infrastructure.358 
 
357 Davis, Joshua. “Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe.” Wired, August 21, 
2007.  Accessed via https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/ on  October 26, 2018.   
358 Iasiello, Emilio. “Cyber Attack: A Dull Tool to Shape Foreign Policy.” 2013 5th International 
Conference on Cyber Conflict, K. Podins, J. Stinissen, M. Maybaum, eds. Tallinn: NATO CCD 
COE Publications, 2013. 
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 “Cyber warriors tend to see that Estonia lost in 2007 because of a focus on 
technical impact rather than the more strategic view that winning means achieving better 
national security outcomes.”359  The technical management throughout the cyberattack 
duration was superior and 
clearly from a tactical standpoint, the DDoS attacks against the Estonian 
information infrastructure were an unqualified success. For three weeks, Estonia 
was the target of these attacks. Each time there was a pause in the activity, it 
would resurface soon after stronger and more potent than earlier iterations. 




Russia clearly understood that the tactical effect was useful for its goals since it employed 
similar techniques the following year against Georgia as part of its hybrid warfare 
strategy combined with kinetic attacks.361  However, these assessments, once again, 
framed a cyber coercive act too narrowly, focused on the binary of winning/losing while 
also limiting the time period examined.  This case study will show the additional 
variables involved in failing to coerce a victim to change its behavior over time including 
audience costs, financial costs, a lack of asymmetric motivation and no fear of 
unacceptable escalation.  
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In the Spring of 2007, Estonia faced an unprecedented cyberattack campaign 
against several of its national critical functions to include the financial industry and 
government services, spanning 22 days, from April 26, 2007, to May 19, 2007. 
Researchers and academics suggest that Estonia “lost” the fight, but that is an artificially 
narrow understanding of the conflict focused solely on the tactical cyberattack and 
ignores the significant strategic cyber developments that arose from the conflict and 
damaged the relative power of the adversary in the cyber realm in Estonia. That view also 
ignores the secondary effects of this incident that served as a wake-up call for Europe to 
not only recognize the cyber threat, but to act meaningfully to improve knowledge 
sharing and defense, to include building a NATO Cyber Centre of Excellence in 2008 
based in Tallinn. Given the strategic and operational changes that occurred in Estonia and 
for NATO in the aftermath of the 2007 cyberattacks, Estonia turned the experience of the  
short-term crippling cyberattacks into a long-term strategic advantage. The event served 
as a rallying cry in the West to commit resources and expertise against the priority of the 
Russian cyber threat. That being said, the incident also allowed Russia to exercise its 
capabilities, learn efficiencies and refine them. It used similar tactics in its conflict with 
Georgia the following year.   
After several months of publicly proposing the move, the Estonian government 
decided to relocate a Soviet-era war monument. Estonia has a rich and colorful history in 
its relationship with Russia. At one time it was part of the Russian Empire, first declaring 
its independence in 1918, after the collapse of the Russia Empire.  It then became a 
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Soviet republic following a tense period from 1939-1944 until 1991, when it declared its 
independence once again.  
On April 26, 2007, the Estonian government in Tallinn began initial preparations 
to relocate the Soviet-era national monument dedicated to the Red Army, “the Bronze 
Soldier” statue along with the remains of a dozen soldiers buried at the monument and 
elaborate grave marker, from the center of Tallinn to a nearby military cemetery. The 
“bronze soldier in Soviet Army uniform, head uncovered, and rifle slung on his back with 
barrel pointing to the ground, stands at ease.”362 This monument was originally erected in 
1947 as a tribute to Soviet soldiers who died in World War II and its proposed relocation 
was strongly opposed by the ethnic Russian population living in Estonia and by the 
Russian government363 whose foreign ministry called the plan a “blasphemous, idea and a 
blatant mocking of the memories of Red Army soldiers.”364 This decision to move the 
Bronze Soldier statue followed a series of public protests, sometimes violent, in Tallinn 
and outside the Estonian embassy in Moscow that occurred over several months. It was a 
sensitive topic for ethnic Russians and ethnic Estonians for different reasons, complicated 
by a convoluted history concerning statues in Tallin.  
“After winning WWII, the Soviets blew up the monument dedicated to Estonian 
 
362 Mardiste, David. “Russia to Estonia: Don’t Move Our Statue.” Reuters, January 25, 2007.  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-estonia-russia-statue/russia-to-estonia-dont-move-our-statue-
idUSL2378719620070125 and accessed on November 11, 2019.   
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Cyberattack.” Forbes,  July 7, 2018.  https:// www.forbes.com/sites/francistapon/2018/07/07/the-
bronze-soldier-statue-in-tallinn-estonia-give-baltic-headaches/?sh=59f777da98c7  and accessed 
on November 14, 2019. 
364 Mardiste, David. “Russia to Estonia: Don’t Move Our Statue.” Reuters, January 25, 2007.  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-estonia-russia-statue/russia-to-estonia-dont-move-our-statue-
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independence”365 and replaced it with a wooden structure. This wooden structure was 
destroyed by two Estonian teenagers who were eventually caught and sentenced to work 
in Soviet labor camps for years. It was at this point, in 1947, that the Soviets installed the 
Bronze Soldier statue to commemorate their success in WWII. In 1998, the two Estonian 
teenagers, then in their 60’s, were awarded Estonia’s highest medal. In Estonia, the 
suggestion to move the Bronze Soldier statue was attached to a complicated and storied 
history of representation, occupation, and marginalization.   
For the Russians, the Bronze Soldier statue represented the heroic efforts and 
sacrifices by Russians during World War II and was a symbol of the identity for the 
minority ethnic Russians still living in Estonia. It is also a rallying point for every May 
9th when Russians gather at the Bronze Soldier statue to commemorate Russia’s Victory 
in Europe World War II celebration.366 The proposal to move the monument and the 
associated remains was seen as an attack on the minority community and an attempt to 
marginalize the ethnic Russian identity in Estonia. The proposal provoked a passionate 
and aggrieved response that came in the form of violent protests lasting several days in 
April 2007.367 For the Estonians, the Bronze Soldier statue was a symbol of unwanted 
 
365 Tapon, Francis. “The Bronze Soldier Explains Why Estonia Prepares for a Russian 
Cyberattack.” Forbes,  July 7, 2018.  https:// www.forbes.com/sites/francistapon/2018/07/07/the-
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Soviet occupation and, for some, an emblem of ongoing tensions with ethnic Russians 
still living in Estonia.  
Cyberattack 
The cyberattacks Estonia suffered in 2007 were a watershed moment in the 
history of hostile cyber actions due to the breadth and depth of the attack. Estonia 
endured cyberattacks lasting over three weeks, consisting of two distinct phases, with the 
first phase, considered the “emotional response,” beginning on April 26, 2007, and 
lasting until April 29, 2007 and the second phase, “the main attack,” lasting from April 
30, 2007 to May 19, 2007.368  The cyberattacks targeted Parliament, various government 
ministries and agencies, banks and other economic sector businesses, private companies, 
the news media, “mail servers, DNS servers and backbone routers.”369 
The Phase I attacks were unsophisticated, targeting government webpages for 
defacement or relatively simple denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. The main attack, Phase 
II, was advanced, massive and coordinated and relied heavily on botnets. “The most 
dangerous ones were Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against some of the 
components of the critical information infrastructure – against the backbone routers of 
data communications network and DNS servers.”370 Two weeks into the attacks, on May 
10th, the attacks on the banks began which meant banking services were unavailable 
 
368 Viira, Toomas. “Cyber Attacks Against Estonia - Overview and Conclusions.” Information 
Technology in Public Administration of Estonia - Yearbook 2007. Tallinn, Estonia: Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communications, 2008. p. 72. The author of the article was the 





locally for a period of time and “restrictions were applied for accessing Internet banking 
services from other countries.”371 Some attacks only disrupted operations for a few 
minutes at a time while others interrupted access for hours.  
To fully understand the extent of disruption caused by these cyberattacks, it is 
essential to understand how much Estonians relied upon their digital infrastructure for 
their daily lives in 2007. Estonia decided in the 1990s to invest significantly in digital 
infrastructure to become one of the most technologically advanced countries. By 1996, 90 
percent of the Estonian population used the internet regularly; by 2000 the government 
cabinet meetings were online, by 2002 Estonia employed a mandatory digital ID card, 
and by 2007, Estonia offered comprehensive e-voting.372 For this small Baltic nation that 
was extremely digitally-dependent for its economic health and growth, as well as its 
government and societal functions, a multi-week paralyzing attack was a significant blow 
to the country. According to Rain Ottis, a scientist at the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence in 2008,  “Estonia is highly networked, so a wide scale 
attack on the availability of public digital services has a significant effect on the way of 
life of ordinary citizens and businesses alike. …these cyberattacks… should be 
considered a threat to national security.373 The Director of IT security at the Estonian 
 
371 Ibid. 
372 Statistics provided by e-Estonia.com. According to Rainer Kattel and Ines Mergel in 
“Estonia’s Digital Transformation,” the “Estonian e-government infrastructure and its success 
rest on two main pillars, both introduced in 2001, that essentially create a digital state and digital 
citizens: the data infrastructure X-Road and a compulsory national digital ID.” Article is in Great 
Policy Successes. Compton, Mallory E.; Hart, Paul. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2019. 
373 Ottis, Rain. “Analysis of the 2007 Cyber Attacks Against Estonia from the Information 
Warfare Perspective.” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn, Estonia. 
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Ministry of Defence at the time, Mihkel Tammet, remarked:   
“Of course [websites] can be put up again, but they can be attacked also again.  
Estonia depended largely on the internet because of the country’s ‘paperless  
government’ and web-based banking.  If these services are made slower, we, of  
course, lose economically.374 
 
 The Estonian Defense Minister at the time, Jaak Aaviksoo, noted:  
 
The attacks were aimed at the essential electronic infrastructure of the Republic of 
Estonia.  All major commercial banks, telcos, media outlets, and name servers — 
the phone books of the Internet — felt the impact, and this affected the majority 
of the Estonian population. This was the first time that a botnet threatened the 
national security of an entire nation.375 
 
 The then-President Toomas Hendrik Ilves of Estonia said “it was unheard of, and 
no one understood what was going on in the beginning”376 when Estonians first 
discovered that online media, government websites and banking resources, among others,  
were all inaccessible. On September 25, 2007, in an address to the United Nations 
General Assembly, Estonia’s President made a plea that:  
Cyberattacks are a threat not only to sophisticated information technological 
systems, but also to a community as a whole.… The threats posed by cyber 
warfare have often been underestimated since, fortunately, they have so far not 
resulted in the loss of any lives.… In addition to concrete technical and legal 
measures for countering cyberattacks, governments must morally define the cyber 
violence and crime, which deserve to be generally condemned just like terrorism 
or the trafficking in human beings.377 
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 When asked to reflect on the cyberattack campaign ten years later, former-
President Ilves noted: “Looking back on it, it was the first, but hardly the last case in 
which a kind of cyberattack … was done in an overtly political manner.”378 He would 
later describe the cyberattacks as ‘Web War One.’379 
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Chronology for Process Tracing 
May 9, 2006: On Russian Victory Day, the red flags of the Soviet Union were flown at 
the Bronze Soldier while an Estonian tricolor flag was torn down. The police were unable 
to maintain public security if they removed the Soviet flags, so they left them where they 
were. This caused the Estonian people to demand the statue be removed lest it become a 
rallying point for Russian nationalism.380  
 
January 10, 2007:  Estonian government announces its plan to move the Bronze Soldier 
statue.381 
 
January 2007: Russia’s Upper House submits a resolution “demanding their Estonian 
parliamentary peers prevent the statue from being moved.”382 
 
Late January 2007: The Russian government summoned the Estonian Ambassador to 
express their dismay and to discourage moving the monument and human remains from 
the center of Tallinn to the cemetery.383   
 
April 3, 2007:  Sergei Ivanov, First Deputy Prime Minister (2007-2008) in Russia called 
on Russians to boycott Estonian goods and services in response to Estonia’s plans: 
“Don’t buy Estonian products [...], don’t go to Estonia for vacations, go to 
Kaliningrad.”384 
 
Mid-April 2007:  In the days prior to Phase I of the cyberattack, “Russian -language 
Internet discussion forums were abuzz with preparations for an online attack”385 which 
points to a wide-ranging operational plan.   
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April 23, 2007: Estonia planned to highlight the online planning operations publicly, 
hoping that it would lead the European Union to admonish the plans and pressure the 
Kremlin to intervene. Unfortunately, Estonia was pressured from within the European 
Union to withhold the public warning and scolding due to an upcoming meeting between 
Russian President Putin and German Chancellor Merkel.386 
 
April 26, 2007: Estonian government began initial preparations to relocate the Soviet-era 
“Bronze Statue” and soldier remains. 
 
April 26, 2007 – April 29, 2007:  Phase I of cyberattack launched against Estonia. Phase I 
consisted of relatively simple denial-of-service attacks and web defacement of high-
profile and political sites including the President, the Parliament, police and major media 
outlets.387 Online forums provided “step-by-step instructions so simple that any Internet 
user could follow, complete with a pre- selected list of targets”388 for Phase I.  
 
April 26, 2007 – April 27, 2007: The “Bronze Night” where rioting, fires and physical 
clashes with police occurred in Tallinn, Estonia.389 “One man was killed, 153 people 
were injured, and some 800 arrests were made as the Russians resisted the removal of the 
bronze statue of a soldier.”390 
 
April 27, 2007, 3:40am: Emergency Parliament session called, government approves the  
immediate removal of the statue.391 Later that day, the monument is removed and taken to 
an unknown location.392 
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April 28, 2007: Estonian Ministry of Defense coordinates defense effort with CERT-EE, 
the Community Emergency Response Team for the Estonian .ee domain 
 
April 28, 2007: Estonian Embassy in Moscow was surrounded by protestors demanding 
the resignations of the Government of Estonia and “subjected the Embassy officials 
inside the building to violence and vandalism.”393 
 
April 30, 2007 – May 19, 2007: Phase II of cyberattack. Phase II consisted of 
sophisticated, coordinated attacks using botnets and distributed denial-of-service. Targets 
included the data backbone network, government servers, two of the largest Estonia 
banks, Hansabank and SEB Eesti Uhisbank, and more extensive attacks on media 
outlets.394 Phase II was significantly more technical than Phase I, both in the type of 
attack and the specific targets. While step-by-step directions for Phase I were widely 
publicized on the internet, no such guide existed for Phase II given the technical 
sophistication and funding required to carry out these operations.  
During Phase II, Russia also suspended rail deliveries of raw materials and 
passenger service between some Estonian and Russian cities, but Russia claimed the 
suspension was not due to the political tension, but instead due to planned 
maintenance.395  
 
April 30, 2007: Russian delegation visited Estonia and issued an official statement at the 
Embassy of the Russian Federation in Estonia that ‘the government of Estonia must step 
down’396 
 
May 2, 2007:  Estonian Ambassador to Moscow physically attacked by protestors in 
Moscow while giving a press briefing.397  Also, the European Commission urged Russia 
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to respect its obligations to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and end 
the blockade of the Embassy of Estonia in Moscow.  The Estonian Embassy in Moscow 
had been closed since April 27, 2007.398  
 
May 9, 2007: The cyberattacks peak on this day and are unrelenting from 00:01 until 
midnight, 24:00. It is reported that, “You couldn't get information; you couldn't do your 
job. You couldn't reach the bank; you couldn't check the bus schedule.”399 
 May 9th is also “Victory Day” in Russia, a celebrated Russian federal holiday.  
During a speech to Russian troops for the Victory Day celebration, President Putin 
remarked: “Those who attempt today to ...defile the monuments to war heroes are 
insulting their own people and spreading enmity and new distrust between countries and 
peoples.”400 
 
May 18, 2007-May 19, 2007, at midnight:  The “cyberattacks abruptly and 
simultaneously cease.”401 
 
October 2007:  NATO meeting of Allied Defense Ministers where they call for the 
development of an official NATO Cyber Defense policy. 402 
 
April 2-4, 2008: The Bucharest Summit marked the first time the Alliance formally 
discussed cyber issues within the summit framework. NATO adopted a Policy on Cyber 
Defense, and “are developing the structures and authorities to carry it out. Our Policy on 
Cyber Defense emphasizes the need for NATO and nations to protect key information 
systems in accordance with their respective responsibilities; share best practices; and 
provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyberattack. We 
look forward to continuing the development of NATO’s cyber defense capabilities and 
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strengthening the linkages between NATO and national authorities.403 The product of this 
policy is the creation of the NATO Cyber Center of Excellence.  
 
May 14, 2008: NATO Cyber Center of Excellence opens in Tallinn, Estonia.404  This 
Center serves as a multi-national hub of cyber expertise for NATO members and 
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Structured Focused Questions 
Targets 
What were the targets of the cyberattack?   
The attacks primarily consisted of denial-of-service (DoS), distributed-denial-of-
service (DDoS) and website defacement. The DDoS attacks resulted in the “temporary 
degradation or loss of service on many commercial and government servers. While most 
of the attacks targeted non-critical services like public websites and e-mail, others 
concentrated on more vital targets, such as online banking and DNS.405 Websites for the 
government, business community, banks, communications and media and political parties 
had to shut down when they were hit with the DDoS attacks.  This meant that initially 
some digital government services were suspended, some digital banking was suspended, 
accessing some digitally-based local information and news was not possible, and several 
businesses were forced offline and unable to function. As the attack campaign continued, 
some victims were able to whitelist clients for access or put in other measures to allow 
some local IP access while preventing access from foreign IPs.  
As noted above, May 9th is an important date for the Russians, when they 
commemorate Russia’s Victory in Europe World War II with a celebration. It is also an 
important date for this cyberattack campaign because “on many sites the organizers 
called for an attack on that politically important date. The big attack wave anticipated for 
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May 9th started shortly after 11PM local time on May 8th, however, suggesting that these 
attackers were on Moscow time.406 
 The website defacement hit several sectors and consisted of replacing the original 
text with disinformation or pro-Russian propaganda and also included hacking the 
Estonian Prime Minister’s site (who many believed to be the driving factor behind the 
relocation of the Bronze Soldier.)407 The hackers who attacked the ruling Reform Party’s 
website early on in the attack campaign left a bogus notice that the “Estonian prime 
minister and his government were asking forgiveness of Russians and promising to return 
the statue to its original site.”408 The targets of the cyberattacks broadly covered sectors 
of Estonian economic, government and society, all considered countervalue (including 
non-military government) targets, and did not appear to target counterforce targets.  
 
Nature of Attack 
What was the nature of the attack? How was the attack conducted?  
As noted above, the cyberattacks largely consisted of DDoS and DoS attacks and 
website defacement, to include “modified attack tools, shared in forums by Russian (or 
Russian-language) hackers and, later, ‘rented’ distributed botnets nearly blocked 
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May 4, 2007.  Located at https://www.rferl.org/a/1076297.html and accessed on November 23, 
2019.   
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Estonia’s access to the internet completely. The distributed nature of the botnet presented 
a more difficult challenge due to the need to defend against multiple attacking groups. 
“Two waves of attacks occurred — the second significantly more sophisticated than the 
first”409  and “were unparalleled in size and variety compared to a country the size of 
Estonia.410   
At first the Estonia perceived the internet attack as a nuisance, but quickly 
realized it was more than that when the targeting expanded to Internet addresses of 
servers supporting aspects of the telephone network, the credit card verification system, 
and the Domain Name System (DNS).411 Over one million computers were involved in 
targeting servers in Estonia.412  “Hansabank, the nation’s largest bank, was staggered. 
Commerce and communications nationwide were being affected and the attacks did not 
stop. Estonia claimed that the ultimate controlling machines were in Russia another 
computer code involved have been written on Cyrillic alphabet keyboards.”413  
According to one cybersecurity company whose systems sees approximately 80% 
of the internet, it saw 128 unique DDoS attacks on Estonian websites in the first two 
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weeks of May using the company’s unique threat analysis research infrastructure that 
examines internet traffic. Of these, 115 were Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
floods, 4 were Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) floods, and 9 were generic traffic 
floods. Attacks were not distributed uniformly, with some sites seeing more attacks than 
others in quantity; some attacks lasted under an hour while others persisted for hours and 
the largest recorded attacks were 40 gigabytes per second.414  “The longest attacks 
themselves were over 10 and a half hours long sustained, dealing a truly crushing blow to 
the endpoints.415 
 
Leadership as a Target, Potential Leadership Destabilization 
Was leadership targeted?   
Yes, the government websites of the Prime Minister were targeted; he was largely 
seen as a proponent of the plan to move the statue. The political website of the Reform 
Party was targeted and posting a fake disinformation message from the Prime Minister 
falsely apologizing for moving the statue.416 It was left for the Estonian people to 
incorrectly believe their government was reversing course. The mail servers for 
Parliament were also targeted.417 These cyberattacks on the leadership did not result in 
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destabilizing the leadership; the attacks focused on the leadership were not sophisticated 
and did not impose large costs on the leadership.   
 
Attribution  
What was the understanding about attribution at the time of the attack? Did this change 
over time?   
In the case of Estonia, “analysts determined the attacked traced back to 178 
countries… [but that] served to muddy the obvious truth: The attacks were supported or 
encouraged by the Russian government and that to make the attacks stop, western 
decision makers needed to engage Moscow.”418 The Estonian government believed 
Russia was behind the attacks: “The European Union is under attack, as Russia is 
attacking Estonia.”419 The actions of the Russian delegation to Tallinn appeared to 
support this assertion. On April 30, a delegation from Russia's State Duma, the lower 
house of parliament, traveled to Tallinn to investigate the violent events surrounding the 
removal of the Bronze Soldier memorial. The delegation was headed by Nikolai 
Kovalyov who was then the head of the Duma Veterans Affairs Committee. While on the 
visit in Tallinn, Kovalyov called for the immediate resignation of the Estonian 
government.420 Making this public statement following a crippling cyberattack campaign 
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that had been ongoing for over a week at that point and would continue for another two 
weeks, served to underscore the Kremlin’s intention:  at least to demoralize and punish 
Estonia for moving the statue and perhaps even as much as destabilize and undermine its 
control.421  The Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet accused the Kremlin of direct 
involvement in the cyberattacks, noting:  
"When there are attacks coming from official IP addresses of Russian authorities  
and they are attacking not only our websites but our mobile phone network and  
our rescue service network, then it is already very dangerous.”422   
 
He also stated:  
 
“The attack is virtual, psychological and real – all at the same time. [...] IP  
addresses have helped to identify that the cyber terrorists’ attacks against the  
Internet pages of Estonian government agencies and the Office of the President  
have originated from specific computers and persons in Russian government  
agencies, including the administration of the President of the Russian  
Federation.”423 
 
Paet was not the only official to publicly accuse Russia.  Prime Minister Andrus Ansip 
charged:  
“the continuing cyberattacks from the servers of Russian state authorities,  
together with tearing the Estonian flag off our embassy and together with  
statements made by the delegates of the Russia Duma, calling for the change of 
 government in Estonia, indicates that our sovereign state is under a heavy  
 
2019.   
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The President of the European Parliament at the time, Hans-Gert Pottering, noted that “it 
is usual in Europe to demand the resignation of a democratically elected government of 
the neighboring country. It is unthinkable in Europe to disregard the Vienna Convention 
on the protection of the diplomatic representations.”425    
In additional to the technical data and obvious heightened tensions surrounding 
the relocation issue, there are a number of real-world political and economic actions from 
the Russian government and Russian government figures that occurred in parallel to the 
cyberattacks and contributed to the assessment of the attribution of the attack.  With these 
supporting statements, the cyberattack against Estonia can be ranked on Healey’s 
Spectrum of State Responsibility between 4, State-Encouraged, and 9, State-executed.426  
Looking at the public statements from Estonian leadership during this timeframe, it is 
clear that they believed attribution was between 5, State-shaped and 9, State-executed. 
While Sharp’s Known Coercer + Known Demand model denotes this cyberattack as “less 
certain”  and therefore “indeterminate” on whether this was a case cyber coercion, the 
Estonia leadership was certain, supported by the real world actions and the technical data 
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provides a level of confidence in Estonia’s attribution.  
“Clear political signatures were even detected in the malicious network traffic. All 
told, it is clear that the cyberattacks were linked with the overall political conflict 
between Estonia and Russia.”427 To aid in the attribution question, one must look at these 
real-world activities, specifically the economic sanctions and Russia’s decision to ignore 
its treaty obligations with Estonia.  “Russia suspended certain rail deliveries of raw 
materials and passenger service between Tallinn and St. Petersburg” for a period of time 
during the attack campaign.428  
Further, the Estonian government notified Russian officials that it traced some of 
the command and control of the campaign back to Russia, to which Russia responded by 
excusing the behavior and noted that patriotic Russians may have acted independently. 
Russia declined Estonia’s formal diplomatic request to pursue the matter through its 
internal services and law enforcement or acting to prohibit further attacks originating 
from Russian control, dodging a treaty obligation with Estonia. The most likely 
conclusion for this behavior is that these actions served Russia’s interests.429  
At an event marking the ten years since the 2007 cyberattacks, speaking on the 
attribution of the attack by Russia, the President of Estonia noted:  “Certainly the fact that 
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a year later they use the same methods [in the cyberattacks against Georgia] and 
combined them with kinetic attacks, they saw it was a success [in Estonia.]”430 He also 
noted that when Georgia was the victim of the same methods the following year, that 
Estonia “set up mirror sites to help them so they… could access more important sites, 
they would re-route to us [Estonia].”431 In a separate interview, Ilves noted that this type 
of cyberattack had never been done until Estonia and then it happens again a year later,  
moreover corroborating our initial beliefs that it was the Russians, same 
methodology, but then, combining that with more than just taking down servers, 
but also taking the servers down in conjunction with actual physical military 
attacks. It’s just a new level that they applied to Georgia.432 
 
Audience Costs 
What were the audience costs?  What were the audience costs over time?  
 The domestic audience costs for Estonia were high, both for sustaining the attack 
and for responding to the aggressor.  Having already suffered significant strife, extensive 
protests and some violent rioting prior to the actual relocation of the Bronze Soldier 
statue, having its government, media, business and banking systems paralyzed was a 
significant event. It made an even greater impact on society than one might assume since 
the country was so heavily reliant on its digital infrastructure for daily life, much more so 
that the United States or most European countries in 2007.  To complicate matters, the 
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domestic schism on feelings toward Russia in the post-1991 independence declaration, 
was another factor of domestic audience costs. The relatively recent reminder of life 
under Soviet control served as a reminder of the importance of defending itself against 
Russian aggression in all forms. If Estonia acquiesced to Russia on the Bronze Soldier 
statue, especially after such a broad and public cyber coercive action, the audience costs 
faced by the President would have been considerable and potentially career-ending. “The 
attack could have resulted in a weakening of Estonian citizens’ trust in the government’s 
ability to defend the country against unconventional attacks, but the quick response of the 
government, together with support from NATO and many nations in ensuring recovery, 
prevented widespread public distrust.”433  
The fight over the statue might be a situation where the Estonians were not 
willing to budge regardless of any Russian threat or action, however, the public nature of 
the cyber coercion strategy that Russia chose resulted in audience costs for the leadership 
that made it impossible for Estonia to acquiesce.  If the Russians had engaged in a less 
public cyberattack or targeted the leadership in particular to gain personal information 
that could be used to coerce them personally on this issue, then there is a greater chance 
they might be successful.  However, given the history of Estonia and Russia, 
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What were the financial costs? What were the financial costs over time?   
The total financial cost of the 22 days of cyberattacks is hard to measure, but 
likely in the billions of Euros. One institution, Estonia's Hansabank, reports that it alone 
lost at least $1million due to the attacks.434 “Estonia faced lost productivity, opportunity 
cost, remediation, and the acquisition of alternative web hosting at emergency rates 
estimated to be in the billions of Euro.”435 The 2007 cyberattacks did not leave lasting or 
permanent damage, but certainly disrupted finance, media, government and a whole host 
of businesses for the time period of the attack campaign. 
 
Pressure on Leadership 
What was the pressure on leadership during the cyber crisis?  
 With an inability to carryout daily digital activities including banking and 
accessing the news, there was a concern about what additional attacks might occur and 
for how long Estonia would experience digital paralysis. Due to the public nature of the 
cyberattacks, there was immense pressure on leadership during this crisis. Beyond the 
obvious pressure from the cyberattack, since Estonia was a leading digital-based country 
in Europe, there was increased pressure to solve the issue swiftly so as not to lose the 
population’s trust in relying on digital services. If the Russians could disrupt and 
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undermine Estonian reliance on its digital infrastructure, it would also serve to undercut 
the government’s digital strategy and, in 2007, undermine the decade-long government 
strategy to make Estonia a leading technologically advanced country. That is, if a Russian 
cyberattack could significantly disrupt daily Estonian life, long-term, the Estonian people 
may prefer to be less digitally-dependent in the future.   
 
George’s seven conditions as structured focused questions: 
Clarity of the Objective  
What was the victim’s understanding of the clarity of the objective? 
 In this case study, the victim was not aware initially what was happening, as 
attested to by former President Ilves. Once they realized this was a coordinated 
cyberattack, the leadership clearly believed that the attack was launched due to the 
controversial relocation of the Bronze Soldier statue and associated human remains.  As 
described above, upon recognition that it was a coordinated attack, and in conjunction 
with the statements from the Russian Duma, the leadership in Estonia believed the attack 
originated from Russia and that the demand was not to move the statue and remains, as 
Russia had been requesting since at least January of that year.436 
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Strength of Motivation of Coercer 
What was strength of motivation of the coercing power?  
 The coercing power, Russia, was particularly strongly motivated because it 
interpreted the relocation of the Bronze Soldier statue as an affront to the history, valor 
and memory of the Red Army. When viewed through the lens that Russia celebrates May 
9th, Victory Day over the Nazis, with a federal holiday and, in recent decades, large 
popular celebrations, it is easier to understand why the relocation of one statue caused 
such a high level of conflict. Russia felt so strongly about the possibility of moving the 
statue that it formally requested a meeting with the Estonian Ambassador in Moscow to 
express its anger, diplomatically. To the Russians, this was not simply relocating a statue; 
it was  
 
Asymmetry of Motivation 
What was the asymmetry of motivation between the adversaries?  
 There did not appear to be asymmetry of motivation between the adversaries.  The 
Russians sought to punish the Estonia’s for the perceived disrespect of the Red Army and 
the Estonians were steadfast in their determination to move the Bronze Soldier statue. 
The fact that an emergency session of Parliament was called at 3:40am to vote to move it 
immediately supports the assertion that the Estonians were just as motivated to move the 
monument as the Russians were to try to coerce them to change their decision and not to 
move it. The Estonians also pursued a significant defense, including calling for additional 
support from NATO and cyber experts in the region, to defend itself against Russian 
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cyber aggression.   
Estonia had significant domestic and patriotic investment in moving the Bronze 
Soldier statue. “Over the past few years [preceding 2007] the statue had become a focal 
point of tension between pro-Kremlin and Estonian nationalist movements.”437 The 
comprehensive assault on its digital infrastructure that touched critical economic sectors 
was a strategy of coercion that back-fired on the aggressor. At first, Estonia employed a 
combination strategy, first doing nothing in response and then defending and mitigating 
what they could with whitelisting domestic addresses only. This meant that only internet 
traffic originating from inside the country could get through. The point was to eliminate 
all the external incoming traffic requests.  Estonia continued to proceed with moving the 
Bronze Soldier statue and the associated remains, while also continuing to defend itself, 
reconstitute where possible and mitigate the attacks, if possible. “To prevent further 
attacks [at one point], Estonia had to close off parts  of its network to computer users 
outside the country, isolating itself from the rest of the Internet.”438 Estonia did not waver 
in its determination and the extensive digital assault forced it to defend itself. Whereas a 
different targeting approach, perhaps one more limited, may not have resulted in 
defensive behavior to the extent seen in 2007 and the follow-on cooperation with NATO 
in 2007-2008. In the long-term,  Estonia engaged in mounting a heavy defense and 
continued to improve on its modern digital system to ensure that it would be extremely 
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difficult for any aggressor to hack in the future. For Estonia, cyber coercion resulted a 
stronger defense and increased cooperation with NATO on cyber matters.  
The cyberattack against Estonia was not considered successful long-term for 
Russia because not only did Estonia increase its cyber defenses domestically, NATO 
realized the severity of the Russian provocation via cyberattack as a threat and created the 
NATO Cyber Centre of Excellence, and NATO chose to headquarter it in Tallinn, 
Estonia.  The 2007 Russian cyberattack against Estonia resulted in the NATO community 
coalescing around the view that the cyber threat was real, that it was significant, that it 
required dedicated attention and funding, and an overarching strategy and they acted 
accordingly.  This was a less-than-ideal scenario for the Russian coercion strategy.  As 
stated before, similar to diplomatic coercion, cyber coercion is a tricky dance requiring a 
coercer to push, but not too far and to choose the correct levers to exercise power because 
mistakes can backfire, and backfire it did for the Russian strategy in meeting its stated 
goal.  However, Russia did benefit from this activity because it was able to see what 
actions it could take in cyberspace that did not result in a NATO action against Russia, 
and it was able to learn from its operations and adapt best practices and lessons learned 
when it conducted similar attacks on Georgia the following year and, later, in Ukraine.   
“Estonia 2007 was the first cyberattack in history that affected a country nation-
wide,” said Helen Popp, counselor for cyber issues at the Estonian Embassy in 
Washington, D.C. The increased “awareness, understanding, resilience and defense 
capability” stemming from that attack in Estonia and inside NATO, she said, “has been 
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immense.”439 At the United Nations Security Council in 2019, Estonia brought up cyber 
threats for the first time in that forum.  According to the current President of Estonia, 
Kersti Kaljulaid: 
“When we finally had a really good conference on the 8th of May in the UN  
Security Council, somebody quipped that it was probably a small step for Estonia  
but a big step for the world and I have to say that it does not exactly sound modest  
if I confirm but we felt a little bit this way.  Our point has been proven.” …“Our  
goal [in going to the UN Security Council] was to start creating the new normal; 
that if a country comes under cyberattack, then they will have at the Security 
Council a place to report about it, complain about it, and ask other countries to 
react, take positions, and maybe one day also take action. …We still do not have a 
clear understanding of how we are able to protect our sovereignty [in cyber].440 
 
 
Victim Understanding of Urgency 
What was the victim’s understanding of the coercer’s sense of urgency?  
 Estonia was acutely aware of Russia’s sense of urgency that the Bronze Soldier 
statue and related soldier’s remains not be moved. This determination is based on the 
public statements of Estonian government officials and Russian government officials 
during the conflict, along with the violent riots and protests in Tallin and Moscow 
immediately preceding the relocation. 
  
 
439 Tamkin, Emily. “10 Years After the Landmark Attack on Estonia, Is the World Better 
Prepared for Cyber Threats?” Foreign Policy, April 27, 2017. 
440 President of Estonia, Kersti Kaljulaid, remarks presented at “Deciding on the Rules of the 
Road for Cyberspace: The Who, What, Where, When, How” at the Institute of International 
Cyber Stability, June 9. 2020.   
196 
 
Adequate Domestic and International Support 
Is there adequate domestic and international support for the victim and the coercer?  
 There was adequate domestic support for both the victim and the coercer in their 
respective polities. In Estonia, the level of domestic support was clouded by the violent 
protests and clashes between ethnic Russians and ethnic Estonians living in Estonia, but 
especially given the history of Soviet rule, fighting Russian aggression was very 
important to the domestic audience. As for international support, the Estonian defense 
minister noted that, at the time, “NATO does not define cyberattacks as a clear military 
action. This means that the provisions of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, or, in 
other words collective self-defense, will not automatically be extended to the attacked 
country.”441 The international support for the victim was demonstrated by NATO’s 
voluntary assistance, in lieu of Article 5 activation, in pursuit and defense in the 
immediate term, and of course by the longer-term NATO investment in Tallinn as the 
Cyber Centre of Excellence, created in 2008. As noted earlier, the U.S. Senate made a 
resolution expressing solidarity with Estonia in the face of these cyberattacks;442  and the 
European Parliament expressed support and solidarity with Estonia while also 
condemning Russian escalatory actions and rhetoric.443 
 
441 Traynor, Ian. “Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia.”  The Guardian. 
May 16, 2007.  
442 U.S. Senate. “Senate Resolution 187--CONDEMNING VIOLENCE IN ESTONIA AND 
ATTACKS ON ESTONIA'S EMBASSIES IN 2007 and EXPRESSING SOLIDARITY WITH 
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF ESTONIA.” Congressional Record Volume 153, 
Number 72 (Thursday, May 3, 2007). Pages S5603-S5604. 
443 “European Parliament resolution of 24 May 2007 on Estonia.” European Parliament, 
Document RC-B6-0205/2007, Texts Adopted, Strasbourg, France.   
197 
 
Estonia was able to use this unfortunate experience to bolster its relationship with 
other NATO members, take advantage of the opportunity to lead and teach NATO 
members about cybersecurity and how to best defend itself against cyber aggression, and 
build a stronger cyber-focused coalition. In the absence of such a massive attack, it may 
have been difficult to coalesce NATO member’s opinions around cyber defense as an 
extremely important topic worthy of investment, let alone secure investment in a NATO 
Cyber Centre in Tallinn.  
As for the aggressor, Russia did not have international support for its cyber 
coercive efforts, but it did not appear that international support, in this case, was 
important nor necessary for Russia to conduct the offensive cyber actions. Russia enjoyed 
domestic support on this topic, especially since framing the issue as one that was 
blasphemous to Russian history.  That being said, during the 2007 timeframe, Russia was 
rated as “not free” as a measure of democracy for political rights and civil liberties, 
according to Freedom House.444 Therefore, while Russia did have domestic support, the 
level of domestic support may not be as important for this aggressor as it might be for a 
free democracy.  
 
Fear of Unacceptable Escalation 
What is the opponent's (victim’s) fear of unacceptable escalation? 
 Estonia appeared to have a high tolerance for escalation in this situation. “Estonia 
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did not consider the event as an armed attack and thus refrained from requesting NATO’s 
support under Art. 5 of the NATO Treaty.”445 When this cyberattack occurred, the 
Estonian defense minister, Jaak Aaviksoo, said: “Not a single NATO defense minister 
would define a cyberattack as a clear military action at present. However, this matter 
needs to be resolved in the near future.”446 The then-President of Estonia, Toomas Henrik 
Ilves, has provided testimony to the U.S. Senate and has been interviewed a number of 
times about the 2007 cyberattack; he consistently characterizes the cyberattack as the first 
time “a nation-state had been targeted using digital means for political objectives”447 and 
consistently invokes von Clausewitz’s principle that the cyberattacks were clearly a 
continuation of policy by other means. In none of his written testimony nor interviews 
does he ever mention nor allude to a fear that, in 2007, they were concerned about 
physical escalation of this tension beyond the initial protests and blockade of their 
embassy in Moscow.  He has, however, remarked repeatedly that Russia learned from its 
experience in Estonia and, the following year, complemented its cyberattacks against 
Georgia with kinetic strikes. 
 According to the statements from the Estonian government leadership, they did not 
 
445 Czosseck, Christian, Rain Ottis, and Anna-Maria Talihärm. “Estonia after the 2007 Cyber 
Attacks: Legal, Strategic and Organisational Changes in Cyber Security.” International Journal 
of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism, 1(1), 24-34, January-March 2011. p 25. 
446 Traynor, Ian. “Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia.”  The Guardian. 
May 16, 2007. 
447 447 Ilves, Toomas. “Prepared Testimony and Statement for the Record of Toomas Hendrik 
Ilves, President of Estonia 2006-2016 At the Hearing on ‘The Modus Operandi and Toolbox of 
Russia and Other Autocracies for Undermining Democracies Throughout the World.’ Before the 
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism March 15, 2017.  Located at: 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/03-15-17%20Ilves%20Testimony.pdf and 
accessed on June 10, 2019.  
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anticipate a physical world or kinetic action to accompany the cyber actions and escalate 
the conflict to an unacceptable level in 2007.  An unacceptable level could be defined as 
an armed attack to complement the cyberattack, a hybrid warfare strategy, like Georgia 
experienced the following year.  
 Having its digital systems incapacitated by DDoS and DoS attacks for 22 days 
along with website defacement with disinformation, led Estonia to defend itself in the 
long-term instead of capitulating. If Russia chose counterforce targets instead of 
countervalue targets or chose a different type of attack with more lasting or permanent 
consequences, such as stealing and leaking sensitive data, or threatened to conduct 
operations in the physical world, Estonia’s calculation for its unacceptable escalation may 
have been different.   
 
Clarity on Terms for Settlement 
What is the clarity concerning precise terms of the settlement of a crisis for the victim 
and the coercer?   
 Estonia clearly understood that the terms of the coercion settlement was to not 
relocate the Bronze Soldier statue nor disrupt the human remains and maintain the current 
site for the monument in downtown Tallinn. 




The attack on Estonia was a watershed moment for cyber statecraft. It was an 
expansive attack, focused heavily on civilian infrastructure and systems needed to 
support daily life in Estonia.  The typical Estonian citizen was affected by this 
cyberattack by an inability to access media, news, banking systems or a variety of other 
services that relied on the backbone that was attacked. This of course was in addition to 
the government sites that were attacked, but most people do not access their government 
services on a daily basis like they do with news or banking. This meant that this 
cyberattack affected the Estonians in a much more expansive and personal way, incurring 
higher audience costs, than if it had been solely targeted on military and government 
networks that would not have consequences for most of the population on a daily basis.   
The nature of the attack, the duration, and choice of both commercial and 
government targets contributed to the significant audience costs faced by the Estonian 
leadership. Further, the financial costs borne by private industry and the government 
while business was frozen and the government scrambled to defend its infrastructure put 
high pressure on the Estonian leadership to resolve the issue. The impact of these 
additional variables on the outcome will be thoroughly discussed in the following 
chapter.   
Reexamining this influential case and subsequent actions of the Russians, the 
former President of Estonia notes: 
“If you look at the situation today [2017], to say that they [Russians] were 
tactically brilliant and must be congratulating themselves on all they managed to 
do [via offensive cyber actions in the last ten years], tactically great. Great job. 
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Strategically you have managed to alienate… Germany is now really angry at 
Russia, Emanuel Macron [after being a victim to cyberattacks]…now has a very 
different take on Russia.  I think what they have done, is a failure. You have 
managed to alienate many of the biggest countries in the West.”448   
 
Ilves noted, in 2017, that one solution to fighting cyberattacks in a world of self-
help is to create a “community or league of democracies, …a new form of defense 
organization, a non-geographical but strict criteria-based organization to defend 
democracies….”449 In the immediate aftermath of the 2007 attack, NATO was energized 
to create a Cyber Centre of Excellence and headquarter it in Tallinn, centering the cyber 
expertise in the capital city of the Russian victim.  Estonia built cyber resilience for 
themselves, extending this knowledge and partnering with NATO to ensure best practices 
throughout the NATO alliance. Further, Estonia worked with its non-NATO Nordic 
neighbors to ensure they, too, managed their cyber risk and shared best practices.  This 
defense collaboration served as a balancing function against Russia in cyber statecraft.  
Estonia worked to shore up not only its defenses, but those of NATO and Nordic 
countries bordering Russia which are some of the most likely potential future victims of 
Russian cyber statecraft.  Not only did Russia’s cyber actions against Estonia fail to 
achieve their goal, they resulted in significantly increased cyber defenses not only of the 
 
448Interview with Toomas Hendrik Ilves, President of Estonia, 2007 – 2016. “10 Years of Cyber 
Estonia: What will the Next Decade Bring?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
November 6, 2017. 
449 Ilves, Toomas. “Prepared Testimony and Statement for the Record of Toomas Hendrik Ilves, 
President of Estonia 2006-2016 At the Hearing on ‘The Modus Operandi and Toolbox of Russia 
and Other Autocracies for Undermining Democracies Throughout the World.’ Before the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism March 15, 2017.  Located at: 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/03-15-17%20Ilves%20Testimony.pdf and 
accessed on June 10, 2019.   
202 
 
initial intended victim, Estonia, but of the entire region.  
 That being said, this cyber coercive conflict provided Russia with an ability to 
exercise and test their capabilities, learn and adapt for future conflicts, including Georgia 
the following year and, later, Ukraine. Further, since this was Russia’s first use of 
extensive cyberattacks against a state’s soft, countervalue targets, they learned that the 
extent of disruption they caused in Estonia did not result in an immediate NATO defense 
declaration. So, while the NATO CCDCOE in Tallinn was created, invested in and 
increased cyber knowledge-sharing and, eventually, improved cyber defenses, Russia was 
able to significantly disrupt daily life in Estonia without provoking a NATO collective 
defense declaration. 
 From a policy perspective, this case study provides several opportunities for 
future work that will be elaborated on in detail in Chapter 7. Policy research stemming 
from this case study includes disincentives for targeting commercial targets, cyberattack 
disclosure requirements, international agreements for enhanced cyber defense and 
deterrence, and looking at tiered agreements to account for the states that, thus far, refuse 




CHAPTER 6: HYPOTHESIS TESTING  
This chapter has two goals. First, to test the multiple hypotheses using process-
tracing to examine the relationship between the values of the independent variables and 
the decisions victims make in responding to cyber coercion, the dependent variables, over 
three temporal values.  Second, this research uses the data assembled from the structured 
focused questions to perform a comparative analysis. It examines the conditional 
influence of a set of variables on why cyber coercion may achieve a degree to 
effectiveness in changing a victim’s behavior over time. Looking at a pair of most-similar 
cases that share significant background factors allows me to highlight which independent 
variables impacted the victims behavior to result in these divergent outcomes.  This 
chapter also provides a better means of analyzing these cyber coercive dyads. Namely, 
instead of the binary winners/losers narrative used in the literature, this research looks at 
a spectrum of victim responses in determining how effective and efficient the coercion 
was in achieving the goal, or part of the goal. Further, it shows how the accepted 
narrative is incorrect for each dyad and provides a new understanding of these case 
studies when looking at the interactions and decision-making over time.  These two 
methods, used in tandem, demonstrate and describe in detail the factors that were and 
were not present in each case study and also to show how and why these factors 
contributed to the causal influence that resulted in each outcome. Lastly, this chapter 
shows that a Utilitarian approach to cyber coercion has a place in the literature, and in 
practice, that neither the first wave pessimists nor second wave optimists recognized. 
Although cyber coercion is unlikely to cause catastrophic death, a lack of body counts 
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does not render it useless and is not necessary in order for it to be effective for coercive 
diplomacy.  
The data reflects that the main factors in these particular cyber coercive dyads that 
impacted the divergent victim decision making are asymmetry of motivation, opponents 
fear of unacceptable escalation, audience costs, financial costs, the choice of target, and 
targeting of leadership that led to leadership destabilization. These variables contributed 
to the increase or decrease of the likelihood of a victim changing its behavior.  
As noted earlier, the exogenous factor in the North Korea vs. Sony case study of a 
subsequent physical threat contributed to Sony’s compellence and, in conjunction with 
the cyber coercion, caused the secondary deterrence effects as well.  
“Throughout all of his writings George emphasized the limitations of abstract 
deductive theory and argued that both explanatory theory and policy relevant theory 
required conditional generalizations that were context dependent and informed by 
history.”450  He also cautioned that the choice of a particular coercive strategy depends on 
the individual context of the crisis event, so there is no widely generalizable theory when 
it comes to coercive diplomacy. Instead, there are factors to identify that can lend 
themselves to increasing or reducing the likelihood of coercion being effective, and with 
the addition of the extended variables tested in this research, this idea can be applied to 
cyber coercion.    
 
450 Levy, Jack. “Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George.” 
Political Psychology, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2008 537-552. p. 538 
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Case of North Korea vs. Sony  
Below is a table showing the changes of the independent variables across three 
temporal values for the Sony Pictures Entertainment-North Korea case study. The 
dependent variable can be shown as an escalation spectrum of options over time. This 
dependent variable escalation spectrum is used to examine each dyad of cyber coercion 
over three temporal values.  For the North Korea-Sony Pictures Entertainment dyad these 
are:   
Time 1 – November 21, 2014 – December 1, 2014: the initial period of attack up to the 
first data release - Sony Pictures Entertainment was internally chaotic given the inability 
to access its systems and did not respond to the GOP threat.   
Time 2 – December 2, 2014 – December 21, 2014: Sony capitulated by cancelling the 
movie and then changed that decision and partially capitulated by lowering distribution of 
the film and releasing it via video on demand. SPE also faced ongoing, expensive 
technology failures and suffered increased audience costs. 
Time 3 – December 22, 2014 – February 2016: Sony and other studios cancelled future 
films featuring North Korea, an SPE leader was forced to step down from her job and 




451 McNary, Dave. “Amy Pascal Talks Getting ‘Fired,’ Sony Hack and Angelina Jolie Emails in 
Candid Interview.” Variety, February 11, 2015.  
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Table 7:  
NORTH KOREA vs. SONY PICTURES ENTERTAINMENT 
T0 The buildup to the conflict was Sony’s announcement of a parody film 
about killing the North Korean leader and North Korea publicly 









Nature: Sophisticated, extensive IT damage, confusion for victim  
 
Attribution; Audience costs; Financial costs; Pressure on leadership; 
Clear objective; Strong coercer motivation; Asymmetry of motivation; 
Sense of urgency; Adequate support; Clear and precise terms 
 
Not Present IVs:  
No leadership as a target, no potential destabilization, minor audience 
costs at this time; No opponent fear of unacceptable escalation due in 
part to the internal chaos and focus on keeping the business running.  
 
Present DV: 
DV: status quo ante:  
no action 


















Nature: Sophisticated, extensive IT damage, exogenous threat of 
physical violence 
 
Leadership as a target, potential destabilization; Attribution; Audience 
costs; Financial costs; Pressure on leadership; Clear objective; Strong 
coercer motivation; Asymmetry of motivation; Sense of urgency; 
Adequate support; Opponent fear of unacceptable escalation; Clear and 
precise terms  
 
Not Present IVs:  
None  
Present DV: 
DV: Initial complete compellence, then a reversal and partial 
compellence – victim behavior change 
Result: Victim announces it will acquiesce to demand, then reverses 















Nature: post-attack  
 
Leadership as a target, actual destabilization; Attribution; Audience 
costs; Financial costs; Pressure on leadership; Clear objective; Strong 
coercer motivation; Asymmetry of motivation; Sense of urgency; 
Adequate support; Opponent fear of unacceptable escalation; Clear and 
precise terms  
 
Not Present IVs:  
None, while the cyberattack is no longer occurring, Sony Pictures deals 
with the fallout 
Present DV: 
DV: continued partial compellence, longer-term compellence and 
deterrence of pursuing other North Korean-related projects  
Result: Victim released film to small independent theatres and video-
on-demand, a significantly lower audience than was originally intended 




The conventional wisdom is that the North Korea hack of Sony Pictures 
Entertainment was a failure because the movie eventually was released.  This is not true. 
As this research has shown, tracing the process of the decision-making reveals that Sony 
Pictures pared down the promotion and release of the film, which reduced its expected 
revenue. As the cyberattack and publication of the stolen data ensued, each decision that 
Sony Pictures made to cancel the planned promotion and restrict the release of the film 
served North Korea’s interest.  Further, Sony Pictures fired one of their executives as a 
direct consequence of this cyberattack, including the reputational costs it incurred, and 
had to pay millions in remediation costs to get its network up and running again. 
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Hypothesis 1: George’s seven conditions that favor coercive success (Clarity of the 
objective, Strength of Motivation, Asymmetry of Motivation, Sense of Urgency, 
Adequate Domestic and International Support, Opponent's Fear of Unacceptable 
Escalation, and Clarity Concerning Precise Terms of the Settlement of a Crisis) will fully 
explain the outcome.  
Status: Reject 
Explanation:  
While George’s seven conditions that favor coercive diplomacy cover a breadth 
and depth of cases in the purely diplomatic realm, cyber statecraft and by extension cyber 
coercive acts require additional variables to truly capture all the factors that can affect the 
outcome of a cyber coercive conflict. For example, a prominent aspect of a cyberattack is 
its nature: namely, whether it is amateurish or sophisticated. Other components to the 
nature of the cyberattack include the duration (e.g. sophisticated attacks that last weeks or 
months will be viewed differently from amateur attacks that are a one-time occurrence) 
and the strategic choices made during the conduct of the attack (e.g. the adaptations the 
aggressor makes to continue the attack or leveraging the cyber access to ratchet up 
pressure by gradually destroying systems over time or by slowly disclosing sensitive 
stolen information.) The nature of the cyberattack is a factor that the victim uses to 
determine its response and how seriously it ought to take a threat. For the cyberattack 
against Sony, it was a sophisticated attack that paralyzed the company’s technical 
systems for weeks and slowly intensified pressure by releasing batches of sensitive data 
over weeks. The components of the nature of an attack are necessary factors to include in 
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determining what variables contribute to the likelihood of a victim changing its behavior.   
Further, as this case study has shown, leadership as a target, the potential for 
leadership destabilization, and the pressure on leadership are factors that apply to both 
cyber coercion and coercive diplomacy.  While George briefly touches on the idea of 
strong leadership, he does not explicitly denote leadership as a target and does not 
address the ramifications of targeting leadership for destabilization.  While that may not 
be a practice often seen in traditional coercive diplomacy, it is most definitely a strategic 
option for an aggressor in cyber coercion and ought to be accounted for as a factor that 
affects the outcome. In the example of the Sony Pictures attack, the focus on targeting 
leadership communications, especially salacious ones, and strategically disclosing these 
communications in a slow and steady manner to increase internal pressure was clearly 
successful in one aspect, getting an executive fired.   
Finally, audience costs and financial costs are also key variables affecting 
outcomes in cyber statecraft in a different way than economic sanctions, blockades and 
embargoes do in traditional coercive diplomacy. In the case of Sony Pictures, a 
commercial company, it is a soft target with fewer defense capabilities than a nation state.  
It faced extremely high audience costs as its internal documents were disclosed, with 
each round of publication containing a range of juicy gossip to substantial security and 
business information.  The media was so hyper focused on analyzing and publishing 
stories on the information that the Sony Pictures attorney threatened legal action if media 
outlets continued to do so.  A Sony Pictures executive lost her job as a direct 
consequence of the cyberattack and associated audience costs.   
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Finally, the financial costs levied against a commercial entity are different than a 
nation state target, especially over time.  A commercial entity has stockholders and a 
board to respond to, so there are limits to the financial costs they can incur before the 
pressure to acquiesce to a demand is “cheaper” financially and/or reputationally.  Further, 
private industry also has the option of insurance and passing the costs of the cyberattack 
on to the insurance industry so that insurance pays for the actual cost of the attacks.  
Additionally, leaders have the self-interest of keeping their job, so if the financial and 
audience costs incurred jeopardize their position, they may be pressured to acquiesce 
sooner in order to ensure their job security.  These additional factors are essential to 
include when assessing the variables that affect cyber coercive outcomes.   
While George hypothesizes that his seven factors are sufficient in investigating 
what favors the success or failure of coercive diplomacy, this research argues that these 
seven factors are insufficient to apply to the effectiveness of cyber coercion.  Instead, 
additional factors must also be considered when looking at what factors favor cyber 
coercive outcomes and that is due, in part, to the nature of cyber coercion and the 
aggressor’s strategic choices.  That is, having access to internal files and private 
communications and driving up audience costs by revealing this information slowly and  
publicly, especially given the scale possible in cyber coercion, is distinctly different from 
the practice of diplomatic coercion. Additionally, the ability to destroy an expensive 
network on which an entity is highly-dependent, without engaging in a kinetic action, is 
also something that is particular to the cyber realm. An aggressor can drive up financial 
costs exponentially simply by executing code and taking advantage of a victim’s 
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vulnerabilities.  Therefore, these additional factors ought to be included when discussing 
the variables that favor cyber coercion.  
 
Hypothesis 2: All other variables being equal, the greater the financial and/or audience 
costs faced by a victim where there is asymmetric motivation combined with a potential 
for leadership destabilization, the more likely the victim is to acquiesce to the demands of 
the aggressor over time.  
Status: Partial acceptance with modification  
Explanation:  
 For Sony Pictures, there were high audience costs, the ramifications from the 
rounds of publications of internal data, and the financial costs certainly did put pressure 
on the company to acquiesce. With North Korea calling this film’s release an “act of war” 
it was clear that there was an asymmetric motivation, although Sony Pictures was very 
motivated to release the film, especially since they did not want to appear to be bullied.  
However the exogenous factor of a physical threat also played a role in the decision-
making and is the additional modification to this hypothesis.   
Despite law enforcement finding no credibility in the threat, major theatre chains 
were deterred by the threat of physical violence and the concern that they could be the 
next victim of cyberattacks should they agree to air the film. The preceding cyberattack 
lent a level of believability to the threat and the implied threat of future cyberattacks 
against the theatre chains that the private sector was not willing to chance and therefore 
they were deterred.   
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 The extraordinary audience costs that Sony Pictures suffered in the wake of the 
cyberattack eventually resulted in the firing of Sony executive, Amy Pascal, as she 
detailed in interviews. Sony Pictures did retain her in another role, but the exposure of 
her communications made it impossible for the company to keep her in her leadership 
role. That is a significant consequence of the cyberattack and a noteworthy variable that 
ought to be included when assessing an aggressor’s strategy in conducting cyber 
coercion.  
In traditional coercive diplomacy, while an aggressor might choose to publicize a 
negotiation overture, that is distinctly different than airing someone’s personal 
communications with their trusted confidants where they reveal the uglier sides of their 
private selves. Doing so, provides an advantage to the aggressor since the victim then has 
to manage both personal and professional crises, while wading through the spectrum of 
decision-making on how to respond to the aggressor’s demand. In examining the key 
factors that influence the success or failure of cyber coercion, choices in the coercive 
strategy like ramping up audience costs for the victim, can be crucial in the context of the 
crisis. This hypothesis can be considered passing a hoop test.452     
 
Hypothesis 3: If an aggressor chooses solely countervalue, soft or commercial targets 
that suffer higher audience costs and have few-to-zero counterattack options, and a fear 
of escalation, a victim is more likely to acquiesce to stop the pain and ward off future 
 
452 Van Evera, Stephen. Guide to the Methods for Student of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell 




Status: Partial acceptance with modification  
Explanation: For the case of Sony Pictures, this hypothesis also partially explains the 
outcomes and can be considered passing a hoop test.453  It is a countervalue commercial 
target, it did suffer high audience costs, it did not have any counterattack options and, as 
the tranches of data were released over weeks, combined with the unsubstantiated threat 
of physical violence, Sony Pictures did have a fear of escalation.  However, these factors 
alone, do not explain the outcome.   
 A combination of all three hypotheses best explains the outcome in the case of 
North Korea’s cyber coercion against Sony Pictures. George’s seven conditions that favor 
coercive diplomacy are a good starting point to explain this case but examining the four 
additional factors shows that they provided greater explanatory value in understanding 
the effectiveness of cyber coercion.  Soft targets are easier to attack, face higher audience 
costs, and have to bear the financial burden themselves. Sophisticated attacks drive up the 
fear of escalation more than amateur attacks. Targeting the leadership can be both 
personally and professionally embarrassing and consequential for the leaders.  Not only 
does the company leadership need to respond to the threat on behalf of the company, but 
they also have a self-interest in keeping their job when doing so, so they may be more 
willing to acquiesce to the pressure exerted by an aggressor.  The addition of a 
subsequent physical threat along with the fear of the threat of potential additional 
 
453 Van Evera, Stephen. Guide to the Methods for Student of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press: 31. 
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cyberattacks against the theatre chains was noted by the theatre executives as the 
motivation to refuse to show the film. Without the extensive cyberattack preceding the 
unsubstantiated threat of violence, the threat of violence may not have been taken as 
seriously and may have failed because it would seem less credible. Each of these 
additional variables beyond George’s original seven factors highlights important 




Case of Russia vs. Estonia 
Below is a table showing the changes of the independent variables across three 
temporal values for the Estonia-Russia case study. The dependent variable can be shown 
as an escalation spectrum of options over time. This dependent variable escalation 
spectrum is used to examine each dyad of cyber coercion over three temporal values.  For 
the Russia-Estonia dyad below these are:  
Time 1 – The initial period of Phase I of the attack – Estonia employed a combination 
strategy, first doing nothing and then defend.  
Time 2 – Phase II of the attack - Estonia moved forward on its plan to relocate the statue 
and human remains and continued to defend itself while sustaining the more sophisticated 
Phase II of the cyberattack. 
Time 3 – Six months post-attack - Estonia engaged in mounting a heavy defense, 
supplemented its modernized digital system to make it more difficult for Russia to hack 
in the future, received a NATO commitment to build a Cyber Centre of Excellence in 
Tallin and worked closer with the various CERT teams throughout Europe.  For Estonia, 
its victimhood of cyber coercion resulted in creating a stronger defense while also not 





RUSSIA – ESTONIA  
T0 The buildup to the conflict consisted of decades of historical and societal 
issues from Soviet invasion to the late 2006 proposal to relocate the 




Targets: Countervalue including non-military government 
Nature: Amateurish in Phase I  
Leadership as a target; Attribution; Audience costs; Financial costs; 
Pressure on leadership; Clear objective; Strong coercer motivation; Sense 
of urgency; Adequate support; Clear and precise terms. 
 
Not Present IVs:  
No fear of unacceptable escalation 
Present DV: 
Coercer: Threat 
DV:  status quo ante 
no action/no capitulation / no desired behavior change 






Targets: Countervalue including non-military government 
Nature: Sophisticated in Phase II   
Leadership as a target; Attribution; Audience costs; Financial costs; 
Pressure on leadership; Clear objective; Strong coercer motivation; Sense 
of urgency; Adequate support; Clear and precise terms. 
 
Not Present IVs:  
No fear of unacceptable escalation 
Present DV: 
Coercer: Full cyberattack against multiple industries, financial institutions 
and government  
DV: status quo ante and defend by mitigating outages where possible by 
only allowing local traffic. 
no action/no capitulation / no desired behavior change 
Result: Victim does not change behavior nor acquiesce to demand; 











No on-going attack  
 
Not Present IVs:  
No fear of unacceptable escalation 
No asymmetry of motivation 
No targets 
Present DV:  
Coercer:  The aftermath of the extended cyberattack against multiple 
industries, financial institutions six months prior.  
DV: Defend - strengthened defense; recognized need for increased cyber 
defenses in Estonia and throughout the region.  
Result: Victim still does not acquiesce to the demand and instead Estonia 
heavily invested in internal cyber defense, precluding future Russian cyber 
aggression and limiting future Russian cyber options. Further, this incident 
resulted in NATO creating a Cyber Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, 
concentrating cyber expertise at the center of the victim in this cyberattack.  
Estonia also partnered with its Nordic neighbors to extend best practices 
for cyber defense.  
  
 
 The conventional wisdom about the Russia-Estonia 2007 cyber conflict is that 
Estonia lost since Russia was able to successfully disrupt Estonian daily life for several 
weeks in late-April-May 2007. Re-examining this assumption reveals that claiming 
Estonia “lost” is a poor assessment of the situation when observed over a longer temporal 
value.  Over time, Estonia’s relative power and influence in the cyber realm increased, its 
ability to influence cyber policy in Europe increased, its own cyber defenses significantly 
increased, and it did not move the Bronze Soldier statue back to the city center. Further,  
Estonia was poised to assist Georgia when it was attacked the following year and was 




Hypothesis 1: George’s seven conditions that favor coercive success (Clarity of the 
objective, Strength of Motivation, Asymmetry of Motivation, Sense of Urgency, 
Adequate Domestic and International Support, Opponent's Fear of Unacceptable 
Escalation, and Clarity Concerning Precise Terms of the Settlement of a Crisis) will fully 
explain the outcome.  
Status: Reject 
Explanation:  
Similar to the North Korea vs. Sony Pictures case study, George’s seven 
conditions are inadequate to account for all the factors affecting the outcome in the case 
of Russia vs. Estonia.  The difference between a low-level attack like web defacement, 
seen in Phase I of the cyberattack against Estonia, compared with a high-level attack like 
paralyzing backbone servers, seen in Phase II,  communicates two vastly different levels 
of threat to a victim.  Similar to the Sony Pictures case study, targeting the soft targets in 
Estonia, in addition to the government targets was a strategic choice to ratchet up 
pressure, increase audience costs and increase financial costs, but unlike the Sony 
Pictures case, it did not work in Estonia. 
The three additional factors that this case study unearthed as necessary to examine 
in a cyber coercive conflict are audience costs, financial costs and pressure on leadership.  
For Estonia, there were significant audience costs, but they were different in nature than 
what Sony suffered.  For Estonia, it was not due to an embarrassing airing of private 
communications, it was embarrassing for the government that touted its digital expertise 
and digital reliability to have their systems overtaken by Russian actors. There were 
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audience costs for the response to Russia; quite simply, Tallinn could not acquiesce to 
Moscow’s demands given the months-long Russian intimidation campaign against 
Estonia on this subject and of course Estonia’s history and culture as a former republic of 
the Soviet Union. The Estonian leadership would look weak if it capitulated. 
Additionally, there were high audience costs because its society was unable to access 
basic services like media and banking that disrupted daily life. Given the extent of 
disruption to society for the Estonian citizens, the polity was much more cognizant of the 
on-going strife between Tallin and Moscow – and therefore there were higher potential 
audience costs –  than would occur if a different strategy like economic sanctions or 
diplomatic threats had been Russia’s strategy.  At the same time, other instruments of 
coercion, like air strikes or a land invasion, would obviously impact the citizenry of this 
small Baltic nation more than an inability to access their banking systems and incur 
higher audience costs. The audience costs from cyber statecraft lean more toward the 
higher end of the scale when the targets of cyber coercion are entities that society relies 
upon for daily functioning and they are severely impacted.  
The financial costs were also high, but a nation state government has a greater 
ability to absorb costs from an adversary attack (for those against the state infrastructure)  
than a company does who has to be responsive to a board. Since Estonia experienced 
both government and private industry targets, those soft targets like the media and banks 
did suffer financial costs.  It is unknown if these costs by private industry were covered 
by insurance and therefore the costs were passed on to their insurers, if these private 
entities had to assume the costs themselves (and possibly make up for the loss by passing 
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part of the cost of the cyberattacks to their customers.)  
There was obviously great pressure on the leadership but the Estonia leaders were 
not in jeopardy of losing their jobs due to this cyberattack in the way that the Sony 
executives were.  One explanation for that is that the nature of cyberattacks differed 
greatly; in Estonia it was not personally humiliating like it was with Sony Pictures so 
while they both faced significant audience costs, Estonia escaped the additional layer of a 
public examination of personal, shameful internal communications.   
While the Estonia leadership was a target, the nature of the attack against the 
Estonia leadership and parliament were lower-level attacks and therefore did not exert the 
same level of pressure on leadership as the public disclosures of sensitive internal 
documents did at Sony Pictures.  The attribution factor was also satisfied in the Estonia 




Hypothesis 2: All other variables being equal, the greater the financial and/or audience 
costs faced by a victim where there is asymmetric motivation combined with a potential 
for leadership destabilization, the more likely the victim is to acquiesce to the demands of 
the aggressor over time.  
Status: Reject  
Explanation:  
For this case study, the dyad did not display asymmetric motivation, but if we 
modify the hypothesis to account for equal motivation, it still does not explain the 
Estonian case.  Estonia not only rejected the premise Russia’s demand and refused to 
acquiesce, it defended itself and then went further to cooperate with regional partners to 
increase cyber defense for itself and throughout the region. With an equal motivation to 
the aggressor and a lack of targeting leadership with sophisticated attacks, the Estonian 
leadership had the space to figure out how to mitigate the attacks and then plan additional 
defense and formulate a strategy to increase regional cyber security.   
If leadership had been undermined like it was at Sony Pictures, if trust in the 
government was damaged, if leadership was destabilized, we might have seen a different 
outcome in Estonia.  However, the amateurish targeting of leadership in Estonia did not 
produce any concern over leadership destabilization so the leaders were not under 
personal attack nor personal pressure and were able to focus on how to lead the country 




Hypothesis 3: If an aggressor chooses solely countervalue, soft or commercial targets 
that suffer higher audience costs and have few-to-zero counterattack options, and a fear 




 For this case study, the aggressor chose both soft, countervalue commercial and 
non-military government targets, but even with the modified addition of government 
countervalue targets, the rest of the hypothesis is not satisfied. Although Estonia’s private 
sector was targeted heavily during this cyberattack, Estonia in 2007 had an advanced 
digital understanding and was able to defend and mitigate some of the consequences of 
the attack for both the government and private industry victims. Estonia may have 
experienced a fear of escalation if Russia supplemented the cyberattack with a threat of 
physical violence but given the months-long lobbying effort by the Russians against 
moving the statue, combined with the fraught history between the two nations in general 
and the high emotional content concerning this particular statue, Estonia was unlikely to 
capitulate based on the strategic and tactical choices Russia made in conducting this 




CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 There is no lasting peace in this game, no final battle determining the end. There 
is no victory banner hanging across a finish line to run through. In cyber statecraft, there 
are iterative games as the terrain, the technology, changes, and the opponents learn and 
adapt. There are only degrees of tension ad infinitum that states and non-state actors can 
use to their advantage, where possible.   
This research counters the first wave pessimists and the second wave optimists 
and provides a Utilitarian theory of how factors involved in cyber statecraft can be 
effectively employed for coercive diplomacy. The comparative case studies of North 
Korea vs. Sony Pictures and Russia vs. Estonia victim decision-making shows a victim 
who partially acquiesces and one who not only refuses to be compelled but defends and 
then expands their defenses, partnering with neighboring countries and international 
alliances.  
The first wave pessimists would consider cyber coercion to be alarming and be 
concerned about an overwhelming number of cyberattacks that could result in widespread 
damage.  Conversely, the second wave optimists would deem cyber coercion as a 
fruitless nuisance, unable to be effective since the threat does not include bodily harm.  
The Utilitarian approach to cyber coercion shows that it can be effective, it can result in a 
victim changing its behavior, and can have consequences for international relations 
among adversaries.  There does not need to be a fear that it will cause undue cyber chaos 
and result in extensive destruction, like the pessimists would reason.  Nor should cyber 
coercion be dismissed as a pointless exercise that will never alter behavior, as the second 
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wave optimists would envision. 
George’s argument in Forceful Persuasion and The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy 
is that the individual circumstances in each coercive dyad determine the effectiveness of 
the attempt at coercive diplomacy and that there is no generalizable theory to extract to 
ensure a victim changes its behavior.454 Instead, coercion is a fluid situation where 
critical factors being present or absent contribute toward its success or failure, but that 
each situation is unique. While George’s seven conditions that favor coercive diplomacy 
begin to explain these divergent outcomes, this research extends his work with the 
addition of key variables for cyber coercion help to more fully explain the different 
outcomes observed in cyber coercion.  The specific variables in the extended set include: 
1) financial costs for the victim, 2) audience costs for the victim, 3) leadership 
destabilization potential through targeting of leadership, and 4) the amount of pressure on 
leadership. These additional factors extend George’s approach to coercive diplomacy and 
adapts it for the advantages and drawbacks that cyber statecraft presents.   
This research examined two case studies to illustrate how cyber coercion has been 
employed as a means of soft power in an attempt to achieve a specific outcome and how 
the extended set of variables help explain divergent outcomes. The first case is focused 
on North Korea’s attempt at cyber statecraft to force Sony Pictures Entertainment to 
cancel the production and distribution of a satirical comedy film where the North Korean 
 
454 George, Alexander.  Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. 
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991; and, Alexander L. George and 




leader is a target of an assassination plot. This case is widely considered to be a failure 
for North Korea because the film was eventually released. However, this is also an 
incorrect characterization. Although the film was eventually released, after Sony Pictures 
decided to cancel it and then reversed that decision, it was a significantly pared down 
distribution that caused a financial loss in the tens of millions of dollars. Further, due to 
North Korea’s actions, a Sony executive lost her job due to the ramifications of the 
attacks, Sony lost tens of millions of dollars on remediation and rebuilding their network, 
Sony lost an additional approximately $15 million due to lawsuits from former 
employees for the data breach, and it suffered an extreme public relations crisis due to its 
unsavory internal emails being published publicly. North Korea caused Sony Pictures to 
change its behavior from what it originally sought to do; Sony may not have complied 
with the full demand, but it did change its behavior due to the cyberattacks and associated 
threats.  
 From a Utilitarian standpoint, a recommendation for North Korea’s strategy 
would not differ greatly from the strategy it pursued. The North Korean operation against 
Sony Pictures Entertainment shows that with the right strategy choices, it is possible for 
cyber statecraft to result in a victim changing its behavior over time.  It may not result in 
a strict yes/no binary response to the coercer’s demand, but instead it may result in partial 
compellence or deterrence. North Korea noiselessly stole the data in advance and then 
coerced Sony Pictures Entertainment not to air the film while also causing extensive 
destruction of Sony’s systems, lending credibility to its talents and reinforcing the idea 
that it could continue to do harm. Pyongyang was able to disrupt the film’s release by 
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imposing audience costs, financial costs, targeting leadership with a potential for 
destabilization, and by choosing a commercial countervalue target. North Korea slowly 
released the data in timed tranches thus building public interest over time and 
maximizing its publicity to pressure SPE, and strategically releasing categories of 
sensitive information in batches which continued to increase the pressure campaign, that 
also doxes and jeopardizes employees and associates. By slowly intensifying the pressure 
and supplementing this with an absurd threat of physical violence that, while found to be 
not credible and was unlikely to be taken serious without the extensive cyberattacks 
preceding it, still caused enough fear that the executives of the major cinema chains 
refused to air the film, North Korea’s strategy was effective for its goals.  While North 
Korea’s ultimate goal of never airing the film was not achieved, it certainly achieved a 
level of effectiveness in relation to its demand.  Its actions resulted in a pared down 
release of the film in question, a secondary deterrence of other studios making similar 
North Korean-focused films, cancelled promotional events, the firing of an American 
executive, a punitive public relations crisis and millions of dollars of destroyed 
computers.  That is not a cancelling of the film, but that is significant damage inflicted on 
a company whose creation of a film the North Koreans perceived to be a direct threat.   
For Sony’s part, the Utilitarian view would be that it should have invested in 
cybersecurity protection for its vast computer network so that a sophisticated cyberattack 
like this could be hopefully detected at one of several levels.  Beyond that, there have 
been extensive cybersecurity industry assessments written455 that detail each step that 
 
455 For a complete accounting of the recommended critical controls that SPE lacked at the time, 
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Sony should have undertaken to reduce its risk along with critical controls it should have 
implemented long before the attack took place. Given the sheer amount of data that was 
stolen along with the extensive amount of physical damage done to its network, its cyber 
defenses were severely lacking.  
The second case examined the use of cyber coercion by Russia to pressure 
Estonia not to move a statue, a move that Russia found particularly insulting to its 
military history. This incident is described as a success for Russia due to the widespread 
chaos the Russian actions caused throughout Estonia. However, this research has shown 
that this is an incorrect characterization. While Russia’s actions were an attempt to 
dissuade Estonia from moving forward with its decision, the coercive measure backfired 
over time in some respects. This cyberattack caused Estonia not only to increase its 
defenses but caused NATO and Estonia’s Nordic neighbors to unite with Estonia to 
create a robust partnership centered on cyber defense.  Russia’s dramatic attempt at cyber 
coercion resulted in the victim creating a stronger defense as well as banding with 
Russia’s other adversaries and neighboring to defend themselves against any future 
cyber-based attacks.  That being said, the attack on Estonia also allowed Russia to 
exercise its cyber capabilities in a way that it had not done prior in the breadth and depth 
of soft targets that it did in Estonia.  From this, Russia was able to learn what worked and 
what did not, where it could improve, and to what extent it could disrupt cyberspace daily 
life before NATO responds.  Russia used these lessons the following year when it 
 
see Gabriel Sanchez. “Case Study: Critical Controls that Sony Should Have Implemented.”  
SANS White Paper,  June 1, 2015.   
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launched cyberattacks against Georgia and, later on, against Ukraine.   
From a Utilitarian standpoint, Russia should not have engaged in such a public 
campaign if it truly wanted a chance to change minds about moving the statue.  Given the 
complicated history between these nations, driving up the audience costs and the 
financial costs operates in opposition to Russia’s stated goal; the more public and greater 
the disruption to the Estonian people, the less likely it was that the Estonian leadership 
would acquiesce.  While ineffective for the stated goal, these cyberattacks allowed Russia 
to exercise its capabilities, allowed them to learn from their mistakes and best practices 
and adapt for future targeting, which has an important value.  Further, it showed Russia 
what cyberspace damage they could inflict that did not result in a collective action from 
NATO. While not the goal of the coercion, these are beneficial consequences for Russia 
from its cyber coercive actions.   
The defenses that Estonia implemented both in government and private sector 
were decently adept given the type of cyberattack launched initially. Since this was a first 
time instance, there was a learning curve, but they were able to restrict traffic to internal 
IPs and engage other mediation techniques that helped but did not solve the issue.  More 
advanced cybersecurity, which is what Estonia invested in afterwards, would have been 
better to fend off aspects of this attack.   
The extended variables with the greatest explanatory value for this case were 
audience costs, financial costs, and pressure on leadership.  The audience costs for 
Estonia were high and functioned differently than in the case against Sony Pictures; 
Tallinn had no ability to acquiesce to Moscow, especially after the months of lobbying 
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and bullying from Moscow about the plan to move the statue, without suffering severe 
blowback from the Estonian constituents.  Further, a significant attack on the nation’s 
infrastructure, for the country that was considered the most digitally-forward in Europe at 
the time, incurred extensive audience costs based on the disruption of daily life for the 
typical Estonian. The high level of disruption that touched most Estonians backfired for 
Russia and served to bolster opinion against Russia’s demands.  Whereas, if Russia chose 
a different cyber statecraft strategy and selected targets that were less essential for daily 
life, they might have been more successful in their coercive efforts or, at least, these 
choices would not have engendered the extreme defensive posture Estonia adopted and 
may not have resulted in the NATO and Nordic partner’s attention and investment in 
cyber defense.   
The financial costs suffered were also high and since the targets were both 
government and commercial entities, these costs were split between the government and 
the private entities. There was high pressure on the Estonian leadership during this 
timeframe to restore access to the trusted digital infrastructure, to stand up to the 
Russians, to  
The pressure on leadership was high but focused on navigating the two phases of 
the attack while still maintaining the confidence of the people in their trusted digital 
infrastructure. Unlike the Sony case study, the personal attack on leadership was 
amateurish in nature and did not cause much angst among the leadership. Due to the 
country’s digital reliance and investment, the leadership was focused on restoring access, 
reestablishing trust in the digital infrastructure, and then strengthening its defenses and 
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resiliency.  The cyberattack by Russia highlighted Estonia’s cyber vulnerabilities and 
instead of acquiescing to Russia’s demand, Estonia maintained its plan to move the 
statue. The 2007 cyberattack resulted in Estonia garnering support for increased 
collaboration on cybersecurity, the creation of the NATO CCDCOE in Tallinn, and 
getting Nordic partners focused on the threat of cybersecurity .  Russia chose a cyber 
coercive strategy to maximally disrupt daily life and it backfired horribly for purposes of 





This research provided four contributions: first, it provided an extended set of 
four variables that favor coercive diplomacy in the cyber realm and showed how these 
additional variables effect outcomes specific to cyber coercion. Second, this research 
provided a fused social science and cybersecurity method to understanding and obtaining 
attribution and surmount the purported obstacle that attribution poses to employing cyber 
coercion. Third, it provided evidence to support a Utilitarian theory of employing cyber 
coercion and showed that examining a cyber coercive act over time may provide 
additional data points and result in a different interpretation of the nature of a cyber 
coercive interaction. That is, a victim may modify their behavior later on, even if they do 
not immediately do so, and it is important to include the longer-term behavior changes 
when assessing the ramifications stemming from a coercive cyberattack. Last, this 
research showed that the conventional wisdom for two influential cases should be 
modified to account for the additional data gained by examining the case over a longer 
time period. These case studies have shown that it is the specific pressures involved in the 
coercive campaign that contribute to how and to what degree a victim may modify their 
behavior, that behavior may change over time, and it is not always to the benefit of the 
aggressor if this happens.   
The additional variables that favor cyber coercive acts audience costs, financial 
costs, leadership as a target with potential leadership destabilization, and pressure on 
leadership. The nature of the attack also matters. Amateurish attacks are not taken as 
seriously as a sophisticated attack. Short attacks do not exert as much pressure as long, 
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drawn out attacks. The victim’s concern over time is a significant factor; it is not just 
about their initial reaction it is how their motivation changes over time as the coercive 
cyber operation persists, the pressure builds, and financial and audience costs increase. 
Countervalue targets are often easier to attack and targeting leadership, with the goal of 
leadership destabilization, can contribute to a victim changing its behavior faster.  
This research provided a strategy to surmount the attribution obstacle. Bringing 
together Healey’s Spectrum of State Responsibility with Sharp’s Known Coercer model 
and combining that with the forensic cybersecurity technical data and analysis denoting 
intrusion cluster attribution and/or country attribution combines a social science method 
with the best practices from the commercial cybersecurity industry to determine 
attribution. This hybrid method provides a holistic approach to the problem of attribution, 
fusing the approaches of social science with the technical insight from cybersecurity 
based on commercial cybersecurity industry techniques, forensics and databasing. This 
attribution strategy means that the “insurmountable challenge of attribution” that some 
researchers rely on to say that assessing cyber coercion is impossible, is now possible.  
 The third original contribution of this research is to look at victim responses over 
time instead of simply looking at a single point in time. This research illustrated problems 
with the conventional wisdom that is centered on winners and losers in a cyber coercive 
act and showed that examining what factors contribute to a spectrum of victim responses 
over time produced a different result than the simplified, one instance look in time would 
suggest. Looking across different temporal values illuminates circumstances that previous 
scholarship has ignored where the victim later changed their behavior.  This is important 
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because it shows that the initial interpretation about how we understand the outcome of a 
coercive dyad can change drastically when viewed over a longer time period.  
 The in-depth nature of these case studies and the supporting evidence from 
cybersecurity forensics, primary and secondary documents and interviews with the 
leaders responsible for the decision-making lends confidence to the findings. This 
research advances a rethinking of how we analyze cyber coercive cases in terms of 
degrees of victim responses, and with the added perspective of looking at a case over 
time, the determination on what is effective and why may change drastically, instead of a 
simple binary interpretation. 
With respect to the financial costs, while targeting countervalue government 
targets means that the government will likely absorb the costs associated with the 
cyberattack, when targeting private industry, those costs are often passed on to the 
insurance industry.  Competent defense of a soft target’s cyber systems is a costly 
endeavor, especially when it includes training all personnel in cyber hygiene practices 
(i.e. not click on the wrong phishing link), in addition to expensive technical defenses. A 
commercial entity may find it easier to purchase insurance and pass the cost on to a third 
party instead of investing in their own cyber defenses.  Provided a company is insured, 




Implications for Future Policy Work 
In terms of future research, especially looking at policies centered on cyber 
statecraft applied to commercial soft targets, this research has revealed several avenues 
that merit further scholarly investigation.  One recommendation is a renewed focus on 
third wave cyber statecraft research; dispense with the concerns that cyber statecraft will 
cause massive destruction or that with no lethality it has no purpose and examine all the 
ways that states can use cyber statecraft to achieve its goals and for its benefit.  What 
other factors that contribute to successful cyber coercion can be discovered by examining 
additional cases in-depth? 
Targeting commercial, soft target entities for cyber statecraft purposes is a 
dangerous precedent from a policy perspective and requires a strong, punitive policy 
response. Both the Sony Pictures Entertainment and the Estonia case studies reveal a 
strategy that highlights the vulnerability of commercial entities and asserts that they are 
easier to target than a state. In addition, the lesson from the Sony Pictures cyberattack 
made the case for would-be coercers for a “hack and leak” strategy against commercial 
entities. While it might provide a means for a state to achieve its goals, targeting 
commercial entities and using hack and leak tactics is a destabilizing practice for 
offensive cyber operations, but also a critical perspective to understand for defensive 
cyber operations.   
Future policy work should include disincentives for the hack and leak model and 
related behaviors.  States ought to seek and work toward increased stability in cyberspace 
and that includes finding ways to disincentivize states from targeting commercial entities, 
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hacking and revealing their internal communications. Targeting commercial entities with 
cyberattacks does not increase cyberspace stability.  However, the Sony Pictures case 
study showed that in this particular dyad, with the distinct strategic decisions that North 
Korea made in the conduct of this cyberattack, it resulted in the victim partially changing 
its behavior. This means that disincentivizing this behavior, especially when it provides a 
modicum of effectiveness, can be very difficult. Furthermore, future policy work ought to 
address disincentives for the individuals who publish the stolen data and doxing 
information. While this is extremely difficult in practice, from a policy perspective it 
ought to be addressed.   
Taking the concept of policy disincentives a step further, it is one thing for a state 
to create policy to deter these activities inside its borders, but quite another for 
international agreements to codify these parameters and punishments and incorporate an 
enforcement mechanism. Future policy work ought to focus not only on creating policies 
to disincentivize this behavior but ensure wide adoption among states with a means to 
enforce and punish those who run afoul of it. 
In looking at the case of Estonia, the attacks on its digital infrastructure and 
commercial, soft targets were so extensive that identifying the victims and the magnitude  
of the cyberattacks was widely reported.  However, the commercial industry has learned 
and adapted; that is, they have learned that disclosing that they are the victim of a 
cyberattack can have financial consequences and have adapted by concealing this 
information from the public and, oftentimes, handing it quietly with their insurance 
company and/or cybersecurity incident response team.  Another area for future policy 
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work would be on public reporting requirements for commercial targets to disclose when 
they have been the victim of cyber coercion or cyberattacks so that a more accurate 
understanding of the broad use of this strategy as well as the specific tactics involved can 
be thoroughly understood and examined.   
Why is cyber statecraft and cyberattacks allowed to happen in the international 
system?  There are divergent paths that states are taking with regard to the approach to 
cyber statecraft: European powers are largely leaning toward creating international 
institutions to agree to norms of behavior and may act as a policing function. While other 
powers in the international system do not want to be restricted and/or do not see a value 
in participating in such institutions since their adversaries are not limited in how they 
exercise their cyber power.  Harkening back to the earlier discussion on Realism versus 
International Institutionalism illuminates the tension between these two schools of 
thought and can be applied to the notion of cyber statecraft.  Further, the chapter on the 
origins of the internet shows how difficult it is to police this ever-changing technological 
terrain, and that difficulty has significant policy implications.  
However, it is each state’s self-interest to invest in the stability of cyberspace and 
build a cooperative cybersecurity coalition. Doing so supports freedom of speech, 
protects the free flow of commerce, and allows for information sharing, while still 
providing options to use cyber statecraft. While there are states that are reluctant to sign 
on to agreements like the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, one policy 
recommendation would be to consider negotiating tiers of international agreements, with 
the goal to eventually have everyone sign on to the full agreement. The case study on 
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Russia versus Estonia showed that Russia was able to act with impunity at the time. That 
is not to say that signing onto an international agreement that lacks an enforcement 
mechanism would restrain a state, like Russia, who believed the cyber statecraft activity 
was in its best interest, but  
 In order to increase participation in cybersecurity institutions, work with 
countries who refuse to join to find out what the individual disagreement points are and 
find a negotiated solution, perhaps a tiered version of the agreement. It will allow these 
reluctant nations to be part of the conversation with the goal of eventually signing onto 
the full agreement.   
The cyber landscape is vast, constantly shifting and the policy world is rushing to 
catch up. As shown in the case studies, cyber coercion can impose high costs on a victim.  
Cyber resiliency, upgrading the internet infrastructure where possible, focusing on 
securing critical systems and improving cyber infrastructure defenses are policy areas 
that deserve additional attention. Similar to the attribution strategy laid out in this 
research, a policy recommendation is that a hybrid expertise approach would be most 
appropriate. That is, formulating policy to manage these issues should be devised by 
hybrid teams of policy experts and cybersecurity professionals in order to appropriately 
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